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**ENHANCING NATIONAL SECURITY IN HUNGARY
THROUGH THE DEVELOPMENT AND EMPLOYMENT
OF SPECIAL FORCES**

by

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June 2006

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ABSTRACT

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This thesis identifies and discusses the strategic factors considered when establishing Hungarian Special Forces (HUNSF) as a new capability for the Hungarian Defense Forces (HDF). Although the findings have a broad application, the focus has been on the Special Forces capability development in the Hungarian Defense Forces. The goal in this thesis was to find answers related to the thesis question of how will factors such as the strategic environment, changes in the nature of war and characteristics of potential adversaries affect the development of a conceptual framework for a successful Hungarian Special Forces capability? Of particular interest are factors found in the strategic environment of Hungary, the tasks of the HUNSF unit, the command and control relationship of the HUNSF capability and the training requirements of the HUNSF unit.

In Chapter II of the thesis provides an overall assessment on Hungary's security environment by analyzing the country's national interests and examining the expected missions of the HDF. Over the course of the analysis, the main features of the security environment of Hungary in terms of threats and subsequent requirements for the military and also collected the military tasks of the Hungarian Defense Forces in support of the policy goals of Hungary are examined. By analyzing Hungary's security environment and the National Military Strategy draft, along with the recently completed Defense Review, it is concluded that Hungary has reasonable need to develop a military capability to counter the new challenges (terrorism, regional instability, and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction) of a modern era. Moreover, at present the HDF is not fully prepared to face all aspects of these new security challenges. Understanding the nature of modern warfare and the possible future threats, the importance of the development of a military unit within the HDF that is capable of fighting in an asymmetric environment using both highly specialized conventional methods and unconventional warfare capability is highlighted. The thesis also points out that recognizing the need for this special military

unit and realizing that neighboring countries have also developed similar capabilities, the Hungarian policy makers have decided to establish a Special Forces capability within the HDF.

In Chapter III of this thesis, based upon the analysis of the current tasks of the HDF, the tasks for the Hungarian Special Forces are identified. This thesis introduces a framework for analysis to identify the appropriate tasks for HUNSF. With the application of this method, the national security challenges and the HDF military tasks are identified, taking into account the relevant NATO and EU SF requirements as well. The proposed tasks are then being analyzed and unconventional warfare (UW) combating terrorism (CBT), special reconnaissance (SR) and direct action (DA) are proposed as primary missions for HUNSF. Human intelligence (HUMINT), information operations (IO) and psychological operations (PSYOPS) are further identified as collateral tasks for HUNSF. Counter proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (CP of WMD) and civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) are proposed to be excluded from HUNSF tasks; nevertheless it is suggested that in relation with these tasks the decision should be made on a case-by-case basis as circumstances demand as to the level and form of participation of HUNSF. These identified tasks will form the basis of further analysis when other aspects of HUNSF (most importantly command and control and training) are taken into consideration throughout the thesis.

In Chapter IV of the thesis the requirements of command and control in relation to the HUNSF capability and argue for the creation of the Special Forces Coordination Office (SFCO) within the structure of the Defense Staff are analyzed. The argument is supported by multiple levels (strategic, operational and tactical) of analysis. It is also understood that Special Forces differ from the HDF GPF in many aspects; therefore, the development of the Hungarian Special Forces capability represents many unique challenges. These challenges can only be countered by specially trained personnel who understand the essence of Special Forces and have the attributes of a Special Forces soldier. Therefore, the main goal of the SFCO at the operational level should be to direct the HUNSF capability development process and to interact with all operational level agencies, the international community (most of all with SF organizations of NATO, the

EU), and the neighboring countries related to the development process as well. At the strategic level, the Hungarian military and political figures need to understand the exact capabilities, limitations and the correct use of HUNSF in order to be able to maximize its capacity. Therefore the Special Forces Coordination Office has the responsibility to keep the strategic level updated, correctly informed and provide expert advice to the policy makers in the Ministry of Defense. At the tactical level during the capability development phase the SFCO has to be the supervisor and coordinator towards the HUNSF unit. Last but not least, during operational deployment the SFCO should be able to provide control of HUNSF during operations.

In Chapter V of this thesis the core purpose and the training requirements of HUNSF are identified. The core purpose is to serve the nation in peacetime, conflict and war by accomplishing missions assigned by the National Command Authorities and the regional commanders in chief in enemy, denied, or sensitive areas, or in areas where the use of GPF is inappropriate using conventional and unconventional (working by with and through indigenous population) means in order to protect the population of Hungary and those of her Allies. Training requirements are based upon the identified mission and the multinational characteristics of the force. Moreover, training specifics related to unconventional warfare (language skills, cultural awareness, interpersonal skills and knowledge of the operational area) are emphasized.

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. PURPOSE AND SCOPE

The Hungarian Defense Forces need to develop a Special Forces capability. As a result of the Defense Review of the Hungarian Defense Forces (HDF) completed in 2002-2003, the transformation of the Defense Forces has recognized the need for a Special Forces capability within the HDF with an establishment of a Special Forces unit. Hungary's ultimate goal in developing a Special Forces capability is to carry out successful special operations to protect Hungary's national security interests. Taking into consideration that by 2009 the new SF unit and other elements contributing to the Hungarian Special Forces capability must achieve full operational capability, the purpose of this thesis is to suggest a conceptual framework for the successful development of the Hungarian Special Forces capability.¹ This thesis argues that the Special Forces in Hungary will contribute unique capabilities to national security, as well as improve the Hungarian military's capabilities in the international arena.

Therefore, a thesis question pertinent to the above is, how will factors such as the strategic environment, changes in the nature of war, and characteristics of Hungary's potential adversaries affect the development of a conceptual framework for a successful Hungarian Special Forces capability?

In this new millennium, asymmetric threats -- international terrorism being the most imminent of them -- have an increasing effect on Hungary's security environment. Global and regional challenges require an integrated civil-military effort with multinational military forces and civil agencies to preserve peace and stability in each region. The participation of the Hungarian Defense Forces in these efforts has been a priority and will continue to be so in the future. Hungary's national security interests at present are best served in "out-of-area" operations. These operations require the development of new civilian and military capabilities which can be rapidly deployed for a

¹ According to this thesis, the Hungarian Special Forces capability involves the Hungarian Special Forces unit and additionally includes all organizations necessary to sustain deployment and the command and control of the unit.

variety of missions and can be effectively employed to counter the emerging security challenges. Special Forces are optimally designed for these operations.

Based on the analysis of the contemporary security environment and in order to become a credible ally in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), it is essential for small members like Hungary to be able to make effective contributions towards the collective defense of the Alliance. For the relatively new and less resource-rich NATO members in Central Europe, the main goal is to develop a defense force that can fulfill fundamental national security needs, and at the same time fit in with the Alliance's basic interoperability requirements. Specialization -- to share the risks, responsibility and tasks -- is perceived as the norm of future Alliance missions. In response to future challenges, NATO countries developed the concept of "niche" capabilities. The Hungarian Special Forces (HUNSF) capability is a designated "niche" capability of the Hungarian Defense Forces (HDF). Therefore, the establishment of a HUNSF unit, which is capable of actively participating in and meeting future military challenges, is a priority task for the HDF.

Due to the nature of Special Forces, they can provide the National Command Authority with strategic utility in terms of economy of force, force multiplication, and expansion of options. In the future, the Hungarian Special Forces unit is going to be engaged in a variety of missions that the General Purpose Forces are not fully capable of carrying out, and will need to develop unique, salient capabilities (most importantly unconventional warfare capability) not found elsewhere within the HDF. A detailed discussion on the need and the definition of unconventional warfare capability and the role of Special Forces in using this capability will be provided in the third chapter of the thesis.

Since the HUNSF is a defense organization that was established in September 2005, the Hungarian Special Forces concept and identity is still under development. Therefore, the steps required to pave the way toward future successes include determining both the appropriate tasks and structural arrangements. Based upon the identified tasks, further characteristics of the HUNSF capabilities like training, as well as command and control requirements, will also be analyzed. To ensure consistency and

flexibility throughout the development process, this thesis introduces issues related to the culture and characteristics of Special Forces and incorporates a vision for HUNSF as well.

B. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY

This thesis fulfills its purpose in the following manner. First, a case is made explaining why the changes in the security environment of the Republic of Hungary necessitate the development of new military capabilities, with Special Forces being one of them. Second, the thesis identifies what is required to carry out successful special operations through analyzing command relationships and training of Special Forces.

This thesis is organized in a specific manner in order to support the development of a conceptual framework for the Hungarian Special Forces capability. Success in Special Forces is relatively hard to define. The intent is to analyze the factors that contribute to successful Special Forces operations. What are these factors? Three factors considered as especially important contributors to successful special operations are:

1. Clear national and theater strategic objectives.
2. Effective command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) support.
3. A force trained, equipped, and organized specifically to conduct special operations.

Based upon these contributing factors and following this structure, this thesis is divided into six chapters.

The introduction of the thesis will briefly examine the significant change in the security environment in the post Cold War period and introduce the increased role of the Special Forces in countering the newly emerging security challenges.

1. Clear National and Theater Strategic Objectives

The *first contributing factor* will be addressed in Chapters II and III by analyzing the main features of Hungary's current security environment and the major military tasks of the HDF, yet the cornerstone of the analysis is the identification of the primary and collateral tasks for the Hungarian Special Forces unit. In order to identify the primary and collateral tasks, this thesis uses a method based on the suggestions of Christopher Lamb. In his article, "Perspectives on Emerging SOF Roles and Missions," Lamb specifies that,

when tasking SF, one must take into consideration the nature of the security environment, the country's national security documents, and the nature of the forces themselves.²

However, before proposing new tasks, one should seriously consider some questions. Therefore, this thesis will find answers to the following five questions in order to positively determine the appropriate primary and collateral tasks for the Hungarian Special Forces Unit.

1. Given that Hungary is a NATO ally and a member of the European Union (EU), what are the main features of the country's security environment in terms of threats and subsequent requirements for the military?
2. In light of the guidance provided by Hungarian national security documents, what are the major military tasks of the Hungarian Defense Forces to support the policy goals of the country?
3. What requirements from the Hungarian National and Military Strategy must be incorporated into the HUNSF tasks and what are the NATO and EU SF requirements?
4. Which of the identified SF tasks can be accomplished by the Hungarian General Purpose Forces (GPF) or other security services, and which are the HUNSF tasks?
5. Which of the identified HUNSF tasks are appropriate?

Chapter II of the thesis focuses on Hungary's security environment. In answering the first question, the thesis provides an analysis of the Hungarian National Security Strategy (NSS) and Hungary's responsibilities as a member of NATO and the EU. In answering the second question, the thesis lists the major military tasks of Hungary through the analysis of the National Military Strategy (NMS) and the 2003 Defense Review.³

The third chapter determines the principal tasks of the Hungarian Special Forces unit. With the subsequent application of the analysis method, this thesis answers the third, fourth and fifth questions in order to propose HUNSF tasks that not only are suitable for

² Christopher Lamb, "Perspectives on Emerging SOF Roles and Missions," *Special Warfare*, (July, 1995), 3.

³ The Hungarian National Security Strategy can be accessed at <http://www.mfa.gov.hu/kum/ku/bal/Kulpolitikank/Biztonsagpolitika/>; Internet; accessed October 2004. The National Military Strategy as a complete document was not accepted by the Parliament yet. The authors, however, are in the possession of a printed draft version of the document. The Defense Review itself is a classified document, yet a summary of the review was published on the Internet, which explains many aspects of the review and its results. The summary was used as the basis for analysis in this thesis, <http://www.honvedelem.hu/cikk.php?cikk=13869&next=0&archiv=1&next=0>; Internet; accessed August 2004.

the requirements of the security challenges that cannot be executed by General Purpose Forces (GPF) or other security agencies, but that support Hungary's defense policy goals and fit well into the country's security environment.

2. Effective C4I Support at the Operational Level

The second contributing factor of this thesis will be addressed in Chapter IV where the authors provide an analysis of the requirements of the command and control relationships. It is not only the National Command Elements that are required to be looked upon, but it is also important to analyze the future place of HUNSF capabilities within the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Union as well, because the HUNSF will most probably be deployed as part of a larger multinational force. In this part of the thesis, the doctrinal as well as the intelligence requirements of the HUNSF capabilities will be analyzed.

3. A Force Trained, Equipped, and Organized to Conduct Special Operations

The third contributing factor of this thesis will be addressed in Chapter V where, based on the analysis of different successful foreign Special Forces Units' selection and training requirements, the HUNSF selection and training concept will be introduced. However, it is not enough to study the present selection and training, as future needs have to be taken into account. Therefore, conclusions have to be made and incorporated into the training process of the HUNSF in order to be able to meet future needs. The training of Special Forces personnel takes two to three years, and by the time they are ready to be deployed, the operational environment can differ from the one during which they started their training. Therefore, special attributes have to be emphasized in order to ensure successful operations in the future. In order to ensure consistency for the HUNSF in the future, the third part of the thesis provides an analysis of the future needs, core purpose, main characteristics and the correct use of the HUNSF capability and proposes a vision for the HUNSF unit.

The conclusion of this thesis will highlight the main points of the research and provide an overall review.

C. SECURITY CHALLENGES IN THE POST COLD WAR ERA

With the end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union, new security challenges have emerged and dramatically changed the global security environment. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 irrevocably altered the international security environment. Only a decade after the conclusion of the Cold War, a new global strategic menace has surfaced, “the threat posed by the nexus of international terrorist organizations, the countries that aid these groups, and the potential access of these actors to weapons of mass destruction.”⁴ The enemy is not only a single conventional military threat any more; “the enemy now is terrorism. Premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against innocents.”⁵ Besides terrorism, small-scale wars, regional conflicts, state failures, and organized crime make the world’s security far less stable than it was during the Cold War. In addition, these conditions are most likely connected to each other and one may generate another. “Regional conflict can lead to extremism, terrorism, and state failure; it also often provides opportunities for organized crime.”⁶ Although Armed Forces have become better in conventional maneuver warfare, potential future opponents more than likely will turn to unconventional insurgency in what is often called asymmetric, insurgent, guerrilla, terrorist, or “knowledge-based” war. These “unconventional low intensity conflicts, complex emergencies, ethnic wars, and small-scale contingencies threaten the security and stability of the global community.”⁷

Since some rogue states and non-state actors are unable to counter the Western powers in the conventional field of war, they are likely to use asymmetric means to pursue their agenda. In essence, asymmetric warfare is a way of “acting, organizing, and thinking differently” from one’s opponent.⁸ Asymmetric warfare demands sophisticated planning, a thorough understanding of the adversary’s strengths and weaknesses, and the

⁴ Nathaniel Bailey, “NATO and the War on Terrorism: Objectives and Obstacles,” Naval Postgraduate School thesis, March 2004, 35.

⁵ The White House, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html>; Internet; accessed August 2004.

⁶ Council of the European Union, *European Security Strategy*, <http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf>; Internet; accessed August 2004.

⁷ Max Manwaring, “Shadows of Things Past and Images of the Future: Lessons for the Insurgencies in Our Midst,” November 2004, <http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi/>; Internet; accessed August 2004.

⁸ Steven Metz, Douglas V. Johnson II, “Asymmetry and US Military Strategy: Definition, Background and Strategic Concepts,” *Strategic Studies Institute* (Carlisle, Pa) January 2001, 5.

ability to attack with a number of techniques, weapons and technologies at several levels at once. The goals of asymmetric warfare are to deny and degrade the enemy's capabilities, to destroy and disrupt the enemy's systems, and to dislocate and dislodge the enemy's political will.⁹

The perpetrators of asymmetric threats (terrorists, insurgents and rogue states) understand that they cannot confront the technologically developed armies of the democratic countries by conventional means. Therefore, they often choose to employ unconventional methods to achieve their goals and satisfy their political agenda and ideology. This warfighting method has been proven successful in the past against big conventional armies and is expected to be increasingly employed in the future.

The democratic countries have to be able to counter this effort and develop a successful military capability in order to fight future wars. Based on numerous historical examples, this thesis suggests that unconventional warfare seems to be a viable military answer to the above mentioned challenges. As part of the development of military responses, Special Forces were created in many European countries and tasked to master unconventional warfare skills.

D. ROLE OF THE SPECIAL FORCES IN THE CURRENT SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

The role of the Special Forces has increased dramatically in recent conflicts. Especially in Afghanistan and Iraq, Special Forces are operating in large numbers on a daily basis. Meanwhile they are being used worldwide on other fronts of the Global War on Terror (GWOT) as well, including many countries in Asia and Latin America. The U.S. Army FM 3-05.20 Special Forces Operations Manual defines special operations as "actions that specially organized, trained, and equipped military and paramilitary forces take to achieve military, political, economic, or informational objectives by unconventional military means in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive areas of the world."¹⁰ Special Operations Forces (SOF) are "specialized military units that can be

⁹ David L. Grange, "Asymmetric warfare: Old Method, New Concern," *The Officer* 77, March 2001, 31-32.

¹⁰ U.S. Army FM 3-05.20, Special Forces Operations Manual, "Introduction," http://www.army.mil/usapa/doctrine/31_Series_Collection_1.html; Internet; accessed May 2005.

deployed in a very short notice through land, sea, or air to conduct a wide variety of operations.”¹¹ Why do Special Forces provide a viable solution for the security challenges of our era?

Conventional forces win by sheer numbers, better executed maneuvers, and through the use of air power and firepower. SOF contributes to victory by achieving objectives that are conducive to their skills, weapons, tactics, training, physical fitness and organization. There are two things that create a demand for an increase in the size of the SF. One is public opinion, which has a direct influence on the political leadership. The public perception is that Special Forces are the answer to all mysterious enemies, especially of the unconventional type. The public, therefore, expects that SOF will be utilized to a greater extent than the conventional military in an asymmetric conflict.

The other pull originates from the views of military theorists and thinkers, who shape the views of the military leadership and the bureaucracy. Contemporary military intellectuals are increasingly advocating the view that the problems of asymmetric warfare require manpower skills and not technology. The soldiers, to deal with the new security challenges, should be skilled and integrated into well-trained troops possessing area expertise, linguists in far greater numbers, and specialists in civic action and nation building, as well as guerrilla warfare. This requirement very much resembles the characteristics of Special Forces.

Special Forces have a strategic reach. They can respond faster to contingencies because of their small size and ethos and deploy for an operation from a cold start. They have enhanced language and cultural skills and the ability to quickly adapt to changing operating conditions. They have an independent direct-action capability. They also have the training and equipment to conduct operations that involve human intelligence collection. Therefore, they can significantly contribute to the intelligence collection on the battlefield. They leave a small footprint, and as a result, they are the preferred means of the employment of force where political or strategic conditions dictate a need. Special

¹¹ Congressional Research Service, Report for Congress: “Special Operations Forces in Operation Enduring Freedom: Background and Issues for Congress,” October 15, 2001.

Forces can task-organize better to suit the mission requirements because of the mix of specialists in each team. They have a higher endurance level than conventional forces because of their selection and training.

As a result of all these factors, SOF are expected to play the roles of both direct-action ‘door-kickers and the winners of hearts and minds.

E. CONCLUSION

International terrorist networks and rogue states will continue to be a considerable threat to the regional security of Hungary in the foreseeable future. The post Cold War environment requires the militaries of the developed countries to restructure their military capabilities in order to be better prepared to counter today’s unconventional threats. Based on the recent security strategy of NATO and the EU, and considering the future needs of the security environment, Hungary needs to develop special military capabilities in order to meet future challenges. One of the most important of these capabilities is the unconventional warfare capability.

Unconventional warfare (UW) is a proven method for countering asymmetric threats and will play an important role in meeting security challenges in the future. Based upon the findings of this thesis, the General Purpose Forces of the Hungarian Defense Forces will not be able to acquire sufficient capabilities in this area. Therefore, this thesis advocates that the distinctive capabilities of the HUNSF provide a viable military option for a variety of operational tasks that are inappropriate or infeasible for conventional forces.

This thesis also highlights the incorporation of the UW capability as a salient task of the Hungarian Special Forces unit. Special Forces are “uniquely qualified to deal with the asymmetric unconventional threat.”¹² Unconventional warfare is the most important aspect, where the uniqueness of HUNSF can best be exploited in the future. From a Special Forces point of view, the goal of UW should be to help win a war by working with, as opposed to neutralizing or fighting against, local populations. UW represents a classical indirect and ultimately local approach to waging warfare, which is the most successful fighting method against networked asymmetric enemies.

¹² David Galland, “U.S. Special Forces Enter the Intelligence World,” <http://globalspecops.com/sfintel.html>, Internet; accessed December 2004.

The establishment of Special Forces within the HDF serves multiple purposes. It serves the country's national interests, and as a "niche" capability, it contributes to the collective defense tasks of NATO as well. The main purpose of this thesis is to suggest a conceptual framework for the Hungarian Special Forces by examining the existing capability gaps in the HDF and determining the tasks for the Special Forces unit. Moreover, the analysis of other noteworthy organizational areas like the training requirements and command and control of the Special Forces will serve the purpose of supporting the ongoing capability development by providing suggestions and planning guidelines to decision makers in the Hungarian Defense Forces. This thesis can also be looked upon as an educational guideline for those soldiers of the Hungarian Defense Forces who wish to elaborate their knowledge on the true nature of Special Forces missions, tasks, command and control, and training.

Carrying out complex missions with strategic importance requires important organizational changes. The conclusions that come out of this thesis indicate that the HUNSF should incorporate unconventional warfare (UW), combating terrorism (CBT), special reconnaissance (SR), and direct action (DA) as primary tasks with additional tasks like human intelligence (HUMINT), information operations (IO), and psychological operations (PSYOPS) included as collateral tasks for the HUNSF unit. Counter-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (CP of WMD) and civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) are proposed to be excluded from HUNSF tasks. Nevertheless, it is suggested that in relation to these tasks, the decision should be made on a case-by-case basis as circumstances demand and decide the level and form of participation of HUNSF.

In the future, the HUNSF should develop into a centralized and joint SF service. By adopting a flexible organizational configuration and acquiring proficiency in the fields related to its missions, HUNSF will be able to conduct special operations, both independently representing the interests of Hungary and (during deployments) in combined scenarios with Allied forces as well. The centerpiece of the future organization is the Special Forces Coordinating Office (SFCO) that incorporates specially-trained military personnel who understand the essence of Special Forces. Moreover, because HUNSF is most likely going to be employed in a multinational environment, the Special Forces Coordination Office should build a working relationship with the international

Special Forces community, especially with the SF managerial level organizations of NATO, the EU and neighboring countries. The Hungarian executive level political and military leadership need to understand the exact capabilities, limitations and the correct use of HUNSF in order to be able to maximize its capacity. Thus, the Special Forces Coordination Office has the responsibility to keep the executives updated and provide expert advice to the policy makers in the Ministry of Defense. The third main area of the Special Forces Coordination Office's responsibilities is to plan, supervise, and distribute tasks to the tactical level (the operator level of the HUNSF unit) itself. Other than cooperation, the Special Forces Coordination Office has the responsibility to oversee and direct the HUNSF doctrinal development process as well as all educational and Public Relations activities related to the Hungarian Special Forces.

The intelligence architecture within a Special Forces structure is also one of its fundamental components. In a constantly changing security environment, if one can be well informed and prepared, one can achieve victory over the enemy. Therefore, it is important to emphasize that the HUNSF unit will not only benefit from tight incorporation into the intelligence cycle of the Hungarian intelligence community, but the SF soldier can be an important contributor as well towards the very same intelligence community.

Lessons learned from recent conflicts where Special Forces soldiers were extensively used (Iraq and Afghanistan) call for placing a special emphasis on training. The type of warfare being conducted in these theatres illustrates the need for SF leaders and soldiers who must adapt if they are to succeed. Therefore, it is imperative for HUNSF soldiers to have the ability to be adaptive and flexible. Moreover, in order to better counter the new security challenges, future HUNSF soldiers must be skilled in the political, psychological, technological, and intelligence-collection techniques that are the primary weapons of asymmetric warfare. All these aspects are reflected in the proposed training.

In a defense environment where resources are scarce, military planners should extract maximum value for the money spent on new capabilities. In fact, the argument suggests that the development of the Hungarian Special Forces capability is an optimal

investment in the current situation for multiple reasons to be seen in this thesis. The development of Special Forces in Hungary; therefore, is not only a necessity originating from the demands of the changing security environment, but also a smart choice for a transforming defense force which is looking for the development of cost-effective solutions with a high security leverage of return investment.

II. HUNGARY'S STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT, FUTURE THREATS, AND CHALLENGES

The purpose of the first part of this thesis (Chapters II and III) is to identify and propose primary and collateral tasks for the Hungarian Special Forces Unit. In order to identify these tasks, the security environment of Hungary will be analyzed. The analysis method used in this thesis and in this chapter will address the following two questions:

1. What are the main features of the country's security environment in terms of threats and subsequent requirements for the military?
2. What are the major military tasks of the Hungarian Defense Forces to support the policy goals of the country?

The goal of this chapter is to provide an overall assessment of Hungary's security environment by analyzing the country's national interests and examining the expected missions of the Hungarian Defense Forces (HDF). The National Security Strategy provides a framework for the analysis of the Hungarian national security interests. Nevertheless, the present role of NATO and the EU has to be taken into consideration as well, as the international environment has a determinant effect on Hungary's security. Arguably, and due to its smaller power base, a small nation's strategic environment is, to a larger extent, determined by world events and the leniency of larger nations more than its own influence. Hungary is no exception, and the following assumptions are true and especially important from the point of view of their further analysis:

- Hungary's security is highly dependent on the member states' continued commitment to NATO.
- Hungary should contribute to preserve and strengthen NATO both politically and militarily and, thereby, also secure continued transatlantic cooperation.
- Hungary should actively participate in the development of the crisis management mechanisms in the EU.

The Hungarian National Military Strategy and the conclusions of the recently completed Defense Review are the cornerstone documents for analyzing the major military tasks of the HDF. The Defense Review in Hungary is especially important because it has a determining effect on the Hungarian military-thinking and the future roles of the HDF as a credible member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

A. SECURITY STRATEGY OF HUNGARY

The security environment of Hungary has changed drastically in the past two decades. Therefore, the Hungarian National Security Strategy has gone through several changes and today NATO and the EU membership have a determinant influence on this fundamental document. The Hungarian Parliament adopted Resolution 94/1998 (XII. 29.) regarding the Basic Principles of the Security and Defense Policy of the Republic of Hungary on December 29, 1998. The Annex of the Resolution is the new National Security Strategy. It refers back to Resolution 94/1998 (XII. 29.), which briefly analyzes the regulatory antecedents relating to the security environment with special regard to the NATO Strategic Concept of 1999, and to the European Security Strategy adopted by the EU in 2003.

As support for this line of reasoning and in order to answer the first question, this thesis examines Hungary's obligations as an independent nation and a member of NATO and the EU. This 'triad' forms the cornerstone of today's Hungarian security policy; therefore, these three areas will form the basis of the analysis. The Hungarian National Security Strategy states "Hungary's membership in the European Union and NATO entails both obligations to adapt and adjust itself and the opportunity of participating in decision-making and common action."¹³

This section of the thesis shows the connection between the Allied and national security interests, as well as the security documents.

1. The Transformation of the Hungarian Security Environment

The transformation of the social and political system of Hungary, which belonged to the military and political framework of the Warsaw Treaty, and the recognition of the necessity of the accession to the North Atlantic Treaty among the antecedents related to the accession of Hungary to NATO, is a historical topic already elaborated in many studies. That's why this thesis refers to - as the first milestone leading to NATO membership - the termination of the Warsaw Treaty on July 1, 1991, facilitated by an

¹³ A Magyar Köztársaság Nemzeti Biztonsági Stratégiája (Hungarian National Security Strategy), "Chapter II - Security environment," http://www.kulugyminiszterium.hu/archivum/Kulugyminiszterium/HU/Miniszerium/Szervezeti_egysegek/NATO/Nemzeti_biztonsagi_strategia.htm, Internet, last accessed April 2006.

essential Hungarian contribution to the new Strategic Concept of NATO, elaborated in November 1991. For Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic, who were the most prepared candidates to join NATO, 1997 was the year when the decisions on their membership were made in the Madrid summit meeting. The ministers of foreign affairs of NATO countries signed the protocols of NATO enlargement in December of that year.

As a member of NATO, and following the amendment of the Constitution in the end of 2003, the Hungarian Defense Forces participated in a broad range of operations. The Article 40/C, transferred the right of permission on engagement of Defense Forces at home or abroad and of troop movements, based on the decision of the North Atlantic Council, to the competence of the government. This change is fundamentally important, as it provides wide flexibility when bringing the internal legislative acts necessary for the implementation of the Allied operations. These missions suppose the existence of a massive material supply, wide human resources, and a technical background. The latest ambition is to reach and keep up a 1,000 troop-strong permanent contingent for NATO and non-NATO-led operations.

Since 1990, Hungary has participated in all major regional conflicts and sent troops to the Balkans, Afghanistan and Iraq. Figure 1 represents Hungary's recent troop deployments. It is understood that this commitment will continue in the future as well; therefore, the HDF has to plan its new capabilities in accordance with this requirement and the new Special Forces capability has to be integrated into the already existing organizations.




Figure 1. Hungarian Soldiers Deployed in Low Intensity Conflicts¹⁴

2. The Basic Principles of Security of the Republic of Hungary

Parallel with the mentioned steps taken towards NATO membership, Hungarian domestic legislation prepared for the accession as well. The Parliament adopted Resolution 94/1998 (XII. 29.) regarding the Basic Principles of the Security and Defense Policy of the Republic of Hungary on December 29, 1998, which replaced Resolution 11/1993 (III. 12.) regarding the Basic Principles of the Security Policy of the Republic of Hungary on one hand, and Resolution 27/1993 (IV. 23.) regarding the Basic Principles of the Defense of the Republic of Hungary, on the other hand. These earlier rules provided the necessary foundation for the elaboration of the first legislative work of determining importance after the change of the social system, and up to 2004 the Act. CX. of 1993 on National Defense.

¹⁴ The figure represented here was based on data provided by the J3 current ops department of the Hungarian Defense Forces, Defense Staff briefing in 2005.

The Basic Principles of the Defense, effective from April 1993 to the accession to NATO, aimed at the organization and guarantee of the defense of the country. The Parliament at that time found exclusive guarantee in preserving of the independence and sovereignty of the country. These Basic Principles, when referring to the analysis of the security environment, did not exclude the possibility of a total war; however, they declared the decreasing nature of its possibility.

In comparison with that, the membership of Hungary in NATO has brought a penetrating change. As the member of an alliance system, Hungary cannot interpret in an unchanged manner the definition of security. Resolution 94/1998 (XII. 29.), which entered into force on the day of the accession, provided a new regulation of the basic topics of the two already mentioned resolutions.

Based upon the analysis of the contemporary security environment of Hungary and the new National Security Strategy, this thesis states that Hungary's security situation is stable. This stability is also guaranteed by different security cooperation taking place within the framework of NATO and the EU. The National Security Strategy states, "Hungary is not threatened by military aggression, and the risk of any other traditional type of threat is also minimal."¹⁵ The security environment also reflects a different type of threat that is in cooperation with new global challenges and threats. According to Hungary's National Security Strategy, "[the new threat] can only be effectively addressed through a governmental stance that co-ordinates our national efforts, and a well-focused development of our capabilities and their flexible application, as well as through wide-ranging international co-operation."¹⁶ The National Security Strategy points out that besides traditional nation-state actors, "the so-called non-state actors (international organizations, transnational companies, non-governmental organizations, as well as international criminal and terrorist groups) are playing an ever-increasing role in security policy."¹⁷

¹⁵ A Magyar Köztársaság Nemzeti Biztonsági Stratégiája (Hungarian National Security Strategy), "Introduction," http://www.kulugyminiszterium.hu/archivum/Kulugyminiszterium/HU/_Miniszterium/Szervezeti_egysegek/NATO/Nemzeti_biztonsagi_strategia.htm, Internet, accessed April 2006.

¹⁶ Ibid, Introduction.

¹⁷ Ibid, Chapter II - Security environment.

These new types of security challenges and threats are more multi-fold, less visible, and less predictable compared to the traditional military threat during the Cold War. Among the security challenges that were defined by the National Security Strategy, one can find a collection of those that can have an impact on the development of the Special Forces capability in Hungary. In other words, the Special Forces in Hungary will likely be called upon to participate in the military aspects of countering the challenges listed below:

- Terrorism.
- Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
- Unstable regions, failed states.
- Illegal migration.
- Regional challenges (under regional challenges the National Security Strategy understands the possible threat from Central Europe, South-Eastern Europe, Mediterranean, Near East and Middle East).
- Political and religious extremism.

3. The New National Security Strategy

The new National Security Strategy (thereafter referred to as NSS) was adopted on March 31, 2004, and took effect on April 15, 2004. It defines and analyzes the country's security environment, risk factors, challenges, and tasks that have an impact on the national security interests in the international political arena of the 21st century. The NSS is an overall conception which comprehends the whole society, and has political, economic and military elements which have directly and immediately affected the security of the country. It determines the foundation of the national military strategy as well.

The NSS consists of five main parts. The first part is named Values and Interests, the second The Global Challenges, the third Goals and Tasks, the fourth The Means of the Implementation of the National Security Strategy, and the fifth is named Sector Strategies.

According to Chapter One of the National Security Strategy, the Republic of Hungary continues broadly interpreting security in conformity with NATO's general definition of security. The Strategy emphasizes, besides the traditional political and

defense factors, the economic and environmental elements, the social factor—and within that the human rights and ethnical rights factors. The Strategy stresses the importance of the respect of peace, stability, sovereignty, democracy, legality, free enterprise, human rights and fundamental freedoms as well.

Hungary furthermore declares as its national interest the preserving of its sovereignty, territorial integrity and constitutional order, the stability of the country and its economy, social and cultural development, and the forming of a security environment. Hungary is interested in the maintenance of international peace and security, because this is the environment wherein the values mentioned above can be preserved and developed.

The aim of the extension of the integration in the frame of the European Union and the reference to the equality of the member states as new elements also appear in the NSS. The EU membership has evidently brought the necessity that the resolution contains the enhancement of the effectiveness of common foreign and security policy, and tightly connected to it the strengthening of the European Security and Defense Policy.

The National Security Strategy builds on and around the basic principles of the country's security and defense policy. The Hungarian National Security Strategy identifies in ten points Hungary's national security values and interests. Among these, the fourth and fifth points advocate the importance of the European Union and NATO. As a member country in both organizations, Hungary sees the future's security in the preservation of these alliances. The importance of Hungary's membership within these organizations will be discussed later in detail. The ninth point suggests that Hungary's interest is to keep a "durable stability in the Euro-Atlantic region, a comprehensive settlement of conflicts in the region and the suppression of threats to the security of the region, in particular terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction."¹⁸

It can be concluded that Hungary's range of security risks has increased in proportion with the broader definition of security, which was also effected by the

¹⁸ A Magyar Köztársaság Nemzeti Biztonsági Stratégiája (Hungarian National Security Strategy), "Chapter I – Interests and values," http://www.kulugyminiszterium.hu/archivum/Kulugyminiszterium/HU/Miniszterium/Szervezeti_egysegek/NATO/Nemzeti_biztonsagi_strategia.htm, Internet, accessed April 2006.

country's membership in NATO and the EU. In defining the security challenges for the country, the National Security Strategy also provides a framework in countering the defined challenges. The third chapter (Objectives and Tasks) states that Hungary will be able to actively shape its security situation and environment only if it develops its capabilities in a deliberate manner, exploits the advantages offered by integration, and makes flexible use of the means and resources available, adapting to the changes. Besides NATO and the EU, other international organizations, such as the United Nations and OSCE (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe), also have an important role in forming Hungary's security and foreign policy. The National Security Strategy clearly states that an effective response can be achieved in countering the abovementioned security challenges through an oversight by these international organizations.

The National Security Strategy also defines the general goal of the Hungarian Defense Forces, which in turn has an effect in designing the operational framework and the capabilities of the HUNSF as well:

The Hungarian Defense Forces need to possess rapidly deployable and sustainable forces suited for flexible use and available also for expeditionary operations that are able to co-operate with allied forces and can be used in crisis spots without any geographical limitations. The necessary capabilities need to be developed in a way co-coordinated with NATO, co-coordinating force contributions committed in the NATO and EU framework, and by making use of the opportunities lying in bi- and multilateral international co-operation and development programs. The goal is to develop an armed force that is new in the sense of operational philosophy, able to fulfill the commitments made to NATO that is financially affordable, capability-based and specialized.¹⁹

The basic document for the Hungarian Defense Forces, defined by the National Security Strategy, is the National Military Strategy. The National Military Strategy will be analyzed later in this chapter.

¹⁹ A Magyar Köztársaság Nemzeti Biztonsági Stratégiája (Hungarian National Security Strategy), "Chapter III – Objectives and tasks," http://www.kulugyminiszterium.hu/archivum/Kulugyminiszterium/HU/Miniszterium/Szervezeti_egysegek/NATO/Nemzeti_biztonsagi_strategia.htm, Internet, last accessed April 2006.

4. The Effect of EU Membership on the Hungarian Security Environment

The European Union's policy and its Security and Defense Strategy have a determining effect on Hungary's National Security Strategy. The European Security Strategy claims, "No single country is able to tackle today's complex problems on its own. Europe should be ready to share in the responsibility for global security and in building a better world."²⁰ The current situation is that the European Union is capable of conducting mainly crisis-management operations. As a service of the European Security Strategy, European forces have already been deployed abroad in Afghanistan, East Timor, the Balkans, and in the Democratic Republic of Congo.

The missions assigned to the EU military force were taken from the Petersberg Declaration of June 1992. The Petersberg Tasks presently include "humanitarian and rescue tasks; peacekeeping tasks; and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking - referred to as 'peace enforcement' in some contexts."²¹ The military capabilities of the European Union were identified at the December 1999 Helsinki Council meeting. The document requires EU members to be able to deploy 60,000 troops within 60 days, and the troops should be sustainable for at least a year.

The Declaration of the European Council (Seville, June 2002) defined the contribution of the Common Security and Foreign Policy (CSFP) and the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) in the Global War on Terror (GWOT).²² One of the significant achievements of the European Council is the implementation of the Plan of Action to fight terrorism. Following the September 11, 2001 terror attack on the United States, the European Union further strengthened the cooperation among the member states and the United States to fight against terrorism. The Union will continue to maintain the closest possible coordination with the United States and other partners.

²⁰ Council of the European Union, European Security Strategy, <http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf>; Internet; accessed August 2004, 3.

²¹ Gustav Lindstrom, "The Headline Goal", European Union Institute for Security Studies, [article online]; available from <http://www.iss-eu.org/esdp/05-gl.pdf>; Internet; accessed March 2004.

²² Martin Ortega, "Petersberg tasks, and missions of the European Force", European Union Institute for Security Studies; [article online]; available from <http://www.iss-eu.org/esdp/04-mo.pdf>; Internet; accessed January 2005.

In May 2004, the EU defense ministers again adopted a new plan, known as Headline Goal 2010, and it predicts that by the year 2010, the EU has to be able to respond with rapid and decisive action and apply a fully coherent approach to the whole spectrum of crisis management operations covered by the Treaty of the European Union.²³

Based upon the analysis of the abovementioned documents, it can be concluded that the following capabilities are especially important for the future forces of the European Union:

1. Combating terrorism and strengthening international cooperation as the essential instrument of the GWOT.
2. Carry out a single corps-sized crisis management task while retaining enough assets to conduct other small-scale operations such as a non-combatant evacuation operation (NEO).
3. Conduct long-term operations at less than maximum level of effort, while conducting another operation of a limited duration.

5. The EU 2003 Security Strategy

In order to have a better understanding of the security environment of Hungary, it is also useful to introduce the parallels and contrasts between the EU 2003 Security Strategy and the Hungarian National Security Strategy. It can be stated that the EU is not a military alliance today, though its Constitution – with its adoption being subjected to referenda in EU member states – contains such obligations for them which overlap the obligations of the so-called collective defense. In relation to the European Union and NATO, refer back to the European Security and Defense Identity initiative in NATO's 1999 Strategic Concept.

The EU document stresses the difficulties of the separation of the internal and external security, while the challenges emerging together with the globalization get special attention. The motto of the EU “United in variety,” especially fits these contexts. That’s why this thesis outlines the similarities and differences of the EU and the National Security Strategy.

²³ Gustav Lindstrom, “The Headline Goal,” European Union Institute for Security Studies; [article online]; available from <http://www.iss-eu.org/esdp/05-gl.pdf>; Internet; accessed March 2004.

a. Similarities

The EU document, like the Hungarian National Security Strategy, does not suppose the possibility of direct conventional aggression against member states. It emphasizes international terrorism, the cooperation between failed states and organized criminal groups, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and the effects of the regional conflicts as the main security risks of the contemporary world. It attributes significant importance to the security problems connected to poverty, the fight for natural resources, and the increasing dependence on energy.

Both in the EU Strategy and Chapter Two of the Hungarian NSS, the new threats, usually of a global character, are more variable and less visible than the conventional ones. The “blurring” of the border between the internal and external risk factors is a typical trend, during which the individual risk factors emerge not separately, but strengthen each other on global, regional, and internal levels.

The “Global Challenges” section outlines the essence of the terrorism: proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, unstable regions, lack of economic stability, challenges of information society, and the security risk thereof. The appearance of illegal migration in a separate paragraph is a new element. The international processes, regional wars and the large economic and welfare differences among the states have made the migration issue a global challenge. As a consequence of the stricter migration policy of the traditional receiving states, and Hungary’s membership in the EU, Hungary has transformed from a transit country to a destination country.

The EU Strategy affirms that contemporary threats might not be repulsed by military means only. The Hungarian NSS also stresses the importance – as values to be protected – of the enduring stability of the Euro-Atlantic region, the retaining of terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, as well as the constructive cooperation of states, international organizations, and national and international non-governmental organizations.

The Security Strategy of the EU must fulfill an integrating role among the member states, and it calls upon the rationalization of resources to be used for security purposes. This appears in the strategies of the member states, including the Hungarian

NSS, and defines the goal of integration. Among the pillars of the EU, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (and its tool, the European Security and Defense Policy) is the second in the line of pillars, with the economic cooperation being more influential.

b. Differences

The European Security Strategy goes beyond the domestic concepts in such a way that it details the strategic ambitions in a more coherent manner, which appears as recommendations for the member states. The three recommendations represent three different levels. The local level does not mean the establishment of internal security, as the member states endeavor to realize it for their own interest. Similarly, an important interest for the EU is the administration stability of its immediate neighbors. The EU has to undertake a role in stabilizing them (political, economic cooperation, support of investments, etc.). Other exposed tasks are related to the asymmetric threats (e.g., combating terrorism). Europe cannot look passively on the events which have influence on its security. It must take the necessary and perhaps preventive measures, with some being initiated after the events of September 11, 2001—the enhanced border-controlling and intelligence activities being relevant examples. The document identifies the establishment of an international security system as the third major goal. Security cannot be granted exclusively by the strict control and maintenance of strong military potential. The whole system of prospering economies is interested in preserving its reached results, enhancing effectiveness, and stabilizing its position in the market. States which do not accept these foundations could count on their relationship with the EU receding.

The size of the EU document is hardly half of the Hungarian Strategy. It exemplifies that the joint representation of the initiatives connected with security in a structure composed by many states is a sensitive point indeed. The main point of the EU Strategy is based on global security, while the domestic NSS document elaborates the local level risks on internal security more thoroughly.

The threats the European Union foresees are more diverse, dynamic, less visible, and less predictable. Countering these threats require the first line of defense to be abroad. Among the key threats, terrorism has top priority. “Europe is both a target and a base for such terrorism: European countries are targets and have been attacked.

Logistical bases for Al Qaeda cells have been uncovered in the UK, Italy, Germany, Spain, and Belgium. Concerted European action is indispensable.”²⁴ The worst-case scenario is a weapon of mass destruction in the hands of terrorists, in which case, a small group could cause enormous damage.

It also has to be emphasized that the EU membership does not decrease the importance of Hungary’s interest to participate in NATO’s Euro-Atlantic security initiatives. In fact, the Hungarian Government reaffirms the necessity of the military presence of the United States in Europe and supports its active role in granting security of the region, and calls for the further enlargement of NATO on the basis of common values and interests.

6. The Effects of NATO Membership on the Hungarian Security Environment

Hungary’s NATO membership has not brought a radical change in the interpretation of the definition of security. The terms used in Resolution 94/1998 were also laid out in the NATO 1999 Strategic Concept. The major goals of the security policy have not changed. Sovereignty of the country, peace in the region, requirement of the enforcement of fundamental rights, and integral stability remain its fundamental cornerstones.

In light of the Alliance’s 1999 Washington Summit and subsequent recent events, NATO is a complex and unique political and military regional organization, with no supra-national authority. It forms an Alliance of twenty-six sovereign states whose fundamental purpose is the use of collective political and military means “to safeguard the freedom and security of all its members, and to contribute to the peace and stability of the wider Euro-Atlantic area.”²⁵ Despite its uniqueness, NATO has a common understanding in the notion of the new security challenges. It is no surprise that in NATO’s new strategic concept, the new and uncertain security environment is emphasized; however, this uncertainty is based on a less existential threat than that

²⁴ Council of the European Union, European Security Strategy, <http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf>; Internet; accessed August 2004, 5.

²⁵ NATO, “Reader’s Guide to the NATO Summit in Washington,” NATO Office of Information and Press, Brussels, 1999: 48. [article online]; available from <http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/1999/9904-wsh/9904-wsh.htm>; Internet; accessed May 2005.

endured in the Cold War. With the disappearance of the communist threat, NATO has directed its political and military attention and resources to other problems, symptoms of violence, or conflicts throughout the world. Earlier, minor and mostly intrastate conflicts functioned as surrogate wars between the two military blocks where ideological views determined the political agenda and the invested resources. The new security environment, however, has led to an expansion of the NATO military task list, including peace support operations and the fight against terrorism and crime, as well as support for human rights and environmental issues.²⁶

On October 3, 2002, at the Alliance's Vision for 2012 Conference, former NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson tried to predict the challenges that the international community was likely to face in the years ahead. Lord Robertson summarized these challenges as follows:²⁷

- Increased instability in the Caucasus, Central Asia, Northern Africa, and the Middle East;
- More spillover effects into the local trouble areas, Europe, and North America; that is, migration, asylum seekers, people smuggling, violence, and drugs;
- More terrorism resulting in the murder of innocent people;
- More failed states that will become potential safe heavens for terrorists;
- More proliferation that will lead to the spread of WMD into the hands of non-state actors who can not always be deterred.

Less than two months later, on November 21, 2002, the heads of state and governments participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Prague issued a declaration that developed in technical terms the aspects previously stated by the Secretary General. Article 3 of the declaration reads, "Recalling the tragic events of 11 September 2001 and our subsequent decision to invoke Article 5 of the Washington

²⁶ NATO, "The Alliance's Strategic Concept," North Atlantic Council in Washington D.C. on 23rd and 24th April 1999. <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm>, accessed September 2003.

²⁷ Speech by NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson in Prague 2002, "Challenge and Change for NATO," available from <http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2002/s021003a.htm>; Internet; accessed April 2005.

Treaty, we have approved a comprehensive package of measures, based on NATO's Strategic Concept, to strengthen our ability to meet the challenges to the security of our forces, populations, and territory, from wherever they may come.”²⁸

In summary, the strategic concepts of the Washington Summit in 1999 have been further developed, and today's NATO requires from its military forces the capability to address the “new threats,” from rogue states to terrorism, in out-of-area operations as well. Another important change to note is that in addition to an increased will to use its military power, NATO's security boundaries are now theoretically unlimited. This is in sharp contrast to the Cold War period where the military power of NATO never was to exceed NATO's well defined boundaries. The discussions of out-of-area operations within NATO are now long gone, as described in the 2002 Prague Summit declaration:

We are determined to deter, disrupt, defend and protect against any attacks on us, in accordance with the Washington Treaty and the Charter of the United Nations. In order to carry out the full range of its missions, NATO must be able to field forces that can move quickly to wherever they are needed, upon decision by the North Atlantic Council, to sustain operations over distance and time, including in an environment where they might be faced with nuclear, biological and chemical threats, and to achieve their objectives.²⁹

With the Prague Summit, the debate about the Alliance's role exclusively within the Euro-Atlantic region has ended. Holding that geography will no longer act as a shield, the Allied leaders decided on a range of key issues,³⁰ including

- The creation of an agile, flexible, deployable (anywhere within 5 to 30 days), combined, and joint NATO Response Force (NRF), which would be able to sustain itself for 30 days.
- The transformation of NATO's command design with a view to providing smaller, more effective, efficient, and deployable command structures.
- The strengthening of the Alliance's capabilities for defense against terrorism, NBC (Nuclear Biological and Chemical), and cyber attacks.

²⁸ NATO Press Release, “Prague Summit Declaration, November 2002,” available from <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2002/p02-127e.htm>; Internet; accessed February 2005.

²⁹ NATO, “Prague Summit Declaration,” paragraph 4. <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2002/p02-127e.htm>, Internet, accessed February 2004.

³⁰ NATO Issues, “NATO's contribution to the fight against terrorism,” available from <http://www.nato.int/terrorism/index.htm#c>; Internet; accessed February 2005.

- The approval of the Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC), through which individual member states made “firm and specific political commitments to improve their capabilities” in various areas ranging from air-to air refueling to intelligence, surveillance, and target acquisition.

In addressing these new threats, as part of the last NATO summit in Istanbul, June 28-29, 2004, decisions were devoted to the establishment of “more capable, usable, and responsive forces in support of NATO’s new missions; and strengthening cooperation with partners, especially in beyond the Euro-Atlantic area.”³¹

The main product of the forces concept is the NATO Response Force. This force was officially created on October 15, 2003, directed to achieve its initial operational capability by the end of 2004, and reach its full operational capability by fall 2006.³² In technical terms, the NRF is planned to provide “a coherent, high readiness, joint, multinational force package, technologically advanced, flexible, deployable, interoperable, and sustainable.”³³ According to this definition, the NRF seems to be a highly useful tool for NATO.

The GWOT and other security challenges have also prompted a transformation within NATO. On September 12, 2001, less than 24 hours after the terrorist attacks on the United States, the North Atlantic Council, which is NATO’s governing body, invoked Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty for the first time in the Alliance’s history. This step meant that the attack on the United States was equal to an attack against all NATO member countries.

Since the invocation of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty on September 12, 2001, NATO member countries have continued to show a strong determination to play their part in the fight against terrorism following the attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001.³⁴ The ISAF in Afghanistan, the Operation Active Endeavor, the

³¹ NATO Istanbul Summit Media Guide; available from <http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/2004/06-istanbul/press-kit/press-kit.htm>; Internet; accessed January 2005.

³² Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, “NATO Response Force Inauguration Ceremony,” available from <http://www.nato.int/shape/news/2003/10/i031006.htm>; Internet; accessed January 2005.

³³ NATO Issues, “NATO Response Force: At the centre of NATO transformation,” available from <http://www.nato.int/issues/nrf/index.html>; Internet; accessed January 2005.

³⁴ The Istanbul Summit Media Guide – Action against Terrorism; [article online]; available from <http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/2004/06-istanbul/home.htm>; Internet; accessed January 2005.

security operations within the Athens Olympic Games and the peacekeeping forces acting against terrorists in the Balkans show the wide variety of tasks conducted by NATO in the GWOT.

Despite its uniqueness and the relatively large number of member states, NATO has a common understanding in the notion of the new security challenges and these defined challenges strongly influence the Hungarian National Security Strategy. The Hungarian Security Strategy identifies the goals and tasks within NATO for Hungary and states “Hungary has a fundamental interest in NATO remaining the primary forum of transatlantic security policy dialogue and co-operation, preserving its effectiveness by adapting to the changing security policy environment of the 21st century, and by contributing to the extension of the zone of security and stability.”³⁵

Not only have the new security challenges been defined as security threats directly linked to Hungarian security interests, but the political will to use military power to resolve them has increased significantly as well. Since the Hungarian security environment is tightly linked to NATO, the Hungarian security focus has shifted from homeland defense to include NATO and more peripheral security requirements abroad. As of the writing of this thesis, the overwhelming majority of the soldiers deployed abroad on military missions are engaged in NATO missions (as can be seen on Figure 2). Since 1990, Hungary has participated in most major conflicts, from the first Gulf War to the conflicts in the Balkans and later Afghanistan, as part of the International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF) troops. Most recently, Hungarian forces have provided training personnel for the NATO training mission in Iraq.

³⁵ A Magyar Köztársaság Nemzeti Biztonsági Stratégiája (Hungarian National Security Strategy), “Chapter III – Objectives and tasks,” http://www.kulugyminiszterium.hu/archivum/Kulugyminiszterium/HU/Miniszterium/Szervezeti_egysegek/NATO/Nemzeti_biztonsagi_strategia.htm, Internet, last accessed April 2006.

Taking into account the future Hungarian security environment and perceived future NATO tasks in which the HDF will participate, these tasks are best represented through the NATO Response Force (NRF) employment scenarios. So far, there are three main scenarios that have been developed for the NRF:³⁶

1. Acting independently within this expeditionary framework in a crisis response scenario the NRF is expected to have the flexibility and the capabilities to evacuate non-combatants, support consequence management (including CBNR incidents), provide support in humanitarian crises, manage crisis response operations (including peacekeeping), conduct embargo operations, and execute CT (counter terrorism) missions.
2. Deployed in support of a larger force, the NRF will facilitate its arrival, acting as an initial entry element.
3. Serving as a demonstrative force package, the NRF will support diplomatic efforts by deterring potential opponents.

In all three aforementioned employment scenarios, one could identify many possible tasks for NATO Special Forces units.

In order to facilitate a better understanding of this increasing need for Special Forces, data was collected on the Special Forces units of European countries and the recent developments in Europe. Figure 2 represents the major special purpose military units and specially tasked rapid reaction military forces within the region.

³⁶ NATO Issues, "NATO Response Force 3: Land Component Command Brochure," available from <http://www.nato.int/nrdcit/docu/brochure/041001.pdf>; Internet; accessed January 2005.




Figure 2. Military Special Purpose Units in Europe

As can be seen in Figure 2, all neighboring countries have established and deployed special military units in order to defend national interests and to support European military initiatives. All member states understand that they have to contribute to the collective defense of the European Union based on their military capabilities. Hungary as a NATO member recognized the need to address the new security challenges and has the commitment to establish a Special Forces unit in order to be able to further contribute to the collective defense of the Alliance. This unit will be a "niche" capability of the HDF.³⁷ Moreover, Hungary has clearly indicated to the EU the willingness to develop a Special Operations capability and will most likely make it available for the European Union in the future.³⁸

³⁷ Based on the response to the 2004 NATO Defense Planning Questionnaire. Force Goal EG3520 states that the Hungarian Defense Forces will develop a Special Forces Unit by 2009.

7. Conclusions Based on the Security Environment of Hungary

This section of the thesis addresses the first question and analyzes the main features of the Hungary's security environment in terms of threats and subsequent requirements for the military. It can be concluded that the Republic of Hungary interprets security in a comprehensive way, in conformity with the definition adopted in NATO's and the EU's Strategic Concept. The internal and external factors of security are less and less separable, and the number of risks stretching over the border is growing. As a result of this, Hungary is facing new security challenges in several aspects. On the other hand, European integration and the development of trans-Atlantic connections are important interests of Hungary, because only a more extended international cooperation may bring solution to global and regional challenges.

By analyzing the Hungarian National Security Strategy, NATO security policy and the EU security policy, the following common aspects are highlighted:

- Based upon the changing security environment, the threat perceptions have changed. Although the occurrence of conventional (state-on-state) disputes cannot be ruled out, non-state actors and rogue states receive increased attention and are perceived as the biggest challenges in the future. These challenges represent an asymmetric threat to conventional militaries. They fight with unconventional methods to achieve their goals. These challenges are terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; spillover effects from unstable regions and failed states, illegal migration, regional challenges, and political and religious extremism.
- The changing threat perceptions necessitate an increased probability of out-of-area operations, and it can be expected that Hungarian soldiers will be deployed in out-of- area missions in increasing numbers in the future. The present allocated number of soldiers for military deployment is 1,000.
- Since the invocation of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty on September 12, 2001, NATO member countries have continued to show a strong determination to play their part in the fight against terrorism. Due to the nature of asymmetric challenges and the likeliness that warfighting methods of future threats will be mainly unconventional, conventional forces will not be able to fully address all military aspects of the perceived military tasks. Therefore, (as most European countries have realized so

³⁸ International Institute for Strategic Studies: The Military Balance Volume 104 (2004) provides a quantitative assessment of the world's military forces and their defense expenditure, available from www.ingentaconnect.com/content/routledg/milbal; Internet; accessed February 2005.

far) specialized units (with a capability to fight in unconventional conflicts) will play an increasingly important role in countering the future challenges.

- Not all countries are capable of providing all capabilities to the collective defense of the North Atlantic Alliance; therefore, specialization is usually perceived as the concentration of resources in a particular area. To share the tasks, countries need to identify "niche" capabilities, or in other words, areas where they already possess special expertise and further develop them in the future.
- As a result of the concepts outlined in Section 5 in this chapter, a review was conducted of the European Union's "niche" capabilities as well.³⁹ Support for developing Special Forces capabilities or improvement of the existing forces were highly emphasized. Smaller countries are especially encouraged to develop specialized capabilities, such as Special Forces. The EU outlined the requirements in a Special Operations Policy document.⁴⁰
- Taking into account the nature of the security environment, current trends in NATO and the EU, and the experiences of the neighboring countries, there is a requirement to establish a specialized military unit in Hungary, capable of fighting in all aspects of modern war, but with a special emphasis on unconventional war-fighting capability.

B. MAJOR MILITARY TASKS OF THE HUNGARIAN DEFENSE FORCES

According to Article 17 of Resolution 94/1998, the Government of the Republic of Hungary is responsible for the elaboration of the National Security Strategy and the National Military Strategy, as well as the review of both strategies if necessary, and the implementation of the tasks deriving from them. The government fulfilled this obligation by creating Governmental Resolution No. 2144/2002 (V. 6.) and later transformed it into Governmental Resolution No. 2073/2004 (IV. 15.) regarding the National Security Strategy of the Republic of Hungary.

This section of the thesis elaborates on the findings of the previous section, analyzes the circumstances of the Defense Review and introduces the problems Hungary has faced and will face during the transformation of the Defense Forces, and explains the

³⁹ These 'niche' capabilities can be found in European Defense: A proposal for a White Paper, Institute for Security Studies (ISS) for the European Union, Paris, [article online]; available from <http://www.iss-eu.org/chaillot/wp2004.pdf>; 119-120; Internet; accessed May 2004.

⁴⁰ The above mentioned document is still in a draft form.

impacts on the HUNSF capability. The analysis of the National Defense Strategy answers the second question of chapter II: What are the major military tasks of the Hungarian Defense Forces to support the policy goals of the country?

1. The Hungarian Defense Review

The numerous reforms and reorganizations of the HDF in the past twenty years have led to many difficulties. One of these difficulties was the maintenance of a large and inappropriate army inherited from the communist era. Despite the difficulties, Hungary received accession to NATO in the year 1999. There is much for Hungary to do to be fully prepared for the challenges of the 21st century and to share in all of the responsibilities given by those alliances to which Hungary is a member. The defense review is a significant part of this transformation process.

The objective of the Defense Review was to redefine the function and tasks of the Hungarian Defense Forces in compliance with the significantly changed international situation and NATO concepts, as well as the national interests and goals and “to identify and prioritize the necessary capabilities and make proposals to allocate resources to such capabilities.”⁴¹ The review targeted the development of an efficient military force that not only must be capable of meeting national defense requirements, but also capable of operating within the framework of NATO. At the same time, as it was analyzed earlier, the HDF must be capable of contributing to EU military operations as well.

To capitalize upon planning methodology that had already proven successful elsewhere within NATO, the Defense Review was conducted along the lines applied within the United Kingdom in 1997/98. This 10-step procedure set objectives regarding foreign, security, and defense policies, defined the missions and task of the HDF, including all necessary combat support and combat service support considerations, and

⁴¹ Ferenc Juhasz, Minister of Defense, Shaping an Armed Forces for the 21st Century, Chapter I of the article – retrieved from <http://www.honvedelem.hu/cikk.php?cikk=13869&next=0&archiv=1&next=0>, Internet, accessed December 2004.

worked out options for the conduct of the defense reform. Based on the results of the Defense Review, expert decision makers identified 14 primary tasks for the Hungarian Defense Forces.⁴²

1. Operations in accordance with the Article V of NATO.
2. Defense of the sovereignty of Hungary and the borders of the country.
3. Host nation support.
4. Participation in international crisis management (peace operations).
5. Participation in international crisis management (international operations other than peace Operations).
6. Fighting terrorism.
7. Operations based on bi- and multilateral cooperation.
8. Adherence of international treaties, arms control.
9. Humanitarian aid operations.
10. Information gathering, processing and protection.
11. Support for civilian authorities.
12. Air space control.
13. Frequency management.
14. Protocol.

As the security environment had changed, maintenance of the structure and the size of the defense forces of the past were not possible for Hungary. Therefore, based on the review, it was determined that “in the present time, Hungary needs flexible armed forces that can be used within the entire spectrum of national and allied tasks, from fighting a war to peacekeeping operations.”⁴³

Besides the broad spectrum of military tasks, the flexibility as an essential element was also highlighted. It was emphasized that contrary to past practices when military units were designed to conduct a given number of specific tasks, flexible response must be built into the new capabilities of the defense forces. Hungary in the future needs light, mobile, and deployable forces that can be appropriately supported in operations and can be maintained in the field for a considerable period of time.

⁴²Ferenc Juhasz, Minister of Defense, Shaping an Armed Forces for the 21st Century, Chapter II of the article – retrieved from <http://www.honvedelem.hu/cikk.php?cikk=13869&next=0&archiv=1&next=0>, Internet, accessed December 2004.

⁴³ Ibid.

The most significant part of the review was the recognition of the importance of Special Forces as a “niche” capability for the HDF. “Conclusions drawn from the previous wars proved the increasing importance of Special Forces, which are very efficient compared with their size and costs.”⁴⁴ Hungary’s intention is to develop specialized capabilities (in other words “niche” capabilities) as its contribution to the collective defensive efforts of NATO. One of these capabilities will be the Special Forces capability; therefore, the result of the Defense Review should provide guidelines for the Special Forces capability development in Hungary.

2. National Military Strategy of Hungary

The objective of the Hungarian Defense Forces is to defend the country’s interest based on the guidelines of the National Military Strategy as well as to support efforts that safeguard and promote the national security interests of the country. The National Military Strategy draft is based upon Resolution 94/1998 (XII. 29) of the Parliament about the security and defense policy of the Republic of Hungary, the Strategy Concept of NATO (adopted in November 2002 at the Prague Summit), the Security Concept of the European Union, and specifically on the National Security Strategy of the Republic of Hungary.⁴⁵

The present concept of the defense of the Republic of Hungary is based upon two pillars, the first being the country’s own national forces, and the second being the country’s commitment international cooperation. With the establishment of the new requirements and with the all-volunteer force, the Hungarian Defense Forces is capable of defending the independence and territorial integrity of Hungary within the framework of NATO. In discussing Hungary’s geo-strategic environment, the National Military Strategy highlights the importance of NATO and the EU membership. The document states that Hungary promotes NATO as a cornerstone of the European security.

⁴⁴ Ferenc Juhasz, Minister of Defense, Shaping an Armed Forces for the 21st Century, Chapter II of the article – retrieved from <http://www.honvedelem.hu/cikk.php?cikk=13869&next=0&archiv=1&next=0>, Internet, accessed December 2004.

⁴⁵ The National Military Strategy of the Republic of Hungary is still in draft format. A draft version is already available at the Ministry of Defense in Hungary. Although slight changes are possible in the document, the assumption was made that basic statements will remain unchanged. This draft version of the National Military Strategy is the one that is analyzed throughout this thesis.

The National Military Strategy also highlights that Hungary does not expect any military aggression in the conventional sense; however, the document defines three types of challenges that may threaten the security of the country. The first of these challenges is global terrorism, while the second one is military threats due to regional instability, and the third one is the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the carriers of WMD.

The document reflects that the HDF understands the changed nature of the modern warfare and the need to develop new capabilities in order to counter new security challenges. The National Military Strategy highlights the major characteristics of modern warfare. The document states that current and projected conflicts in the near future will be mainly asymmetric; in other words, “non-traditional combat techniques may appear, such as guerilla warfare, partisan and terrorist operations.”⁴⁶

The second chapter of the National Military Strategy defines the tasks and missions of the HDF. The possible missions for the HDF are the following:

- The HDF comprises an integral part of the system of institutions and one of the most important, indispensable elements of security policy and defense policy.
- The basic mission of the HDF is to defend the territory and the air space of the Republic of Hungary, secure the border, and contribute to the defense of NATO member nations.
- The HDF shall participate in peace support operations and other international operations. The HDF may participate in the war on terrorism, and international operations against terrorism may be conducted pursuant to the provisions of Article V of the Washington Treaty.
- With a view to maintain international peace and security, the HDF promotes bilateral and multilateral military relations and participates in the enforcement of international agreements.
- The functions of the HDF shall comprise the collection and the processing of information, safeguarding information, the provision of support to civilian authorities including participation in disaster relief operations, search and rescue operations, air space control, frequency management, and the performance of protocol functions.
- A shift of emphasis from area defense to deployed operations beyond the borders of the country far from Hungary in an expeditionary manner,

⁴⁶ Draft Hungarian National Military Strategy, Chapter 4 - Characteristics of modern warfare.

deployable at short notice, professional, mobile, flexible, modular, comprising of specialized elements, employable in an efficient manner, survivable, sustainable, and capable of operating in a multinational task force.

The third chapter of the National Military Strategy analyzes the structure, capabilities, and major development trends of the HDF. The most significant change, from the perspective of this thesis, is that the document states the need for special military units capable of countering the new challenges - among them, the Army Special Forces.

3. Conclusions Based on the National Military Strategy and Defense Review

By analyzing the Hungarian National Military Strategy draft and the recently completed Defense Review, this thesis highlights the following common aspects:

- Both documents highlight Hungary's membership in NATO and the EU as a cornerstone of the country's security. It is also clear that as a member, Hungary has obligations towards collective security as well; therefore, the HDF must be capable of meeting national defense requirements, but at the same time must be able to contribute to NATO and EU military operations as well.
- Hungary does not expect conventional military aggression; however, terrorism, regional instability, and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction may threaten the security of the country. Therefore, countering these challenges will be important military tasks in the future. Preparation for these tasks must include the development of new military capabilities as well.
- It is also understood that because the nature of warfare is changing and future conflicts will most likely be asymmetric, non-traditional combat techniques will be required and the HDF will need light, mobile, specialized, easily deployable, and supportable military forces to counter these challenges in the future.
- Both documents understand the importance of specialization and "niche" capabilities. In addition, the documents recognize the importance of the Special Forces and their role as one of the "niche" capabilities of the HDF. Both documents suggest that Hungary must develop its own Special Forces capability and establish a Special Forces unit.

C. EVALUATING AND HANDLING REGIONAL AND INTERNAL CHALLENGES

It is important to highlight that the Republic of Hungary understands regional stability as a cornerstone of the overall security of the country; therefore, the thesis deems

it practical to describe further topics on regional security of the Hungarian NSS in this section of the thesis with the goal of furthering understanding the practical applications of these topics towards the development process of the Special Forces.

1. Regional Security Considerations

The National Security Strategy executes the evaluation of regional challenges when the positive change in the situation of Central Europe, facilitated by the common goals of the new members and candidates of NATO and the EU, is highlighted. It deals with the changes of South East Europe in detail and also with the risk factors in the successor states of the former Soviet Union. The NSS remarks that the states of South Eastern Europe have committed themselves towards the Euro-Atlantic values.

It is a risk factor in respect to the successor states of the former Soviet Union that the transitional proceedings have not been finished yet; however, the elements of consolidation, accountability, and advancement of partnership are becoming more powerful. On the other hand, the reality of organized crime departing from the East-European region, and considering Hungary as partly a destination, partly a transit state, represents a serious challenge. Russia is still mentioned as an important player in international political life, and the lessening of the danger caused by its instability is an emphasized new element. It is a positive fact that Russia has opened a partnership with NATO and the EU.

Chapter Three of the National Security Strategy identifies tasks in relation to particular international organizations, against global challenges, and in terms of the management of the internal challenges. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the European Union, the trans-Atlantic political cooperation, and traditionally the UN and OSCE receives special emphasis. The improvement of the mutually advantageous economy, commercial cooperation, and trans-Atlantic commercial links are also stressed. The Strategy identifies the building of the bilateral and regional cooperation as one of the most important tasks of the Hungarian foreign and security policy, in which Hungary has to support the Euro-Atlantic integration of its neighbors as well.

The National Security Strategy carries out the evaluation of the security situation of the Mediterranean region and the Middle East, where cultural, ethnical, migration, political, territorial and religious tensions exist together. The spillover effect of globalization no longer allows Hungary to neglect far-away events, and Hungary's Alliance interest also dictates the neutralization of the global crises and armed conflicts as well.

Based on the abovementioned findings, Hungarian national security interests were identified as geographically limited to Europe, North-Africa and the Middle-East (as is shown in Figure 3). Deployment of the defense forces within these geographical boundaries mainly serves national or Allied interests, but bilateral cooperation is an option as well.




Figure 3. Geographical Boundaries

These restrictions have far-reaching implications when one develops the Special Forces capability for the Hungarian Defense Forces. Apart from obvious deployment limitations, the effect of the geographical restraints will be noticeable in training, cultural and linguistic orientation as well as other related areas of the Hungarian Special Forces capability development process.

2. Internal Security Considerations

The National Security Strategy is naturally obliged to deal with internal security challenges as well, given that the internal relations - in addition to external factors - basically determine the safety of the country. Organized crime appears to be the primary source of danger, and it is tightly followed by black economy and corruption. The common feature is that the criminals make the basic rules of market-economy and legality annulated and, therefore, they demolish internal security.

The NSS also deals with the identification of internal aspects of the new security challenges, which are not strictly connected with the Allied position of the country; nevertheless, these challenges can have an effect on the security of Hungary and, therefore, on the tasks of the HUNSF in the future as well. The following challenges have to be taken into consideration when designing the HUNSF capability and identifying the tasks of the HUNSF unit:

- Support the Hungarian minority living beyond the borders.
- Further economic relations in respect to Russia and Ukraine.
- Develop a modern and safe information infrastructure and protection of the government informatics systems.
- Protest against environmental pollution, preserving natural values.
- Fight against organized crime and money laundering.
- Fight against corruption.
- Fight against drug trafficking.
- Prevent attempts directed at interfering with fundamental human rights, and effective oppression of political and religious extremities.
- Manage demographical challenges.

Although the police, medical, humanitarian and other activities of civilian character are the primary efforts by which to address the abovementioned challenges, it is also important to realize that military operations will play an increasingly supporting role, and the development of their capabilities has to be tailored in accordance. The Special Forces capability has always been known as one of the best suited to employ in civil-military situations, where the lines between war and peace are blurred or non-existent. In the development of the HUNSF capability and identification of tasks for the HUNSF unit, one must not forget about these emerging tasks.

D. CHAPTER SUMMARY

The goal of this chapter was to provide an overall assessment on Hungary's security environment by analyzing the country's national interests and examining the expected missions of the HDF. During the course of the analysis, this thesis adopted an analysis method, and in this chapter the following two questions were addressed:

1. What are the main features of the country's security environment in terms of threats and subsequent requirements for the military?
2. What are the major military tasks of the Hungarian Defense Forces to support the policy goals of the country?

In order to find answers to these questions, the main features of the security environment of Hungary in terms of threats and subsequent requirements for the military have been examined and the military tasks of the Hungarian Defense Forces in support of the policy goals of Hungary have been collected, which resulted in the following findings:

- By analyzing Hungary's security environment and the draft of the National Military Strategy along with the recently completed Defense Review, it can be concluded that Hungary has a reasonable need to develop new military capabilities to counter the new security challenges (e.g., terrorism, regional instability, and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction) of a modern era.
- The National Security Strategy points out that besides traditional nation-state actors, the so-called non-state actors (e.g., international organizations, transnational companies, non-governmental organizations, as well as international criminal and terrorist groups) are playing an ever-increasing role in security policy.
- The "blurring" of the boundary between the internal and external risk factors is a typical trend, during which the individual risk factors emerge not separately, but strengthen each other on a global, regional and internal

level. The "global challenges" aspect outlines the essence of the terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, unstable regions, lack of economic stability, challenges of information society, and the security risk thereof.

- The threats NATO and the European Union foresees are more diverse, dynamic, less visible, and less predictable. Countering these threats requires the first line of defense to be abroad.
- At present, the HDF is not fully prepared to face all aspects of these new security challenges; therefore, understanding the nature of modern warfare and the possible future threats, the development of a military unit within the HDF that is capable of fighting in an asymmetric environment using both highly-specialized conventional methods and unconventional warfare capability is necessary.
- Recognizing the need for this special military unit and realizing that neighboring countries have also developed similar capabilities, the Hungarian policy makers have decided to develop a Special Forces capability within the HDF.
- The structural modernization is laid down in Governmental Resolution No. 2329/204. (XII. 21.) which includes cuts in personnel numbers. Cuts in personnel numbers and other capabilities of the Hungarian Defense Forces means that the new Special Forces capability will be developed in a shrinking and constantly changing defense structure. Therefore, a lot of flexibility has to be embedded when designing the HUNSF capability.

In the following chapter, based upon the analysis of the security challenges and the current tasks of the HDF, this thesis will identify existing gaps in the current warfighting capability of the HDF and suggest the improvement of implied tasks, with the most important one being unconventional warfare. This thesis will suggest possible tasks for the Hungarian Special Forces, based on the premise that some of these tasks either cannot be assigned or would be difficult to assign to the General Purpose Forces of the HDF.

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III. IDENTIFICATION OF TASKS

The purpose of this chapter is to identify the tasks of the Hungarian Special Forces. Proposing new tasks is an endeavor that should seriously consider at least three questions. The first question is what are the missions of the HUNSF unit? According to the findings provided by the analysis of the first two questions in Chapter II, this main mission is proposed to be unconventional warfare. The second question is what are the principal SF related tasks of the Hungarian Defense Forces to support the policy goals of the country, and which of these are appropriate SF tasks? The third question, given that Hungary is a NATO ally and a member of the EU, is what are the main SF task related requirements of these organizations?

To answer the abovementioned questions, this chapter will focus on identifying the tasks that are required but not applicable for Hungarian GPF and determine if the remaining tasks are appropriate for HUNSF. Based upon the analysis of the strategic environment discussed in the previous chapter, in this chapter five questions will be addressed:

1. What requirements from the Hungarian National and Military Strategy must be incorporated into the HUNSF tasks?
2. What are the NATO SF tasks?
3. What are the SF tasks of the European Union?
4. Which of the identified SF tasks can be accomplished by the Hungarian General-Purpose Forces (GPF) or other security services and which are tasks of the HUNSF?
5. Which of the identified HUNSF tasks are appropriate?

Chapter III provides HUNSF tasks that are suitable for SF requirements, cannot be executed by the GPF or other security agencies, support Hungary's defense policy goals, and fit well into the country's security environment.

There is a disagreement that still exists within the Special Forces community as to what makes Special Forces "special" and whether they ought to be "shooters" or "social workers" or in other words, whether they would be employed directly or in a more

indirect way. This argument can have a serious influence on the nature and culture of HUNSF, especially in regards to the main mission and tasks of the Special Forces; therefore, it is important to analyze this issue in more detail.

In the light of indirect capabilities, the current debate on the unconventional warfare (UW) capability has to be addressed as well. It is an important cornerstone of today's SF related debates. Most Special Forces experts argue that UW should be a major part of Special Forces capabilities. This thesis suggests that UW should not only be incorporated into the tasks of the HUNSF, but should be a primary mission for the Hungarian Special Forces unit.

A. SHOOTERS VS. SOCIAL WORKERS DILEMMA

The question of exactly what Special Operations Forces do is less straightforward than one might expect. Special operations are defined in many different ways, and experts have a different understanding on the roles of Special Forces. The U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) defines special operations as follows:

Special operations encompass the use of small units in direct or indirect military actions that are focused on strategic or operational objectives. They require units with combinations of specialized personnel, equipment, training, or tactics that exceed the routine capabilities of conventional military forces.⁴⁷

The Army Special Forces Command (USASOC) manual on Special Operations Forces states that these forces are “Specially organized, trained, and equipped military and paramilitary forces that conduct special operations to achieve military, political, economic, or informational objectives by generally unconventional means in hostile, denied or politically sensitive areas.”⁴⁸ Comparing the USSOCOM definition of special operations with the Army Special Forces Command's (USASOC) definition, the former emphasizes that SF are special because they have unique equipment and conduct tasks that exceed the routine capabilities of General Purpose Forces (the tasks and methods being, by implication, conventional). The latter stresses SF use of unconventional means for political, economic, or informational objectives beyond military ones. Are SF

⁴⁷ USSOCOM Publication 1, Special Operations in Peace and War, (Washington DC: GPO, 1996), 1.

⁴⁸ US Army Field Manual 100-25, Doctrine for Army Special Operations Forces (Washington, DC: GPO, 1996), 2.

essentially conventional soldiers with a very high degree of proficiency, tailored high technology equipment, and training not available to GPF or are they unconventional operators dedicated to roles and using methods that are different than the ones associated with the conventional military forces?

The stress in the USASOC definition is on the use of these forces for “political, economic, or informational objectives,” beyond ordinary military ones and employing something called “unconventional means.” This reflects an important difference about what is special about special operations. Are these essentially conventional soldiers with a very high level of proficiency or are they something else, dedicated to purposes and functions that are different and using methods that are outside the conventional mold of most military forces, that is, unconventional? Do the Hungarian Defense Forces need an unconventional capability at all?

There is a constant debate within the special operations community regarding the relevance of unconventional warfare (UW) in contemporary conflicts and the separation of direct and indirect action capabilities of Special Forces. The so-called indirect action activities typically performed by Special Forces - psychological operations and civil affairs with and through the forces and people of host countries, such as Afghanistan or Iraq – are critical for reshaping the sociopolitical environment in which terrorists and insurgents thrive. Direct action capabilities of Special Forces – which bring force to bear directly against the enemy - are also proficient, and in most cases have a strategic significance. Therefore, it is necessary to recognize the two major approaches by which Special Forces worldwide accomplish tasks. One facilitates or brings force to bear directly against the enemy. Examples include destroying key targets (direct action), reconnoitering target areas or key enemy personnel (special reconnaissance) and deceiving the enemy about the intentions of Special Forces (a subset of information operations). The other approach works indirectly by providing training and advise to help the forces of other countries to counter security challenges (military assistance) or to reconstitute institutions and infrastructure (civil affairs). These two broad approaches may be mutually supportive; therefore, it is also important to realize that not all tasks fall

clearly within one approach. Nevertheless, the distinction between the direct and indirect approaches helps to clarify how Special Forces should be used both now and in the future.

1. The Importance of Unconventional Warfare

In Hungary, unconventional warfare seems to be a less understood form of military operations; therefore, it is important for the purposes of this thesis to explain this form of warfare in a little more detail, analyze the necessity of UW, and find a proper definition to explain the term.

The main question is whether or not Hungarian Special Forces should include UW as part of their doctrine and training? To find an appropriate solution to this most complicated question, the nature of conflicts in the recent past and in the near future have to be analyzed and the true nature of unconventional warfare has to be understood. Analysis of the security environment was provided in Chapter II. This section aims towards a better understanding of unconventional warfare.

Guerrilla warfare, revolutionary wars, underground resistance, subversion, sabotage and propaganda (to name just a few forms of unconventional warfare) are far from being inventions of modern societies and can be traced back to ancient times. Unconventional tactics have been used throughout history in the context of military confrontations, from low to high intensity conflicts. Despite their different tags, they share some common underlying principles that have helped unconventional warfare emerge and grow in the first place, and which makes them noticeably different from conventional confrontations. During the last 50 years, a special military capability was successfully developed to deal with situations that have often been categorized as somewhere between uneasy peace and something that was not quite war. Places like Somalia, Haiti, Rwanda, El Salvador and Nicaragua, to name a few, are illustrative of these situations. Generically these can be termed unconventional warfare because they do not follow the conventions of military conflict. More recently, these types of operations have also been referred to as stability and support operations, or SASO. These include, but are not limited to, humanitarian assistance, insurgency and counterinsurgency, noncombatant evacuation, shows of force, nation assistance, disaster assistance, recovery operations, strikes and raids, and more. In order to fight an insurgency, one has to

understand the operational environment within which it takes place. This can be best represented by the following three aspects: the political nature of an insurgency, the physical environment (i.e. terrain features, climate, etc.) and the human environment (with its language, cultural and traditional aspects).

Whereas the typical Clausewitzian-based warfare strategy tends to place the center of gravity on the destruction of the opponent's army in order to control a certain territory, unconventional warfare strategies often place a premium on co-opting local populations in order to achieve the same results. Traditionally, military operations have avoided mixing with civilians and sought to separate them from the battlefield; however, this is not an option in irregular warfare because it takes place among the people. Unconventional warfare is not a small-scale conventional confrontation, and it is dangerous to treat it in this manner. Each insurgency is a unique occurrence which is greatly influenced by the local conditions of the place in which it arises.

One of the first to acknowledge and describe guerrilla warfare was Antoine Jomini in 1838 who, as he witnessed the French defeat in Spain, wrote, "the spectacle of a spontaneous uprising of a nation is rarely seen; and, though there be in it something grand and noble which commands our admiration, the consequences are so terrible that, for the sake of humanity, we ought to hope never to see it."⁴⁹ However, he described only one instance, namely the wars of national liberation - when people have resorted to guerrilla tactics to achieve their goals. Huntington in 1962 distinguished three instances when groups resort to guerrilla warfare to accomplish their goals, "(1) after regular (i.e., stronger) forces have been defeated, (2) before they have been created, and (3) where they are unable to operate."⁵⁰ Their aim is twofold. On the political side, they aspire "to destroy the government's prestige and authority" and rally people's support, while on the military side, they "aim to neutralize the government's armed forces, and render them

⁴⁹ Antoine H. Jomini, *The Art of war*, (London: Greenhill Books, edition 1996), 29.

⁵⁰ Samuel P. Huntington, *Introduction: Guerrilla Warfare in Theory and Policy*, in F.M. Osanka, *Modern Guerrilla Warfare*, (New York: The free Press of Glencoe, 1962), xvi.

powerless to save the country.”⁵¹ In this milieu, insurgencies are unique occurrences during which, as Arthur Cebrowski wrote, “nations, states and others who wage wars, do so in ways appropriate to their culture and values.”⁵²

In identifying the definition of unconventional warfare, the best sources are the United States doctrines and manuals, as the United States has been training for and fighting UW since the 19th century. Definitions also seem to alter during this time and the latest proposed definition that best explains UW can be read in the U.S. Army’s Special Warfare magazine:⁵³

A broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations that are not usually directed at the conventional objective of defeating the enemy’s military forces in combat. It includes subversion, sabotage, intelligence collection, training, and employing surrogate forces, offensive information operations, and offensive command and control warfare. These operations maybe conducted in peace, conflict, or war, and they may be overt, covert, or clandestine in nature. If these operations are conducted when our nation is not at war, their success, failure, and even exposure are politically sensitive and carry strategic implications.⁵⁴

The most important element in this definition is recognizing that UW is not conventional. Conventional warfare is focused on the contest of armies on the battlefield and the goal is the destruction of the enemy military force. UW is more involved with political considerations than with military ones. That is why the success criteria are more difficult to determine. UW’s desired end state is not so much a defeated military as it is a changed political system. If the desired change can be brought about by efforts short of conventional war, then UW would be a desirable option. Many of the regional conflicts that have occurred in the recent past fall into this category. “If UW [Unconventional Warfare] is to succeed, we cannot restrict it to an unlikely GW [Guerrilla Warfare]

⁵¹ Robert Thompson, *Defeating communist insurgency: the Lessons of Malaya and Vietnam*, (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1966), 29.

⁵² Arthur Cebrowski, Speech to the Network Centric Warfare 2003 Conference. Transformation Trends– 17 Feb Issue, Office of Force Transformation, Retrieved from http://www.oft.osd.mil/library/library_files/trends_170_Transformation%20Trends--%20February%20Issue.pdf, 2, Internet, accessed October 2004.

⁵³ Greg E. Metzgar, “Unconventional Warfare: Definitions from 1950 to the present,” *Special Warfare*, (Winter 2001): 18-23.

⁵⁴ Gary M. Jones and Christopher Tone, “Unconventional Warfare: Core purpose of Special Forces,” *Special Warfare*, (Summer 1999), 9.

scenario that conveniently allows us to avoid political issues. We must recognize UW's inherent political nature and embrace that nature, especially during peacetime competition and conflict.”⁵⁵

It can be concluded that today's rapidly changing situations have brought new opportunities for UW operations. The contemporary unsettled security environment, which in the future can become even more complex, is the environment in which the Hungarian SF will deploy. In the recent past, conventional conflicts occurred during the Gulf Wars (in 1991 and in 2003) and yet it was thought to be unlikely for them to break out on a big scale in the near future. On the other hand, there were more than one hundred unconventional conflicts in 2001 and 2002 alone, and even the United States National Defense Council Foundation has discontinued putting together the World Conflict list, as was previously posted every year in the past 10 years, because the nature of conflict has become dominantly asymmetric and difficult to categorize.⁵⁶ Therefore, UW is a likely mission for NATO and the HDF in the future. In order to have success in the 21st century, the Hungarian Special Forces have to be able to react to new security challenges and encompass tasks for supporting both conventional and unconventional operations. If unconventional warfare becomes a requirement, special tasks (such as those listed below) related to the development of this capability also have to be carried out:

- Soldiers and commanders at all level must foster an attitude of creativity.
- A doctrinal change must be implemented (as the Hungarian Military Strategy does not recognize UW as a separate entity of warfare).
- Extra training is necessary for the soldiers, and they have to be even more highly skilled and mature with excellent problem solving skills and an ability to maintain mental agility in the most fluid situations.
- Because UW addresses the political nature of a conflict instead of the military one, the flexibility and adaptability of soldiers deployed for UW must be unparalleled.
- Foreign language skills, cultural expertise, and interpersonal skills have to be a basic requirement for these soldiers because soldiers deployed for UW must understand the cultural context of those whom they train or

⁵⁵ Gary M. Jones and Christopher Tone, “Unconventional Warfare: Core purpose of Special Forces,” *Special Warfare*, (Summer 1999), 13.

⁵⁶ National Defense Council Foundation, http://www.ndcf.org/Conflict_List/World2002/2002_Conflictlist.htm; Internet, accessed May 2005.

contact, and they must comprehend the relevant social, economic and political situation.

- UW training is different from the training for conventional warfighting, so one has to ask, how do we train soldiers and leaders to be able to succeed in these types of missions? This issue will be addressed in detail in Chapter IV.

In the HDF, the GPF are not trained for UW tasks. As it can be seen by the abovementioned requirements, the UW capability is not easy to achieve and takes a lot of time and effort to develop; moreover, specially selected soldiers are needed to carry out tasks related to UW. Therefore, the HUNSF by nature is best suited to develop this capability.

It is undeniable that the information superiority the HUNSF can provide through UW intelligence gathering (especially HUMINT) is the biggest contributor in future asymmetric conflicts for the theatre commander to achieve information superiority. Apart from information dominance, UW can contribute to the training of surrogate forces, supporting offensive information operations and offensive command and control warfare as well.

2. Conclusion

The unique character of unconventional warfare comes largely from the fact that it is usually a struggle for the hearts and minds of the population, rather than a fight for territory with special significance. Fostering legitimacy during insurgencies is more important, perhaps, than is the use of firepower. Thus, any strategy to conduct irregular warfare operations should be based on gaining local support. This requires people to have a deep understanding of their counterparts, which is a knowledge that can best be obtained through specific training that emphasizes not only language but also cultural understanding.

Hungary is likely to be involved mainly in regional conflicts in the near future; therefore, the Hungarian Defense Forces will most likely need to have an unconventional warfare capability in order to fight in conflict zones and engage the opposing forces effectively in low intensity conflicts. By analyzing the current trends and development of the Hungarian GPF, it is obvious that in the near future conventional forces will better themselves and their tactics techniques and procedures (TTPs) in order to be able to react

more effectively to the new challenges of the asymmetric environment. They will inevitably lean towards improving DA, SR and CT related capabilities if they want to succeed against the new threat. With massive firepower, light small unit tactics, and precision guided weapons, as well as improved intelligence skills, they can achieve agility, speed and precision. The one thing they will not be able to master is the unconventional warfare capability, because it requires different training and a completely different mindset as well. This is where the uniqueness of HUNSF can be best be exploited in the future. From a Special Forces point of view, “the goal of UW is to help win a war by working with, as opposed to neutralizing or fighting around local populations. UW represents a classically indirect and ultimately local approach to waging warfare.”⁵⁷ The only thing required is to accept this as a shift in expectations. “For the most part UW is devoid of clear solutions and clear victories. Nor it is usually rapid. This means a willingness to accept lengthy commitments and incremental progress.”⁵⁸ It is also important to emphasize that UW (if correctly carried out by specially-trained units) builds a unique intelligence capability and serves as a force multiplier in low intensity conflicts.

Therefore, creating a UW capability should form an important cornerstone of the HUNSF capability development process.

B. IDENTIFICATION OF HUNSF RELATED TASKS

In determining the tasks of the HUNSF, three main areas have to be taken into account. These three main areas are the SOF related tasks of the Hungarian Defense Forces, NATO SF requirements and guidelines, and last but not least, EU SF requirements and guidelines. By the analysis of these three requirements, the HUNSF related tasks can be identified.

1. Hungarian Military Strategy

The National Military Strategy was introduced in Chapter II. In this section of the thesis, it will be analyzed with a view of deriving Special Forces related tasks from it. Moreover, the political guidelines provided by the National Security Strategy have to be taken into account when establishing a framework for the HUNSF capability. In some

⁵⁷ Hy Rothstein, *The Challenge of Unconventional Warfare*, December 2003, 114.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

cases, these guidelines represent limitations and have to be adhered to in order to properly determine the mission and tasks. The draft version of the Hungarian Military Strategy⁵⁹ outlines the possible tasks for the HDF.

- Defense of the homeland and the sovereignty of Hungary.
- Providing border security.
- Participation in NATO Article V operations.
- Participation in peace support operations and other international operations.
- The HDF may participate in the war on terrorism, such that international operations against terrorism may be conducted pursuant to the provisions of Article V.
- With a view of maintaining international peace and security, the HDF promotes bilateral and multilateral military relations, and participates in the enforcement of international agreements.
- The functions of the HDF shall comprise the collection and processing of information, safeguarding information, the provision of support to civilian authorities including participation in disaster relief operations, search and rescue operations in Hungary, air space control, frequency management, and the performance of protocol functions.
- A shift of emphasis from area defense to deployed operations beyond the borders of the country, far from Hungary in an expeditionary manner, deployable at short notice, professional, mobile, flexible, modular, comprising specialized elements, employable in an efficient manner, survivable, sustainable, and capable of operations in a multinational task force.

To summarize the tasks defined by the draft version of the Hungarian Military Strategy in relation to the Hungarian SF capability development, the draft version of the Hungarian Military Strategy concentrates mainly on countering the following threats:

1. Instability in the Euro-Atlantic region, local conflicts, and risks such as terrorism and the proliferation of WMD.
2. Threats to the transatlantic security architecture.
3. Threats to international peace and security in accordance with the UN and other international norms.
4. CSFP and ESDP within the EU.

⁵⁹ The final version of the Hungarian Military Strategy has not yet been approved; therefore, a draft version of the document is used in order to identify the tasks.

It can be seen that the main objectives for the Defense Forces are to support Hungary's national security interests, to qualitatively contribute to euro-Atlantic peace and security, and to support the EU military initiatives. Cooperation with other members of the North Atlantic Alliance requires specialization and the development of "niche capabilities," which are Special Forces, specialized medical units, CIMIC, and special NBC capabilities. Fundamental elements of Hungary's defense rest on its own capabilities and international cooperation.

Hungarian policymakers so far have proposed four tasks for the Hungarian Special Forces to be incorporated into the principle tasks of the HUNSF unit. These identified tasks are: direct action (DA); special reconnaissance (SR); military assistance (MA); and combating terrorism (CBT).

Additional to these identified tasks, by analyzing the main tasks of the HDF, it can be stated that Hungary does not consider a conventional attack to be likely in the foreseeable future. The majority of the tasks of the Hungarian Defense Forces are related to regional conflicts and an active participation in promoting peace and stability within the region. This thesis identifies a number of implied tasks considered to be important in the fight against non-state opponents and regional security challenges. Some of these implied tasks represent capability gaps within the HDF at present; therefore, these areas of warfighting capabilities need to be improved in the future in order to be able to better cope with future security challenges. All of these identified tasks will form part of the analysis as possible HUNSF tasks. The implied tasks are as follows: Counter proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (CP WMD), unconventional warfare (UW – based upon the argument at the beginning of this chapter), psychological operations (PSYOPS), civil-military cooperation (CIMIC), information operations (IO) and human intelligence collection capability (HUMINT).

2. NATO SF Tasks and Requirements

In an attempt to answer the second question of this chapter, the following paragraphs will concisely address the NATO SF policy and the requirements NATO

demands from SF units. According to NATO Special Operations guidelines⁶⁰ special operations are “military activities conducted by specially designated, organized, trained and equipped forces using operational techniques and modes of employment not standard to conventional forces.”⁶¹ These activities are conducted across the full range of military operations, including peace, crisis and conflict, and independently or in coordination with operations of conventional forces to achieve objectives.

As a consequence of the changed security environment, the enhanced mission spectrum defined by the new strategic concept in view of NATO’s new military structure and the integration of new members into Alliance structures, SF has emerged as a significant part of the NATO force structure. Special Forces provide a flexible, versatile, and unique capability to attain military-strategic or operational objectives.

NATO SF provide strategic commands (SC’s) with rapidly deployable and flexible Combined Joint Special Operations Task Forces (CJSOTFs) which can reinforce, augment, or complement conventional forces, or conduct stand-alone operations in situations where a small, discrete force provides special options. NATO also believes that sensitive operations where the risk of escalation and collateral damage are to be avoided may be best handled by SF units as well.

NATO requires SF units to conduct the following three principle tasks: special surveillance and reconnaissance (SR), direct action (DA), and military assistance (MA). However, the most recent draft version of the NATO Special Operations Policy also

⁶⁰ The proposed NATO SOF concept is based on the present NATO Special Operations Policy draft document (MC 437 draft). As NATO has not approved the final version of the document yet, the draft version is used here to identify tasks for Special Forces.

⁶¹ Draft NATO Special Operations Policy - MC437, 3.

considers counterterrorism and counterinsurgency (CT & COIN) as a potential principle task for NATO SF.⁶² To qualify as part of NATO SOF, Hungarian SOF must basically possess the following capabilities:⁶³

- Conduct the three principle tasks of NATO SOF across the operational continuum.⁶⁴
- Infiltrate using air/land/sea means into and out of the operational area, ideally utilizing organic transportation assets.
- Conduct intra-SOTG communications using lightweight, reliable, mobile equipment that have a low probability of detection.⁶⁵
- Communicate from SOTG level to the CJFSOCC at the NATO SECRET level.
- Conduct CS and CSS functions to SOTGs in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive areas.
- Command and control and provide intelligence to deployed elements.
- Conduct mission planning.
- Operate as part of a CJFSOCC.⁶⁶
- Conduct E & E from a hostile or denied operational area.
- Rapidly deploy in support of CJTF, and NRF operations in accordance with established deployment timelines.

⁶² According to the NATO Special Operations Policy, CT is an overarching umbrella of offensive measures designed to reduce the vulnerability of Allied interests, their forces, individuals, and property to terrorism; to include Counter-Force activities and containment by military force and civil agencies. COIN are those military, paramilitary, political, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat an insurgency. CT and COIN are not the exclusive domain of NATO SOF, but SOF can effectively compliment the overarching application of diplomatic, economic, informational, and military operations applied in a COIN role. Asymmetric warfare, by virtue of its very nature, will usually involve NATO SOF conducting CT activities within COIN operations across the operational continuum.

⁶³ Based on draft NATO Special Operations Policy (MC 437) guidelines.

⁶⁴ As it was outlined in Allied Joint Publication AJP-01, these tasks are special reconnaissance (SR), direct action (DA), and military assistance (MA).

⁶⁵ A Special Operations Task Group (SOTG) in NATO is a national grouping of land and/or naval SOF that is employed to conduct Special Operations as directed by the Combined Joint Force Special Operations Component Command (CJFSOCC). SOTGs may also include ground units from national groupings of air SOF elements. An SOTG is composed of: (1) a HQ that is capable of conducting J1-J6 staff functions; (2) subordinate Special Operation Task Units (SOTUs), (3) CS units, and; (4) CSS elements.

⁶⁶ A Combined Joint Force Special Operations Component Command (CJFSOCC) in NATO is a multinational, joint component command, tailored to command and control its assigned SOF. CJFSOCCs are not standing headquarters in the NATO command structure, but are formed during implementation planning on an agreed SOF framework nation augmented by staff personnel from other nations. The CJFSOCC employs and controls SOF and can act as a supporting commander. A CJFSOCC is comprised of a combination of command and liaison elements, and force elements which are described in the following paragraphs.

- Conduct activities independently or in conjunction with conventional forces.
- Conduct overt, covert, or discreet operations.
- Provide force protection for own forces.

In light of both NATO's recent developments and the way the NATO Reaction Force (NRF) has employed SF elements so far during exercises, specified and implied core tasks for the HUNSF capability can already be discerned. These tasks are the following: direct action (DA); special reconnaissance (SR); military assistance (MA) and counterterrorism and counterinsurgency (CT & COIN). Counter proliferation of weapons of mass distraction (CP of WMD) is also an implied task derived from the draft NATO Special Operations Policy document.

3. EU SF Tasks and Requirements

Based on the draft version of the European Union Special Forces Policy guidelines, the development of the European Union (EU) military capability to meet the requirements of the future security environment will need the full range of military capabilities as well.⁶⁷ One of these capabilities is provided by Special Operations Forces. EU SF is based on nationally formed Special Operations Task Groups, which can reinforce, augment, or complement the other components of military forces, or conduct stand-alone operations as well.

The Hungarian SF unit can directly contribute to enhance mutual cooperation, support democracies, and sustain the full spectrum of military operations to include crisis or conflict, establish forward presence, provide early identification and assessment of a crisis, train friendly forces, and develop military liaison. In crisis, the Hungarian SF unit can provide area assessments and an early C4I capability, complement and reinforce political activity, and assist in the transition from crisis and conflict to peace if necessary.

To qualify as part of EU SF, the Hungarian SF capability must possess very similar capabilities to the ones described in relation to NATO. Therefore the proposed principle tasks are also similar to those of NATO. The European Union Special Operations Policy guidelines tasks are the following: direct action (DA); special

⁶⁷ Based on the European Special Forces Policy Guidelines (draft document). As the European Union has not yet approved the final version of the European Special Forces Policy document, the draft version is used here to identify tasks for Special Forces.

Reconnaissance (SR); military assistance (MA). Counter proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (CP of WMD) and combating terrorism (CBT) are also implied tasks derived from the draft of the European Union Special Operations Policy document.

4. Conclusions

The previous sections provided an overview of NATO and EU SF related tasks as well as the SF related issues of the Hungarian Military Strategy. It is important to emphasize that both NATO and EU basically perceive the same challenges and display the same views on how modern and effective combined military forces should look. It is also important to point out that the Hungarian Military Strategy is a draft document; therefore, it is subject to further changes.

Based upon the data analyzed so far, Table 1 provides an overall summary of the identified threat and the proposed tasks for the SF capability.

	Identified Threats	SF tasks
NATO	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Regional conflicts (ethnic conflicts, human rights abuses) 2. Spill over 3. Terrorism 4. Failed states 5. Proliferation of WMD 	<u>Specified:</u> SR DA MA CT&COIN <u>Implied:</u> CPWMD
EU	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Terrorism 2. Proliferation of WMD 3. Regional conflicts 4. State failure 5. Organized crime 	<u>Specified:</u> SR DA MA <u>Implied:</u> CPWMD CBT
Hungarian Security and Military Strategy	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Instability in the Euro-Atlantic region, local conflicts. 2. Threats from rouge states. 3. Terrorism. 4. Proliferation of WMD 	<u>Specified:</u> SR DA MA CBT <u>Implied:</u> CP WMD UW PSYOPS CIMIC IO HUMINT

Table 1. Hungarian Special Forces Task Matrix

As it was concluded in Table 1, the following tasks are proposed to be considered for the Hungarian SOF capability to develop. The principle specified NATO/EU tasks are direct action (DA), special reconnaissance (SR) and military assistance (MA). The implied NATO/EU tasks are counter proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (CPWMD) and combating terrorism (CBT). The specified Hungarian Military Strategy implied tasks are direct action (DA), special reconnaissance (SR), military assistance (MA) and combating terrorism (CBT). The implied Hungarian Military Strategy tasks are unconventional warfare (UW), psychological operations (PSYOPS), civil-military cooperation (CIMIC), information operations (IO), and human intelligence collection capability (HUMINT).

In conclusion, the proposed tasks for HUNSF that can form the basis of further analysis are the following:

1. Unconventional warfare (UW)
2. Special reconnaissance (SR)
3. Direct action (DA)
4. Military assistance (MA)
5. Counter proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (CP of WMD)
6. Combating terrorism (CBT)
7. Psychological operations (PSYOPS)
8. Civil-military cooperation (CIMIC)
9. Information operations (IO)
10. Human intelligence collection capability (HUMINT)

C. ACCOMPLISHMENT ANALYSIS

In this section, the proposed principal tasks will be defined and analyzed in further detail. Finding a definition for these activities is important from the perspective of the analysis. It is highly important that everyone understands the same military activities when talking about a specific aspect of the tasks of Special Forces. As these terms in Hungary are not yet well developed, it is important to adopt a definition for these tasks before analyzing their applicability. In order to identify their applicability in relevance to

each task the fourth question will be answered: can the Hungarian General Purpose Forces (GPF) or other security services accomplish the identified principal HUNSF tasks?

1. Establishing Categories

Another important aspect of the analysis in this chapter is realizing the difference between principal and collateral tasks. Christopher Lamb in his article, “Perspectives on Emerging SOF Roles and Missions,” offers a set of axioms that can guide the process of evaluation of proposed new tasks for HUNSF. The analyst warns “the tasks should fit the characteristics of Special Forces, and the fact that a military task must be carried out (and nobody else is capable of doing it) does not necessarily mean that SF should take responsibility for it.”⁶⁸ Listed below are the axioms that provide focus to the model in this thesis, and aim to further distinguish SF primary missions and the tasks that should be assigned to GPF. These axioms also provide categories for the analysis to follow.

- A. (Category A) If the mission has as a necessary condition for success, namely the requirement that SF operators undertake it, then it should be considered a primary SF mission.
- B. (Category B) If the odds for mission success significantly increase when SF perform or participate in the mission, then the task might constitute a collateral mission.
- C. (Category C) If the mission will only marginally be better performed by SF, it probably is not a SF mission, unless there are special circumstances. As a general rule, such a mission should not be formally assigned to SF, and the decision should be made on a case-by-case basis as circumstances demand.
- D. (Category D) If SF do not perform the mission as well as or better than conventional forces, the mission is inappropriate for SF, and should be assigned to the GPF or other services.

2. Defining Tasks and Accomplishment Analysis

a. Unconventional Warfare (UW)

In the future, UW will likely be the preferred means of exercising military influence as an element of national power. Globalization, technology advances, and the dominance of economic power over sheer military power will lead to nations challenging one another using asymmetric or unconventional means instead of using conventional

⁶⁸ Cristopher Lamb, “Perspectives on Emerging SOF Roles and Mission,” *Special Warfare*, (July 1995), 5.

formations. The importance of UW will lead to the ability to conduct unconventional warfare, which will become the benchmark in defining military strength and capability. “Employing unconventional warfare forces around the world to exercise national policy and influence will become the preferred alternative to large signature troop formations.”⁶⁹

Unfortunately, the purpose of an unconventional warfare force is not so easily defined. Certainly, it must serve the national interests; however, there is no clear task so easily defined as the “destruction of the enemy army” and no method so easily specified as “the direct application of violent force.” “Combat is not the only way to apply military power but it is certainly simple, direct and easily understood. Consequently, the basic questions about unconventional war have never been adequately answered.”⁷⁰ In the Joint Vision 2020, Henry H. Shelton also acknowledges that the “ambiguities creating an increasingly unsettled future are the perfect medium to conduct unconventional warfare”.⁷¹

Although there is much ongoing debate these days on defining unconventional warfare, the following definition is one of the most comprehensive; therefore, it can establish a framework for future discussion. UW involves “military and paramilitary operations that are not usually directed at the conventional objective of defeating the enemy’s military forces in combat. It includes subversion, sabotage, intelligence collection, training, and employing surrogate forces, offensive information operations, and offensive command and control warfare”.⁷²

It is the nature of UW that it is conducted by, with, or through the use of indigenous or surrogate forces, when practical. Conducting operations using local military or paramilitary forces to achieve goals will enable countries to effectively exercise foreign policy without appearing overly heavy-handed.

⁶⁹ Michael R. Kershner, Army Special Forces' Training Focuses on Unconventional Warfare, *Army Magazine*, (Arlington, VA: Association of the United States Army, July 2001), 26.

⁷⁰ Dennis Steele, “A Force of Great Utility That Cannot be Mass-Produced,” *Army Magazine* (April 1992), 13.

⁷¹ Henry H. Shelton, *Joint Vision 2020*, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, June 2000), 4.

⁷² Gary M. Jones and Christopher Tone, “Unconventional Warfare: Core purpose of Special Forces,” *Special Warfare*, (Summer 1999), 9.

It is understood that the HDF GPF may be able to conduct some aspects of these tasks; however, some situations involve complex combinations of missions such as humanitarian or disaster assistance, nation assistance and even counterinsurgency, all occurring at once and in the same area.⁷³ One of the focal points of this thesis is that conventional forces are not best suited as military forces for UW missions. These situations are characterized by a lack of a defined enemy, the need for influence, negotiation, and even community leadership, and by the ability to resort to deadly force if necessary. Only specially trained soldiers are capable of shifting rapidly between these roles and being able to realize the difference between the necessary actions required in different situations.

Based upon these guidelines, at present the Hungarian GPF are not capable of carrying out UW, and a special unit should be developed to incorporate this capability. The component best prepared to successfully accomplish these tasks is the Special Forces.⁷⁴ This supports the idea that unconventional warfare should be an integral part of the HUNSF capabilities; therefore, UW has as a necessary condition for success if HUNSF operators undertake it. The proposal of this thesis is to include UW as a principal HUNSF task.

b Combating Terrorism (CBT)

The United States Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms defines combating terrorism as “actions, including antiterrorism (defensive measures taken to reduce vulnerability to terrorist acts) and counterterrorism (offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism), taken to oppose terrorism throughout the entire threat spectrum.”⁷⁵

⁷³ The Haiti intervention of 1994 is a historical example of such a situation.

⁷⁴ The original purpose of the development of the Army Special Forces in the United States was to conduct unconventional warfare. These soldiers have proved in several cases in history that they are masters of UW and that this task uniquely fits the operating principles of Special Forces.

⁷⁵ Department of Defense, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. Joint Pub 1-02 (Washington, D. C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 10 June 1998), 88.

Superceding the two tasks in the Department of Defense definition (counterterrorism and antiterrorism) related to combating terrorism, the Hungarian Strategic Research Institute identifies⁷⁶ a third related task as well. This third CBT task is consequence management (CM). In relevance to the CBT tasks, all three must be taken into consideration when one establishes the framework of tasks for the HUNSF.

It is understood that within the HDF, Special Forces will provide limited military forces capable of deterring and defeating terrorist operations worldwide; nevertheless, because of the growing incidence of terror, future HUNSF detachments must increasingly have the skills and training necessary to conduct counterterrorist operations (CT), to include hostage rescue and attacks. Efforts to prevent attacks to the homeland will most probably continue to be controlled and coordinated by the Ministry of Internal Affairs, but in some special cases HUNSF may provide unique support in antiterrorism (AT) and consequence management (CM) operations as well (bearing in mind that law enforcement agencies will retain authority for response to terrorist incidents within Hungary).

It is also understood that defeating terrorist organizations based on actionable intelligence (and this way preventing homeland attacks) will increasingly be required by NATO. The most likely trend is that terrorist organizations will change tactics to avoid detection and defeat, most notably by operating in ever smaller cells, reducing communications, using advanced technology for attacks, blending into their chosen environments, and moving frequently. The key to attacking these multiple and fleeting targets will be rapid reaction forces able to exploit intelligence windfalls.

The Hungarian Defense Forces are clearly committed in the GWOT and HUNSF detachments, as part of NATO Special Forces, and will likely be in theater (or on high readiness alert inside the homeland) and able to respond quickly. In this case, they will become the logical force to execute CT operations outside NATO member countries, rather than deploying a single force with a distinct signature.

⁷⁶ Based on MC 472, NATO military concept to fight terrorism.

Moreover, carrying out military actions against a highly sophisticated terrorist organization requires special military expertise, which is obtained by Special Forces worldwide. This expertise calls for a focused attention on the ever-changing tactics of terrorists. The HDF GPF at present has no such unit and it is not likely that GPF units will achieve the required standard (in training, skills and education) in the near future. Therefore this task is best suited for the HUNSF, which is most likely to achieve the required standards.

Based on the abovementioned argument, it can be concluded that CBT clearly supports at least two national security policy objectives. The first objective is protecting the security of Hungarian citizens; the second objective is improving the capacity to participate and actively take part in international actions aimed at combating terrorism. Additionally, since CBT represents one of the main priorities for the NRF, it is likely that it will soon become a task for the EU SF. CBT has as a necessary condition for success if HUNSF operators undertake it; therefore, CBT should be a principle mission for the HUNSF unit. With the incorporation of CBT into the primary tasks of HUNSF, Hungary will better contribute with a specialized “niche capability” to the security of the Alliance and to the Euro-Atlantic burden-sharing efforts. As part of the CBT tasks, the HUNSF unit should train for sub-tasks like supporting intelligence operations, conducting attacks against terrorist networks and objectives, participating in hostage rescues, recovering sensitive material from terrorist organizations, capturing wanted individuals, and providing CT-related training to Allies and partners (that is military assistance in the CT field). These activities present features peculiar to DA and SR as well.

c. Special Surveillance and Reconnaissance (SR)

The United States Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms defines special reconnaissance as

reconnaissance and surveillance actions conducted by special operations forces to obtain or verify, by visual observation or other collection methods, information concerning the capabilities, intentions and activities of an actual or potential enemy or to

secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a particular area. It includes target acquisition, area assessment, and post strike reconnaissance.⁷⁷

From Vietnam to Desert Storm, Special Forces have enjoyed a long and successful history of conducting special reconnaissance in support of theater commanders. These operations required units and soldiers capable of operating behind enemy lines or in contested areas for extended periods, often with little external support. In this form, SF have acted as an information providers for analysts where the information later turns into intelligence.

In conventional conflicts, special reconnaissance missions generally take place before any movement by higher military echelons.⁷⁸ During these missions SF soldiers are sent behind enemy lines to conduct special surveillance before a strategic strike against an adversary, to gather intelligence about the enemy, and to monitor as much about the enemy's movement and operations as possible. SF soldiers survey enemy camps, machinery and weapons and send back the information to their commanders in order to best prepare for a strike.

In unconventional conflicts, special reconnaissance complements intelligence collection assets and systems by obtaining specific, well-defined, and time-sensitive information of strategic or operational significance. Special reconnaissance in most regional conflicts is best achieved through a human intelligence (HUMINT) function that places "eyes on target" in hostile, denied or politically sensitive territory. These tasks are best accomplished by Special Forces.

Modern as well as future, SR operations will not be limited in scope. The complex environment and the spectrum of operations change the traditional concepts of Special Forces conducting SR. The present HDF GPF includes reconnaissance units that are partially capable of carrying out the abovementioned tasks. They are mainly trained to fight in conventional conflicts; therefore, the reconnaissance methods in a built-up area and HUMINT techniques are not part of their training. These will form the two most

⁷⁷ Department of Defense, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. Joint Pub 1-02 (Washington, D. C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 10 June 1998), 418.

⁷⁸ In 2001 Special Forces were sent into Afghanistan months before conventional forces entered the country to fight the Taliban and the al-Qaeda network.

important components of SR in support of regional conflicts in the future. Special Forces are uniquely trained in carrying out these tasks and SR has as a necessary condition for success if HUNSF operators undertake it; therefore, SR should be a principal HUNSF task.

d. Direct Action (DA)

The United States Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms defines direct actions as

short duration strikes and other small-scale offensive actions by special operations forces to seize, destroy, capture, recover, or inflict damage on designated personnel or material. In the conduct of these operations, special operations forces may employ raid, ambush, or direct assault tactics; emplace mines and other munitions; conduct standoff attacks by fire from the air, ground, or maritime platforms; provide terminal guidance for precision guided munitions; conduct independent sabotage; and conduct anti-ship operations.⁷⁹

Direct action complements include attacking specific, well-defined targets of strategic significance. Direct action operations are normally limited in scope and duration, are aimed at providing a precise surgical strike, and usually incorporate a planned withdrawal from the immediate objective area. HUNSF soldiers may conduct these tasks unilaterally or in support of conventional operations.

Hungarian GPF have very limited capability in performing DA tasks in conventional-type operations. DA operations frequently occur at the same time beyond the reach of tactical weapon systems and strike capabilities of conventional forces. Conducting unilateral direct action will become a growing mission set for Special Forces of the future. An SF detachment's small signature, ease of movement, and regional cultural awareness will increasingly make it the force of choice for conducting direct action, and DA has as a necessary condition for success if HUNSF operators undertake it. It has to be emphasized that Special Forces should not be designed to engage opposing forces directly with standard tactics, nor are Special Forces suited to reactive or defensive

⁷⁹ Department of Defense, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. Joint Publication 1-02 (Washington, D. C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 10 June 1998), 137.

operations. Instead, SF DA missions should be aimed at creating conditions that will allow decisive military/political action to follow thereafter. Based upon the above mentioned argument, DA should be a principal mission of the HUNSF.

e. Military Assistance (MA)

The Hungarian Defense Forces, as part of a NATO mission, may have to provide direct or indirect military assistance to friendly or Allied forces in crisis situations or during conflicts in the future. Although military assistance is the most vaguely defined by NATO, nevertheless it is a principal NATO SF task. Military assistance is closely related to other proposed tasks (most importantly to UW skill sets). By analyzing the similarity between UW and MA, the HUNSF soldiers will be able to carry out any NATO related MA activities in case their UW capability is fully developed.

It is concluded that the importance of military assistance is going to increase in the future; therefore, it should be within the capabilities of the HUNSF soldiers to carry out. Nevertheless, MA should not be listed as a separate principal task of HUNSF, but rather as a subset of UW.

f. CP of WMD

The United States Department of Defense Doctrine for Joint Special Operations defines the counter proliferation of weapons of mass destruction as “actions taken to seize, destroy, render safe, capture or recover weapons of mass destruction.”⁸⁰

One can pick up any current security or military strategy document and it will contain ominous apocalyptic warnings about the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). “What was once an elite club comprised of rational states capable of qualified responses has become, and will continue to be, a growing collection of uninvited and less responsible members. Terrorists are having increasing success obtaining WMD technology and expertise.”⁸¹

⁸⁰ Department of Defense, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations, Joint Pub 3-05, (Washington, D. C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 17 April 1998), II-10.

⁸¹ Donald H. Rumsfeld, Quadrennial Defense Review, (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, September 2001), 6.

Given that globalization and information technology trends will continue, the threat of WMD use will continue to rise. The Hungarian Security Strategy also emphasizes the importance of this subject. The Defense Security Strategy of Hungary states that the HDF should contribute to the national and international efforts to counter the proliferation of WMD and arms. CP of WMD supports the same defense policy objectives as does CT. This capability will substantiate Hungary's contribution to the Euro-Atlantic security, since both NATO and the EU consider proliferation of WMD one of the major threats in the future as well.

Terrorists possessing WMD represent the acme of terror. The HDF should therefore be prepared to contribute to CP efforts by conducting specific sub-tasks such as preventing attacks against sensitive WMD targets, destroying or disabling non-WMD assets belonging to rogue states or terrorists, collecting intelligence related to WMD, and providing specific training to partners. Hungarian CP of WMD military capabilities at present are limited to identification and detection of NBC material, performed by NBC units of the GPF. A newly purchased mobile biological agent detection laboratory⁸² is amongst these capabilities. Many aspects of the abovementioned aspects of CP of WMD correlate with other already proposed tasks for the HUNSF. CP of WMD will only be marginally better if performed by HUNSF; therefore, it is probably not a HUNSF mission unless there are special circumstances (e.g. the integration of the biological laboratory with SF detachments in hostile territories and special attack scenarios on sensitive targets). Therefore, CP of WMD should not be formally assigned to SF, and the decision should be made on a case-by-case basis as circumstances demand.

g. Psychological Operations (PSYOP)

General Carl Stiner, U.S. Army Commander in Chief, U.S. Special Operations Command, stated in 1993 in his address at the Association of the U.S. Army Symposium "PSYOP [psychological operations] are the most powerful weapon in the SOF [special operations forces] inventory."⁸³ It is understood that PSYOP as a concept is just being formulated within the HDF; nevertheless, taking into consideration the

⁸² Most recently used, as the contribution of the HDF to the security of the 2004 Olympics.

⁸³ Carl Stiner, US Army Commander in Chief, US Special Operations Command, Address at the Association of the US Army Symposium, April 1993.

significance of PSYOP, it has to be analyzed in relation to SF. In the HDF, the PSYOP doctrine has recently been formulated. The doctrine itself is influenced by foreign (mainly United States) doctrinal principles and it can be concluded that Hungarian PSYOP activities will aim to “induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behaviors favorable to the originator’s objectives by conducting planned operations to convey selected information to foreign audiences.”⁸⁴ It is also emphasized that PSYOP is treated within the HDF as a separate entity from Special Forces; therefore, this section of the thesis identifies possible areas of cooperation between PSYOP and SF, and suggests a close relation between the two subjects in the future. The recommendations are based upon the United States Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations.⁸⁵ This doctrine suggests many areas where PSYOP may support SF core tasks.

(1) Unconventional Warfare (UW). A major component of UW is psychological preparation of the battle space. Conventional PSYOP techniques may be applicable during UW operations, but because of the changing operational environment, different target groups exist. The four major UW targets of PSYOP are “the uncommitted, hostile sympathizers, hostile military forces and resistance sympathizers.”⁸⁶

(2) Direct Action (DA). PSYOP in support of SF DA tasks depend on the situation, mission, and type of forces involved. When PSYOP forces participate in DA, their presence needs to be closely coordinated and linked to Hungarian public diplomacy and command information programs. One of the most important PSYOP objectives in DA operations is the explanation of the purpose of the operation to counter the adversary’s reaction and ensure that friendly, neutral, and hostile audiences know what has occurred and why. Other common PSYOP objectives in DA may include influencing different target groups in the operational area, exploiting and demoralizing potential adversaries, assessing the

⁸⁴ The 2000 Special Operations Forces Posture Statement, (Washington D.C.: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense), <http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/sof/index.html>, 43, Internet, accessed May 2005.

⁸⁵ Joint Publication 3-53, Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations.

⁸⁶ Joint Publication 3-53, VI-8.

psychological impact of the operation, reducing the adverse effects of mission failure, capitalizing on DA mission success in strategic PSYOP, and supporting DA missions in contingency operations.

(3) Special Reconnaissance (SR)

PSYOP may support SR by assessing the psychological impact of the operation to include the impact on compromised operations, limiting or negating the effects of compromise, conducting deception operations, and providing personnel to help in area assessments.

(4) Combating Terrorism (CBT)

PSYOP must integrate with other security operations to target terrorism. The aim of these operations is to place the terrorists on the psychological defensive. To do so, PSYOP forces analyze the goals of the terrorists and use psychological programs to frustrate those goals. One of the most important PSYOP objectives in CBT operations is countering the adverse psychological effects of a terrorist act. Other common PSYOP objectives in CBT may include lessening popular support for the terrorist cause, publicizing incentives to the local people to inform on the terrorist groups, deterring terrorist acts by persuading potential terrorists of the futility of their actions, and promoting legitimacy.

(5) Counter Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (CPWMD). PSYOP may support operations to counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in numerous ways. Specifically, one of the most important PSYOP objectives in CPWMD operations is discrediting the adversary or non-state actor with neutral groups and the adversarial group itself. Other common PSYOP objectives in CPWMD may include strengthening HN support of programs that provide positive populace control and protection from weapons of mass destruction, explaining the purpose of the operation to counter the adversary action, assessing the psychological impact of the operation, and providing personnel to help in area assessments.

It can be concluded that psychological operations (PSYOP) are planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to

influence the emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. It is likely that HUNSF will play an integral part in supporting the strategic aspects of PSYOP as part of a larger multinational contingent. Based on the above analysis and suggestions, PSYOP mission success will significantly increase if HUNSF perform or participate in the carrying out of PSYOP tasks. HUNSF soldiers will have the capability to carry out the abovementioned tasks (UW, DA, SR, CBT, CPWMD), with some of them being primary tasks of HUNSF. The HUNSF elements will most likely support psychological operations in order to support strategic, operational, and tactical goals and objectives. Therefore, PSYOP should constitute a collateral HUNSF task. It is also suggested that (based upon the many similarities and the wide range of common tasks between PSYOP and SF) a close cooperation between the two subjects should be established within the HDF in the future.

h. Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC)

It is understood that the CIMIC as a concept is just being formulated within the HDF and at present is closely related to PSYOP. Nevertheless it is believed that civil-military cooperation facilitate military operations and consolidate operational activities by “assisting commanders in establishing, maintaining, influencing, or exploiting relations between military forces and civil authorities, both governmental and non-governmental, and the civilian population in a friendly, neutral, or hostile area of operation.”⁸⁷ The purpose of this section of the thesis is to analyze CIMIC in relation to SF and to identify possible areas of cooperation for the future. In the HDF, the CIMIC doctrine has recently been formulated and a CIMIC command at the operational level has been established with the goal of supporting national and international CIMIC objectives. The HDF has the capability to provide CIMIC teams to achieve these goals. The HUNSF in the future can provide support and information for CIMIC activities. This thesis identifies some areas for future cooperation. In addition to military intelligence, HUNSF cooperating with CIMIC teams can develop information concerning the location, state of mind, and health of civilians and the physical characteristics of the operational area, and disseminate information concerning the safety and welfare of the indigenous civilian population. HUNSF (in most cases being co-located with the indigenous population) can

⁸⁷ The 2000 Special Operations Forces Posture Statement, (Washington D.C.: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense), <http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/sof/index.html>, 43, Internet, accessed May 2005.

influence a civilian population's attitude and prepare it for CIMIC involvement across the range of military operations. HUNSF can also maximize CIMIC efforts by exploiting the goodwill created by HUNSF detachment efforts in the area of medical and veterinary aid, construction, and public facilities activities. During disaster-relief operations, HUNSF can foster international support for host governments and coordinate publicity efforts. HUNSF will also be able to conduct assessments before and after the operation to determine the most effective application of effort and document the results, and provide direct support to CIMIC conducting emergency relocation operations.⁸⁸

As a corollary, when conducted within the framework of a viable civil-military concept, HUNSF activities can contribute to the overall success of CIMIC activities. It is also obvious that many aspects of the abovementioned aspects of CIMIC correlate with other already proposed tasks for the HUNSF. CIMIC will be only marginally better if performed by HUNSF; therefore, it probably is not a HUNSF mission, unless there are special circumstances. Therefore, CIMIC should not be formally assigned to SF, and the decision should be made on a case-by-case basis as circumstances demand.

i. Information Operations (IO)

Future military operations will be as much about winning intellectually as about winning with sheer kinetic military power. Information operations (IO) will be a critical component of winning intellectually in any form of crisis or war. Probably the most important aspect of information operations is providing an information advantage over the adversary. This advantage is most sought after in asymmetric conflicts. The definition of IO can be found in Joint Publication 3-13, but for the purposes of this thesis the description suggested in the Department of the Army, Special Forces Operations (FM 3-05.20) document is used. "Actions taken to affect adversary information and information systems, while defending one's own information and information systems to achieve information superiority in support of national military strategy."⁸⁹

⁸⁸ JP 3-57, Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations, and JP 3-7.1, Joint Doctrine for Civil Affairs.

⁸⁹ Department of the Army, Special Forces Operations, FM 3-05.20 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, June 2001), 2-19.

IO as a concept is just being formulated within the HDF. There is no existing doctrine or organization within the Defense Staff stating who is responsible for the coordination of the whole IO spectrum. In the future it will remain centrally planned at the highest civilian as well as military levels to facilitate interagency coordination. Consequently, HUNSF (most likely within the CJTF concept, as part of a larger Alliance force) will likely undertake IO missions in support of a larger integrated campaign involving multiple elements of IO. General Hugh Shelton in 1999 highlighted the need for a future information capability: “The SOF operator of the 21st century, will most likely require greater math, computer and language skills”.⁹⁰ In the future, HUNSF soldiers are likely to be required to conduct offensive information operations. New technologies will enable SF soldiers to quickly understand the operational environment and to leverage available combat power in a timely manner. “As future IO become more complex, the military services will likely be faced with creating specialized organizations to cope with mission expansion.”⁹¹

Special Forces in the United States are already tasked to perform IO. In the future it is expected that SF will fully define its own roles and missions and support specific activities. These will most likely include offensive skills in deception, electronic warfare, computer network attacks, and psychological operations. SF units will most likely be required to support and conduct defensive IO to protect themselves and safeguard their own information and systems from attack as well.

It can be concluded that information operations conducted to gain information dominance are essential to all the patterns of operations. They consist of both offensive and defensive efforts to create a disparity between what is known about the operational environment and what the enemy knows about its operational environment. IO mission success will significantly increase if HUNSF perform or participate in the carrying out of offensive IO. HUNSF soldiers will have the capability to identify, locate,

⁹⁰ Hugh H. Shelton, *Quality People: Selecting and Developing Members of U.S. SOF*, *Special Warfare Magazine* Spring 1998, 2.

⁹¹ Henry H. Shelton, *Joint Vision 2020*, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, June 2000), 30.

target, and attack enemy command, control, communications, computer, and intelligence (C4I) nodes. Therefore, information operations should constitute a collateral HUNSF task.

j. Human Intelligence Collection Capability (HUMINT)

Special Forces must have the skills required to gather human information across the entire spectrum of conflict. Current historical examples have proved that having SF deployed in or around potential hot spots during conflicts greatly enhances human intelligence efforts.

Personal contact during peacetime engagement with sources in a potentially hostile country or neighboring region is a primary advantage. It has to be understood though that SF undertaking overt human intelligence collection (as an integral part of their UW activity) is not plausible. This will quickly destroy any rapport and freedom of operation that a detachment has been able to develop over time because the host senses that they are collecting information rather than advising and assisting local nationals. Therefore, SF detachments must have increased skills for planning, coordinating, and conducting clandestine intelligence collection. Of even more importance will be the ability to handle potential intelligence sources when they present themselves based on personal relationships developed between SF and foreign nationals. SF detachments must be able to cultivate and develop such a source. In most cases, traditionally this is the task for intelligence agencies, but in some cases these agencies are not in the operational theatre in such a large numbers as SF soldiers are. At the same time, passing sources to intelligence agencies (at a later stage, after recruitment) can destroy the trust already established between a potential source and SF. Therefore tradecraft and related special techniques must be taught as a common operational skill.

Although SF provides an outstanding source of human intelligence throughout the spectrum of conflict, they must be assisted by the very latest in advanced electronic surveillance capabilities. Joint Vision 2020 states, “Accepting and taking advantage of technology is key to achieving battlefield effectiveness.”⁹² “SF detachments

⁹² Henry H. Shelton, Joint Vision 2020, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, June 2000), 22.

must be skilled at using the latest surveillance technology. Visual, audible, tactile, and aural remote surveillance devices must become standard equipment for SF detachments.”⁹³

The human dimension is the cornerstone of success in future operations and is the most important factor in the fight against networked organizations. Current HDF GPF are not trained to carry out HUMINT in support of operations. Mission success in HUMINT will significantly increase if SF perform or participate in the mission; therefore, HUMINT should constitute a collateral HUNSF task.

3. Conclusion

Based upon the analysis in Part 2 or Section C of this chapter, Table 2 proposes the tasks of the HUNSF unit.

IDENTIFIED TASKS OF THE HUNGARIAN SPECIAL FORCES UNIT		
Primary tasks (category A)	Collateral tasks (category B)	Case by case tasks (category C)
UW, CBT, SR, DA	HUMINT, IO, PSYOP	CPWMD, CIMIC

Table 2. Proposed Tasks of the Hungarian Special Forces Unit

The identified primary tasks for HUNSF are the following:

- Unconventional warfare (UW)
- Combating terrorism (CBT)
- Special reconnaissance (SR)
- Direct action (DA)

The identified collateral tasks for HUNSF are the following.

- Human intelligence (HUMINT)
- Information operations (IO)
- Psychological operations (PSYOPS)

⁹³ Donald H. Rumsfeld, Quadrennial Defense Review, (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, September 2001), 6.

In relation with the following tasks, the decision should be made on a case-by-case basis as circumstances demand and the level and form of participation of HUNSF decided upon:

- Counter proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (CP of WMD)
- Civil-military cooperation (CIMIC)

D. CHAPTER SUMMARY

Special Forces with their organizational flexibility, rapid mobility and underlying strength of exceptionally well-trained personnel already make major contributions to national defense worldwide, and one of their major tasks is to contribute to worldwide peace and stability through working with and through the local forces.

In the first part of this thesis (Chapters II and III), the Hungarian national security challenges and the HDF military tasks were analyzed, taking into account the relevant NATO and EU SF requirements as well, in order to identify the appropriate tasks for the HUNSF. As a result of the analysis, the proposed primary tasks for the HUNSF unit are:

1. Unconventional warfare (UW)
2. Combating terrorism (CBT)
3. Special reconnaissance (SR)
4. Direct action (DA)

Collateral tasks for the unit were further identified as follows:

5. Human intelligence (HUMINT)
6. Information operations (IO)
7. Psychological operations (PSYOPS)

Counter proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (CP of WMD) and civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) were proposed to be excluded from HUNSF tasks; nevertheless, it was suggested that in relation with these tasks, the decision should be made on a case-by-case basis as circumstances demand and the level and form of participation of HUNSF is decided upon. These identified tasks will form the basis of further analysis when other aspects of HUNSF (most importantly command and control and training) are taken into consideration throughout the thesis.

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IV. EFFECTIVE C4I SUPPORT OF HUNSF

This chapter introduces the second part of the thesis, on the second criterion of successful special operations: the concept of effective command, control, and intelligence support. Therefore, the purpose of this chapter is to analyze the command and control relationships and to address the intelligence requirements of the Hungarian Special Forces.

Due to the nature of the Hungarian Special Forces unit that is mainly employed abroad and earmarked for use within the North Atlantic Alliance and EU, the HUNSF will most probably be employed as part of a multinational element. Therefore, during the analysis of the command and control relationships in this chapter, both the National Command Elements and HUNSF capability within the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Union will be considered.

Effective command and control of Special Forces missions will not come automatically. The characteristics of both decision makers and operators tend to undermine effective command and control. For example, as the Senate report on the Task Force Ranger unit noted:

One of the weaknesses of a unit, like Task Force Ranger, whose combat capabilities are unparalleled, is the belief by the unit members and its commanders that they can accomplish any mission. Because of the supreme confidence of special operations forces, the chain of command must provide more oversight to this type of unit, than to conventional forces.⁹⁴

Chapter III outlined the debate of the direct and indirect capabilities of Special Forces. Effective integration of the two approaches must be taken into consideration when one designs the command and control architecture for the HUNSF. The organizational defects are two-fold: lack of integration across bodies of functional expertise and familiarity with SF capabilities. Lack of integration undermines complex endeavors such as counterterrorism and counter proliferation. SF capabilities are critical in these activities but should not be used without regard for a host of political, diplomatic

⁹⁴ Senators Kohn Warner (R-VA) and Carl Levin (D-MI), "Review of the Circumstances Surrounding the Ranger Raid on October 3-4, 1993 in Mogadishu, Somalia," September 29, 1995, 49-50.

and legal issues.⁹⁵ The lack of regular communication between civilian and even military decision makers also produces subversion of the chain of command, and will be analyzed later on in this chapter. Civilian decision makers often lack a sufficient understanding of Special Forces operations to oversee them effectively. On the other hand, senior military commanders may also lack such understanding and often have prejudices against Special Forces.⁹⁶

Although Special Forces unquestionably have a strategic significance, the command and control relationship between Special Forces units (operators) and senior civilian and military decision makers (executives) is too distant. It is the task of operational leaders (managers) to bridge this gap.⁹⁷ They have to make sure that senior leaders understand the tactical capabilities and limitations of Special Forces in order to be able to employ the HUNSF most effectively and discreetly.

This understanding and discretion can only be developed through direct contact with SF operational leaders and familiarity with their modes of operation, thus building a culture for the Special Forces and making sure that these forces are used correctly. With a familiarity of these issues, senior leaders are more likely to examine and critically guide strategic operations from conception through completion. The failure to coordinate policy and operations can contribute to the failure of the mission itself, which in turn has strategic and political consequences; therefore, before the analysis of the possible command, control and intelligence relationships, three organizational issues, namely culture, the correct use of Special Forces, and doctrinal requirements, have to be identified.

⁹⁵ David Tucker and Christopher J. Lamb, "Restructuring Special Operations Forces for Emerging Threats," *Strategic Forum*, (No. 219, January, 2006), 4.

⁹⁶ For example of a civilian decision maker failing to understand the complexities and risks of a Special Forces mission, see Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, *The Age of Sacred Terror* (New York, Random House, 2002), 318 or Richard Shultz, "Showtoppers," *The Weekly Standard* (January, 26, 2004), 25-33. Shultz reports that senior military leaders did not trust SOF.

⁹⁷ The use of terms "operators," "managers" and "executives" are based on Wilson's *Bureaucracy* and represent the appropriate levels of decision makers within the bureaucratic organization, understood by the author. James Q Wilson, *Bureaucracy: What government agencies do and why they do it*, (New York: Basic Books, 1989).

A. CULTURE AND MISSION

Zegart suggests that “structural choices made at the agency’s [CIA] birth had lasting implications for its development.”⁹⁸ She emphasizes that the CIA has always proved remarkably resistant to the force of events and change in mission, design or operations, even when failures destroyed the agency’s morale. Therefore, it is imperative to build the right organizational culture at the beginning, and there is hardly any room for error, as there is not much room for maneuvering later on. This section of the thesis identifies the problematic areas related to culture and the sense of mission for the Hungarian Special Forces as an organization.

Wilson asserts that “all organizations have one or more cultures, just as all people have a personality.”⁹⁹ The mistake that is often made, though, is to assume that an organization will have a culture. In fact, many will have several cultures that are often in conflict. Another mistake is “to give so much emphasis to culture that one loses sight of the objective conditions of organizational participation.”¹⁰⁰ It is important for future successful Special Operations to understand the importance of culture within an organization and to build this culture purposefully from the beginning.

An organization acquires a distinctive competence or sense of mission when it has not only answered the question “What shall we do?”, but also the question “What shall we be?”¹⁰¹ No administrators find it easy to create a sense of mission; government executives find it especially difficult. When goals are vague (as in the case of the HUNSF right now), it is hard to convey to operators a simple and vivid understanding of what they are supposed to do.¹⁰² Thus, tasks will get defined in ways which administrators have only limited control, with the result that the definition adopted by the operators may be one that the executive does not intend and may not desire.

⁹⁸ Amy B. Zegart, *Flawed by Design*, (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1999), 221.

⁹⁹ James Q Wilson, *Bureaucracy: What government agencies do and why they do it*, (New York: Basic Books, 1989), 93

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid*, 92.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid*, 92

¹⁰² *Ibid*, 95.

Sometimes an organization is endowed with a sense of mission, despite ambiguous goals. This usually occurs during the formative experience of the organization, an experience shaped and interpreted by a founder who imposes his or her will on the first generation of operators in a way that profoundly affects succeeding generations.¹⁰³ Therefore, this period of Special Forces capability development in Hungary is a window of opportunity to create this sense of mission and culture. What is the link between the mission and culture? Wilson suggests “when an organization has a culture that is widely shared and warmly endorsed by operators and managers alike, we say that the organization has a mission.”¹⁰⁴

The great advantage of the mission is that it permits the head of the agency to be more confident that in particular cases, operators will act in ways that the head of the agency would have acted had he or she been in their shoes. There are fewer distortions in the flow of information because both the sender and the recipient of the message share common understandings.¹⁰⁵ It is especially important in the case of Hungarian special operations, because the organization’s operations have a strategic significance; nevertheless, the success of the mission depends on the operators at the tactical level. What are the culture related issues that should be looked upon when building this organization? Wilson recommends taking into account three important criteria:¹⁰⁶

- Tasks that are not part of the culture will not be attended with the same energy and resources as are devoted tasks that are part of the culture.
- Organizations in which two or more cultures struggle for supremacy will experience serious conflict.
- Organizations will resist taking on new tasks that seem incompatible with its dominant culture.

¹⁰³ James Q Wilson, *Bureaucracy: What government agencies do and why they do it*, (New York: Basic Books, 1989),96.

¹⁰⁴Ibid, 95. Mission is used here in a way to mean what Philip Selznick calls “distinctive competence” or Morton Halperin calls “essence”. Among the other scholars who have made use of the term are Jonathan Bendor, Jerry Mashaw, Robert F. Durant, and Martha Derthick.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid, 109.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid, 101.

Therefore, a major responsibility of senior military and political leaders in Hungary is not only to infuse the organization with value, but also to discover a way by which different values can productively coexist. Culture is the perfect cohesion if it is developed and maintained correctly.

B. CORRECT USE OF HUNSF

For all the benefits and utility that Special Forces can offer, they do carry their fair share of risks and possess inherent characteristics that may be inimical to their intended purpose and utility. It is, therefore, critical that those charged with the responsibility of controlling and directing the use of SOF possess a thorough knowledge of their functions in order to surmount these challenges.

Some of the challenges associated with the employment of Special Forces include the incorrect use of SF and the subversion of the chain of command. This milieu of potential negatives associated with HUNSF will be examined in further detail, with a view to identifying ways in which these challenges may be diminished.

1. Theories Regarding the Correct Use of Special Forces

Winters and Paro present a theory to demonstrate the misuse of SF. They demonstrate this principle based on the expected value (EV) and expected cost (EC) associated with the execution of a specific mission for any given force type. In summary, they posit that misuse occurs when “SF are used while GPF [General Purpose Forces] have an absolute and comparative advantage, or SF are not used while they have an absolute and comparative advantage over GPF.”¹⁰⁷ This theory presents a useful guide in the employment of the HUNSF in pursuit of any particular mission or operation.

Gray also proposes answering four questions that can help in determining whether or not SOF should be employed: “(1) what is it that only SF can do? (2) What is it that SF can do well? (3) What is it that SF tends to do poorly? (4) What is it that SF cannot do at all?”¹⁰⁸ Not surprisingly, similar criteria were also used during the identification of the HUNSF- related tasks. Making such a determination will reduce the risk of misuse of SOF and simultaneously increase the likelihood of mission success.

¹⁰⁷ Edward G. Winters and Kent A. Paro, *The misuse of special operations forces*, (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, December 1994), 18.

¹⁰⁸ Colin S. Gray, *Explorations in strategy*, (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1966), 185.

Cohen further indicates that there are three principles which can reduce the risk of SF being misused. Firstly, SF missions must be strictly defined and the troops themselves must be clear as to their role and mandate. Secondly, the autonomy normally associated with SF, and which is necessary at times for the speed and flexibility required for mission success, must be balanced with the appropriate control mechanisms to keep SF focused within their mandate. Thirdly, in order to maintain the proper basis of civil-military relations, politicians must exercise restraint and resist the temptation to be amateur soldiers.¹⁰⁹ Gray confirms this principle when he states that, “First-class special operations forces have the potential for great strategic utility, but political leaders and strategists must understand how to realize that potential.”¹¹⁰

A failure to properly use SF can have disastrous consequences. While Gray’s template was forwarded in 1996 and relevant to the dominance of small wars, it should assume even greater importance in the HDF, as Hungary seeks ways and means of addressing the far more challenging issues of terrorism and other transnational threats arising in the world today.

2. Organizational Pitfalls and the Subversion of the Chain of Command

Through the analysis of historical examples, one can conclude that “mainly two problems have led to the misuse of SF in the past: lack of institutional control and a lack of understanding.”¹¹¹ Given the strategic value that Special Forces can offer the civilian authorities, the potential exists for the creation of an alternate or parallel chain of command. In fact, Cohen indicates that “the movements of a small unit may now be directed from political headquarters – and often are.”¹¹² While recognizing the primacy of civilian control over the military in democratic societies and the possibility and remittance of such civilian authorities in directing the operations of the HUNSF in particular circumstances, every effort must be made to keep this to a minimum and to

¹⁰⁹ Eliot A. Cohen, *Commandos and politicians: elite military units in modern democracies*, (Boston, MA: Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 1978), 97-100.

¹¹⁰ Colin S. Gray, *Explorations in strategy*, (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1966), 149.

¹¹¹ Edward G. Winters, Kent A. Paro, *The Misuse of Special Operations Forces*, NPS Thesis, 1994, xi.

¹¹² Eliot A. Cohen, *Commandos and politicians: elite military units in modern democracies*, (Boston, MA: Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 1978), 48.

utilize the normal military chain of command in the employment of the Hungarian Special Forces. This will reduce the likelihood of confusion within the SF, arising from orders at variance with each other from more than one legitimate source.

However, restricting the HUNSF to the existing military chain of command can also be counter-productive and create problems. These problems include dealing with the friction and jealousy normally associated with SOF/GPF relationships and a lack of understanding about the use of SOF within existing conventional chains. Thus, the "SF option" may never reach key decision makers, but rather be squashed from the very outset by "conventional" thinkers within the military.

An alternate (political) chain of command may also be abused by politicians and misguided SF commanders with predictably negative results. A specially-trained military unit operating outside a unified chain of command presents a higher risk for seizing power from the civilian authorities, as borne out of the failed attempt of some units of the French Foreign Legion and Paratroops to stage a *coup d'etat* through an airborne assault on Paris.¹¹³ Therefore, a unified chain of command will reduce the risk of the HUNSF playing alternate command structures against each other to achieve their own ends, or to simply adopt an approach which may be outside their mandate.

3. Conclusions and Suggestions

In Hungary, at present, no clear description of the correct use of Special Forces exists; moreover, a widely accepted analytical definition of the correct use of SF is lacking within the SF community or anywhere else. Yet any Special Forces soldier can give a catch phrase example of what they believe "misuse" is. The concepts and problem areas described above serve the mere purpose of generating ideas for future analysis.

What is the cost of improper use of SF? If misinterpretations to the tasks of HUNSF occur, it is possible that the HUNSF unit will not be used appropriately, so in other words it will be "misused." The doctrinal foundation to ensure the correct use of SF exists in other countries, and it is best developed in the United States. This should be taken as an example when formulating the policy for future use and identifying the command and control relationships for the HUNSF.

¹¹³ This failed as the attempt did not have the support of all the SOF forces, as the Air Force, Navy, nor the conscript elements of the French military support the *coup d'etat*.

Joint Pub 3-05.3 (Joint Special Operations Operational Procedures) advises how to avoid misapplication of SF by applying the criteria of appropriateness, feasibility, and supportability. The doctrine states, “Commanders should recognize the high value and the limited resources of SF and ensure that the benefits of successful mission execution are measurable and in balance with the risks inherent in the mission.”¹¹⁴ This definition can certainly serve as a guideline to start with identifying the problem areas that can lead to the improper use of Special Forces.

The results of misinterpretations can be inefficiency and induced changes within the HUNSF community, which ultimately have the potential risk of reabsorption by conventional forces. In this case, HUNSF is most often used to carry out tasks that the HDF GPF is perfectly capable of, and the strategic importance and force-multiplier capability is not exploited to its full extent. Assuming that something must be done by either HUNSF or the HDF GPF, improper use occurs at the decision point because decision makers lack the full understanding of SF limitations and capabilities.¹¹⁵ Therefore, it is imperative to establish clear command and control relationships for tasking the HUNSF, and always to ask for the advice of subject matter experts before the decision is made. Commanders with a conventional mindset may not be able to fully exploit the capabilities of HUNSF and can make improper decisions during the planning of tasks for Special Forces.

Improper use of SF can also result in, perhaps, the most catastrophic option, which is either a failed mission or an inordinate price for success. In this case, two costs are paid, and neither is acceptable. First, improper use may result in a failed mission. In this case either, SF were used and failed, or they were not used and the mission failed. Proper use may not ensure mission success, but it certainly creates a favorable environment. Second, misuse may result in paying an inordinate price for success. This causes an overall political and military inefficiency that may teach decision makers the wrong lessons and may result in more inefficiency down the road, which fosters a continual cycle of paying a high price for success.

¹¹⁴ Joint Special Operations Operational Procedures Joint Pub 3-05, IV-8.

¹¹⁵ In this case the HUNSF is tasked with a new task that is not appropriate. In the case of tasking HUNSF in the future, planners should always refer to the criteria proposed in Chapter II, section C of this thesis.

Summing up the abovementioned ideas, this thesis suggests that through lack of understanding and the potential subversion of command and control channels of the HUNSF the cost can result in the following:

- Inefficient use of specialized assets for conventional tasks, channeling of limited resources towards programs of conventional nature at the expense of core capabilities, and possible inter-service tensions.
- Decrease in HUNSF's ability to think creatively.
- Threat of reabsorption by conventional forces.
- Mission failure or inordinate price for success.

In order to avoid these pitfalls, commanders at all levels should be educated on the capabilities and limitations of Special Forces (the issue of education will be discussed in further detail in the following chapter). Military educational institutions at all levels should incorporate HUNSF-related subjects into their syllabus. HUNSF should also be an active participant of national and international exercises, and national doctrinal publications should be modified accordingly.

The misuse of SF is also directly related to the doctrine development process. If the doctrine clearly states the instances when HUNSF should be used, then there should be less examples of improper tasking; nevertheless, there can be some exceptions when SF has to be used, and they cannot all be looked upon within the framework of the doctrine.

C. DOCTRINE REQUIREMENTS, STANDARDS, AND PROCEDURES

The HUNSF doctrine should be developed according to national needs, but based on a NATO-wide basis in order to provide Hungary with guidelines for development of HUNSF capabilities. The reason for international cooperation is that the HUNSF unit is probably going to be deployed in a multinational contingent. Therefore, the HUNSF doctrine, operational requirements, and standards and procedures have to be coordinated with the Allied partners. Of course, where necessary, the HUNSF doctrine will be developed taking into account the present Hungarian doctrines. Interoperability standards and procedures should also be developed and implemented to achieve a HUNSF capability that will meet joint and combined needs and enable the integration of national capabilities.

In the NATO Special Forces doctrine, operational requirements and standards and procedures are coordinated as follows:

- The doctrine is developed on a NATO-wide basis in order to provide nations with guidelines for development of SOF capabilities. Where necessary, the SOF doctrine is developed taking into account appropriate extant national doctrines.
- Operational requirements documents and mission need statements are incorporated into the SF doctrine, where appropriate.
- Interoperability standards and procedures, particularly CIS and intelligence applications, are developed and implemented to achieve a Special Operations capability that will meet joint and combined needs and enable the integration of national capabilities.

D. COMMAND AND CONTROL RELATIONSHIPS OF THE HUNSF

In this section of the thesis, three main areas of the command and control relationships of the Hungarian Special Forces capability will be analyzed. The HUNSF unit first has to establish a clear chain of command within the Hungarian Defense Forces and with other cooperating agencies in Hungary. On the other hand, because the Hungarian Special Forces capability most probably will be deployed in the framework of NATO and the European Union Special Forces Task Groups or as part of a bilateral agreement, Allied and EU command and control channels are also analyzed here.

1. National Command and Control of Special Forces

Since Special Forces have strategic significance and many special operations have political implications, the Hungarian Special Forces unit should be placed directly under command of the Hungarian Defense Staff. Within the Defense Staff, the J-3 department and its current operations is responsible for planning, initiating and tracking operations.

Current security problems are so complex and fast evolving that they require the integrated expertise of many government agencies and even non-governmental organizations. To achieve this integration, the HUNSF capability needs a permanent “horizontal integration team” to draw upon, but cut across functional areas to produce sound, integrated, and adaptive solutions; therefore, the establishment of a section within the J-3 of the Defense Staff (the Special Forces Coordination Office) is necessary to take on this task. The chief of this section should report directly to the Chief of the Defense Staff. Figure 4 presents an overview of the relationships of the national command and

control concept for HUNSF and the main tasks of the Special Forces Coordination Office (SFCO). Apart from horizontal integration, this team should develop strategies and plans for specific problems, such as the military aspects of terrorism, and oversee the implementation of these plans as well as budgetary and acquisition issues. Making the transition to new horizontal organizations will be difficult. In particular, achieving unity of effort will require, at one level, violating the principle of unity of command.

The creation of the SFCO is necessary for many reasons. First of all, Special Forces differ from the Hungarian Defense Forces General Purpose Forces in several key aspects. This difference has to be realized and understood, otherwise the HUNSF development process can divert from the right track. Development of the Hungarian Special Forces capability represents many unique challenges. These challenges can only be countered by specially trained personnel who understand the essence of Special Forces, the unique role they represent in the military, and have the attributes of a Special Forces soldier. Since the development of the Special Forces is a long process, upcoming problems can only be anticipated by those who understand the true nature of Special Forces. During the design of HUNSF there is no room for error, because even small mistakes can result in mission failure in the future. Correcting mistakes or shortcomings on the other hand takes a long time. Therefore, the main goal of the SFCO should be to direct the HUNSF capability development process at the manager level and interact with all managerial level agencies related to the development process.¹¹⁶

¹¹⁶ The use of terms “operators,” “managers” and “executives” are based on Wilson’s *Bureaucracy* and represent the appropriate levels of decision makers within the bureaucratic organization, understood by the author. James Q Wilson, *Bureaucracy: What government agencies do and why they do it*. (New York: Basic Books, 1989).




Figure 4. Overview of the National Command and Control Concept

Moreover, because HUNSF is most likely to be employed in a multinational environment, the Special Forces Coordination Office should build a working relationship with the international Special Forces community as well, especially with SF managerial level organizations of NATO, the EU and neighboring countries.

Second, the Hungarian military and political leadership has to be briefed on the situation of the HUNSF development process. The executive level leadership needs to understand the exact capabilities, limitations and the correct use of HUNSF in order to be able to maximize its capacity. Therefore, the Special Forces Coordination Office has the responsibility to keep the executives updated, correctly informed and provide expert advice to the policy makers in the Ministry of Defense. The Special Forces Coordination

Office should also have the responsibility to oversee all media-related issues of HUNSF and provide guidance in the creation of an "image" for the Hungarian Special Forces in order to facilitate the right kind of perception towards the public.

The third main area of the Special Forces Coordination Office's responsibilities is to plan, supervise and distribute tasks to the tactical level (the operator level of the HUNSF unit) itself. During the capability development phase there are myriad tasks that have to be supervised and coordinated at the managerial level (the important ones are the procurement of weapons, communications systems and special equipment). The employment of the training concept at the operator level also has to be supervised by the managerial level.

Other than cooperation, the Special Forces Coordination Office has the responsibility to oversee and direct the HUNSF doctrinal development process. Hungary does not have a HUNSF doctrine yet. This doctrine has to be formulated in order to be able to plan the capability, correctly train operators and employ the HUNSF unit in the future. A doctrine development process also has to be initiated at the operator level and various doctrinal publications have to be authorized and published in order to enable the HUNSF unit to operate. These publications have to be in accordance with the Hungarian Special Forces doctrine and the NATO/EU policies as well.

Finally, another task of the SFCO is related to operational deployment and the control of HUNSF during operations. Once the HUNSF unit is deployed, personnel from the SFCO should be immediately delegated to the Hungarian Defense Staff Joint Operations Centre and (in case the deployment is international) into NATO theatre level CJSOTF JOCs as well, in order to support and supervise the current operations of HUNSF soldiers and maintain command and control. This last task is probably the most important one because these personnel need not only knowledge, but also operational experience; therefore, the Special Forces Coordination Office personnel have to be properly trained as Special Forces staff officers with unmatched language skills and a thorough understanding of the operational theatres of HUNSF. This combination of skill

sets is extremely time-consuming to build; nevertheless, the education and training of these officers and NCOs have to be started early on, in order to meet the deadline of the full operational capability.

2. Allied Command and Control of HUNSF

It is very likely that the HDF will designate the Hungarian Special Forces as an Allied asset, and, therefore, the HUNSF unit will most probably be deployed as part of an Allied Special Forces Task Force. The command and control relationships that are proposed in this section of the paper (see Figure 5) should be looked upon in relation to the national command and control concept.¹¹⁷




Figure 5. Proposed NATO Special Forces Command and Control Relationships

¹¹⁷ The proposed C2 concept is based on guidelines provided by NATO Special Operations Policy. Participation of the author in NATO Special Operations working groups and seminars made it possible to develop and propose a C2 structure for the future. This proposal can serve as a basis for future discussions.

All nations in the NATO Special Operations community retain full command of their special operations task groups (SOTGs) in peacetime. Transfer of authority (TOA) of HUNSF to the appropriate Joint Forces Commander is only for exercises or North Atlantic Council approved operations, with nations usually retaining OPCOM. Nations will transfer SOTGs OPCON through Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) to the highest operational level commander, normally a Joint Forces Commander. OPCON is then delegated to the CJFSOCC.¹¹⁸ The CJFSOCC commander reports to the highest appropriate operational level commander, as directed by SACEUR.

In the event of a NATO Response Force / Combined Joint Task Force (NRF/CJTF) activation, the CJFSOCC will normally be placed OPCON to the affected NRF/CJTF commander. TACOM/TACON may be retained by COMCJFSOCC or may be further delegated to allow Special Operations Task Groups (SOTGs) to operate independently or under a Special Operations Command and Control Element (SOCCE).¹¹⁹

The assumption is made that in the future a decision will be made (on a Force Generation Conference) to deploy HUNSF soldiers as part of a larger NATO Special Forces component. In this case, the designated HUNSF capability needs to be incorporated into the above described NATO structure as can be seen in Figure 5. Hungary, being a relatively small country with limited resources, is unlikely to meet the NATO criteria of a framework nation (see Appendix C), so it is expected to belong to another NATO nation who will meet the criteria in forming a CJFSOCC. As part of the SOTGs, Hungary will most probably provide Special Operations Task Units (SOTUs)

¹¹⁸ A NATO Combined Joint Special Operations Component Command (CJFSOCC) is a multinational, joint component command, tailored to command and control its assigned Special Forces. CJFSOCCs are not standing headquarters in the NATO command structure, but are formed during implementation planning on an agreed SOF Framework Nation (SOF FN) augmented by staff personnel from other nations. A SOF FN will form the nucleus of the CJFSOCC headquarters by providing, at a minimum, the commander, key staff personnel, CCIS (down to SOTG level), and base life support functions. The FN will also be expected to coordinate the CSS functions for the component.

¹¹⁹ An SOTG is a national grouping of land and/or naval SOF that are employed to conduct Special Operations as directed by the CJFSOCC. Similar to a JSOTF, an SOTG is composed of: 1) a HQ that is capable of conducting J1-J6 staff functions; 2) subordinate Special Operation Task Units (SOTUs), 3) CS units, and 4) CSS elements. When SOF operate directly in the battle space of conventional forces, or when the likelihood of integrated or converging operations with conventional forces is probable in a joint operations area (JOA), the CJFSOCC may establish a SOCCE to synchronize, de-conflict, and coordinate operations with conventional forces. The SOCCE will normally collocate with the appropriate-level conventional force headquarters, and may exercise OPCON or TACON of affected SOF.

and liaison personnel to the operational level staff elements of SOTG and CJFSOCC.¹²⁰ If deployed within the framework of the Alliance, operations of the HUNSF unit will be planned, directed and coordinated by the CJSOTF, but tasking will occur through National Command Elements. This is why it is important to have SFCO officers ready to be deployed into NATO Special Forces staffs.

In most cases, the execution of the Special Forces tasks at the operator level will remain along national lines. Combined SF units at the level of execution will be the exception and will only be considered so as to capitalize on expert cultural, linguistic, or negotiation skills, and when personnel are agreed to by the Hungarian SFCO. Liaison is an essential element in the coordination of Special Forces within NATO. Therefore, SOCCs usually dispatch liaison teams with appropriate communication means to other component and joint headquarters functions as necessary. The participation of Hungarian staff officers within these elements is also required and necessary.

The above proposed command and control concept requires the SFCO to have appropriate Special Operations joint and multinational expertise on their staffs supported by their peacetime establishment. The Hungarian Liaison Detachment (HLD), established within the multinational staff, is best organized in a cell which can support the command across all the staff agencies. Coordination between the National Command Authorities through the HLD officers towards the NATO operational commands is essential to ensure that direction and syndication is achieved.

3. Command and Control of HUNSF within the EU

In the near future, the European Union can also direct its own operations, and Special Forces are regarded as an important component of these operations. The Special

¹²⁰ The SOTU is the lowest level of a SOF tactical-level combat element that deploys by air, land, or sea and is able to conduct DA, SR, or MA. An SOTU is normally comprised of 4-16 personnel, and should be capable of split-team operations.

Operation concept of the European Union is still under development; nevertheless, the work on concept development has already started and various working groups are formulating the final EU concept.¹²¹

By participating in the working groups and through analyzing the draft documents, the authors understand that the Special Forces concept of the European Union will be very similar to the one of NATO. In this section of the thesis, the authors will propose a command and control concept (see Figure 6) for the HUNSF in case of deployment in an EU operation in the future.




Figure 6. Proposed EU Special Forces Command and Control Relationships

¹²¹ The proposed C2 concept is based on the present EU Special Operations Concept, which is still being developed in the European Union Military Staff. Participation of the author in working groups and seminars made it possible to represent a proposal for the future. This proposal can serve as a basis for future discussions.

The concept mainly relies on the contribution of various nations. In order to provide the operational commander with a viable and effective special operations capability, Special Forces from contributing member states will be designated as part of the EU SOF. From these forces, at the appropriate time, the Strategic Commander should form a Special Operations Component (SOC) to employ these forces in support of the appropriate operational level commander.

According to the concept of the EU, the SOC will consist of one or more Combined Joint Special Operations Task Forces (CJSOTF) and will have a non-standing headquarters formed during the planning phase on an agreed framework which is nation augmented by operators from the contributing member states. Other member states not contributing forces can provide staff officers if necessary. A SOC and a CJSOTF are synonymous. In the proposed concept, the CJSOTF commander will report to the operational level commander. The CJSOTF will establish subordinate elements, namely Special Operations Task Groups (SOTG), to assist in their span of control. Special Operations will be planned, directed and coordinated by the CJSOTF. Tasking will occur through national C2 elements. The execution of the SOF tasks at unit level will be conducted by SO task groups.

Liaison, just like in NATO is an essential element to ensure coordination. The Hungarian Liaison Detachment (deployed from the Hungarian Defense Staff J-3 SFCO) will play an important role in EU staffs as well. Liaison personnel have to be equipped with appropriate communication means in order to be able to communicate with other components and the joint headquarters as necessary.

The EU has similar requirements as NATO. EU demands that the relevant strategic and operational headquarters have appropriate SO joint and multinational expertise in their staffs within their peacetime establishment. The HLD, where established, should be organized in a cell which can support the command across all the staff functions.

E. INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS

During the Cold War the Hungarian intelligence community necessarily focused on NATO countries and the defense of the Warsaw Pact countries. Concern over the

military capabilities and intentions of NATO countries, especially the United States, was highly emphasized. Nuclear weapons have also complicated the intelligence efforts, as the biggest threat was obviously finding and monitoring the superpower targets. Later on, the intelligence community provided information for arms control agreements and defense planning. The whole intelligence architecture was developed accordingly and intelligence was designed to find and track “big targets” such as mass military formations and military equipment collocated with these formations.

Information is the bread and butter for Special Forces operations; therefore, tight cooperation between the Hungarian National Intelligence Agencies and the HUNSF capability is crucial. In response to the new security challenges, the need to establish firm relations between the already existing Intelligence Agencies and the above proposed Special Forces Coordination Office is increasing; therefore, Hungary’s SF capability should build upon a competitive intelligence architecture that is integrated into the national intelligence community and works closely with them in planning and executing the tasks. In this section of the paper, a concept for the integration of the HUNSF and the Hungarian intelligence community at the level of operators and managers is introduced.

At the operator level, the intelligence team in the HUNSF unit staff has several responsibilities. They have to manage all intelligence requests and requirements for the HUNSF unit. As opposed to the team and company levels, which should be area specific, the unit S2 and its team should be prepared to provide timely information on HUNSF tasks and related issues within all areas where the HUNSF unit could be deployed. Concerning these areas, the S2 section of the HUNSF unit staff should have access to the most updated open and classified information, together with the analyzed future and possible outcomes of certain threat actions in relation to the tasks of the HUNSF unit. The S2 section must be able to set up the AOR specific information requests that can be forwarded to the intelligence agencies (civilian as well as military) through the S2 officer in the SFCO to the intelligence agencies. The primary goal for the battalion is to have its own updated information database for all possible missions conducted by the unit.




Figure 7. Proposed Intelligence Relationships for the HUNSF

At the level of managers, the Special Forces Coordination Office should be liaising with intelligence organizations that have a stake in planning and supporting the HUNSF capability (as is proposed in Figure 7). These organizations should include the National Intelligence Services, the Joint Operational Center (JOC), the Joint Logistics Center (JLC), and other supporting and civilian crisis response agencies. Furthermore, a mid-term goal should be to integrate HUNSF intelligence gathering capabilities in the military aspects of the GWOT. Based upon the tasks of HUNSF, one can easily realize that the focus on intelligence gathering capabilities of HUNSF soldiers is fundamental, most importantly in their traditional role of UW. In fighting an asymmetric threat in the future, establishing “grass-roots level” control, and achieving local knowledge of the area by working with the local population, the information HUNSF soldiers can acquire is superior to information gained through technical means. The future battlefield is

characterized by the domination of the human terrain. This human terrain can only be controlled with forces that are living, eating with the locals, and share the same living conditions. They also learn local practices and social preferences. Building trust takes time, but in a protracted conflict it is a far better way of defeating the enemy than trying to rely on overwhelming force and firepower. “The payoff is the understanding of the operational environment and the ability to solicit the kind of solid intelligence that enables operations.”¹²²

The intelligence architecture within a Special Forces structure is one of its fundamental components. In a constantly changing security environment, if one can be well informed and prepared, one can achieve victory over the enemy. Therefore, it is important to emphasize that the HUNSF unit will not only benefit from being tightly incorporated into the intelligence cycle of the Hungarian intelligence community, but the SF soldier can be an important contributor as well. Based upon the tasks of the HUNSF unit, one can easily recognize that special reconnaissance has important strategic informational value and the unconventional warfare capability is closely tied together with the collection of strategic information. Moreover, knowing that the likely threat in this era is illusive and fights in an unconventional manner, human intelligence (HUMINT) has an increasing value, and this aspect of the HUNSF soldiers should be fully exploited in future military operations. It is also possible to vest the SFCO with the coordination of other core HDF tasks, the most obvious one being the GWOT.

F. CHAPTER SUMMARY

It is important to highlight that during the capability development process it is not only the National Command Elements that are required to be looked upon, but the place of the HUNSF capability within the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Union as well. It is important to coordinate the different decision making levels by creating a culture for the Hungarian Special Forces and avoiding the misuse of these forces once they are created. This thesis suggests that through lack of understanding and the potential subversion of command and control channels of the HUNSF, the cost can result in the inefficient use of specialized assets for conventional tasks, a decrease in HUNSF’s ability to think creatively, a threat of reabsorption by the

¹²² Hy Rothstein, *The Challenge of Unconventional Warfare*, December 2003, not published, 114.

conventional forces, and in mission failure or an inordinate price for success. In order to avoid these pitfalls, commanders at all levels should be educated on the capabilities and limitations of Special Forces and the doctrine development process of the HDF should specifically address Special Forces and the Special Forces doctrines at all levels should also be developed. If the doctrine clearly states the instances when HUNSF should be used, then there should be less examples of improper tasking.

The HUNSF has to be integrated into the defense planning processes and the implementation into directives and planning documents of the HDF and NATO has to be coordinated. Based on the analysis of this chapter and taking into account Hungary's responsibilities in the development of the HUNSF capability, the following suggestions should be taken into account:

- Develop plans and programs in support of the HUNSF policy and doctrine.
- Develop the right organizational culture with special emphasis on taking into account that tasks that are not part of the culture will not be attended with the same energy and resources that are devoted to tasks that are part of it; organizations in which two or more cultures struggle for supremacy will experience serious conflict; and organizations will resist taking on new tasks that seem incompatible with its dominant culture.
- Develop and maintain national control over HUNSF through national C2 elements.
- Fully integrate the HUNSF capability into the command and control architecture of both NATO and the European Union.
- Ensure that, within their capabilities and overall priorities, intelligence research and analysis is provided to HUNSF.
- Ensure interoperability is taken into consideration during development of capabilities and procurement of SF equipment, especially communications equipment.
- Include HUNSF at all levels in the Hungarian military education, training and exercises as appropriate.

Participate in NATO SF exercise programs in order to further test and enhance the multinational component of command and control.

V. HUNSF SELECTION AND TRAINING

The third criterion of this thesis will be addressed in this chapter. Based on the analysis of the selection and training requirements of different successful foreign Special Forces units, the Hungarian Special Forces selection and training concept will be explained in detail. However, it is not enough to study the present selection and training requirements. Future needs have to be taken into account as well, and conclusions have to be made and incorporated into the training process of the HUNSF in order to be able to meet future needs.

It takes several years to train Special Forces personnel. By the time they are ready to be deployed, the operational environment can be somewhat different than when they started their training. Therefore, before providing a training concept for the HUNSF unit, other special attributes of the Special Forces capability have to be emphasized in order to ensure successful operations in the future. After highlighting and analyzing some important areas of differences between Special Forces and General Purpose Forces, this chapter will introduce a proposed vision of the HUNSF, the core purpose of the Special Forces capability, and the main characteristics of the Hungarian Special Forces. Only after the analysis of these basic attributes of the capability is it possible to make suggestions towards training and analyzing three main areas of that concept: selection, training, and education.

A. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN SF AND THE CONVENTIONAL MILITARY

The training of Special Forces is a lengthy process, and it is a well-known truth that competent Special Forces cannot be created after emergencies occur. Anticipating future needs in today's complex and rapidly changing security environment is a hard enough endeavor, but these security concerns are not the only issues that have to be taken into account when designing the Hungarian Special Forces capability. It is important to realize that a cultural and philosophical chasm between the conventional military and Special Forces worldwide has always existed. Those who oppose Special Forces argue that SF are "expensive, independent, arrogant out of uniform, [operate] outside normal

chain of command and [are] too specialized for [their] own good.”¹²³ The truth about Special Forces is hard to find out because of their secretive nature. Nevertheless, it is important to look more closely into the issue of what are the real differences between the conventional military and Special Forces and analyze some of the problem areas that can create tension between the two organizations. Knowing these pitfalls helps to design a long-lasting, more robust training concept for the Hungarian Special Forces.

No issue engenders more animosity between the GPF and SF more than the "skill drain." It is thought that a reduction in the skills, professionalism and capacities of conventional forces through "defection" to SF results in an overall unbalanced force structure with significant implications for joint operations. It is not surprising that commanders of conventional units are resentful that some of their best officers and soldiers are attracted to and recruited by Special Forces. It was for this reason that Field Marshal Sir Alan Brooke, Chief of Imperial General Staff, never agreed with Churchill's Special Forces policy. He felt that it was a "dangerous drain of the quality of the infantry battalion.”¹²⁴ Special Forces units have often, and in some cases justifiably, been accused of taking the best and most highly skilled personnel from conventional units. Not only can the "brain drain" affect the physical readiness of conventional forces, but it can equally render significant psychological damage to these forces. "Skimming off the cream" from regular forces to SF in small militaries has far greater implications than in larger organizations. Care must be taken to maintain a balance in such a situation, thereby preserving the combat readiness of both GPF and SF to successfully execute their missions. A depleted GPF in favor of SF will logically suffer from a lowering of morale which leads to the dangerous condition of malaise that sets in among the regular troops. The ineffectiveness of demoralized fighting forces has been well documented throughout history. Morale reduced by any reason is a threat to any military grouping.

The British "recirculation" of SAS officers back to their parent units after a couple of years has many positive effects on the standing of Special Forces within the General Purpose Forces. The school of thought that SOF can act as a "training ground" or "leader

¹²³ Thomas K. Adams, *US Special Operations Forces in Action. The Challenge of Unconventional Warfare*, (London: Frank Cass, 1998), 162.

¹²⁴ Eric Morris, *Churchill's Private Armies*, (London: Hutchinson, 1986), 90.

nursery" for the regular forces bears merit. However, based on the operational tempo of the SF, and in the absence of a formal rotation of Special Forces troops between SF and GPF, this has to be thoroughly analyzed before implementation. If this concept is to bear fruit, it must be specifically stated as part of the mission of the Hungarian SF and duly implemented, as in the establishment of a training cadre, part of whose mandate would be to provide specific training modules for GPF. The advantages of the "leader nursery" idea are that first of all, these officers bring back a set of special skills to conventional forces, which can be exploited to their fullest extent. Secondly, there is always a stream of freshly recruited officers arriving to the Regiment, and in time an even larger number of specially-trained officers will serve in the Defense Forces. Thirdly, this solution is a compromise for conventional commanders and they are more willing to let their officers apply for Special Forces training, because they know that they will get them back in time in even better shape.

Failing selection is another source of potential animosity. Further aggravating the "skimming off the cream" effect is a perception that there are negative consequences for those who failed to meet the high standards of selection for Special Forces. Those who are rejected can have their confidence undermined by failure; therefore, it is important to emphasize during the selection process that Special Forces soldiers are different from conventional ones in many senses, and those who are not selected can be exceptionally good soldiers in the conventional sense. Those who are selected are not elite in any sense. As one former SAS member noted: "elitism is counter-productive; it alienates you from other people."¹²⁵ They only have special characteristics that are not superior to other personal traits, but are unique within Special Forces.

A diverse cultural and philosophical methodology is often claimed to be another difference between the GPF and SF. The former Commanding Officer of the 4th Parachute Brigade Colonel Sir John Hackett, who fought in Sicily, Taranto and Arnhem, captured the essence of this debate when he stated that a misconception existed within the conventional army that special formations are "a lot of resolute but irresponsible cut-throats, who roam around the campaign area, spreading confusion amongst their own

¹²⁵ Andy McNab, *Immediate Action*, (London: Bantam Press, 1995), 381.

troops and consternation amongst those of the enemy.”¹²⁶ Part of this problem most probably stems from the limited philosophical understanding of war. Special Forces often use an unconventional mindset towards warfare. For those who are trapped in a dogmatic conventional doctrinal mind set, Special Forces become problematic. U. S. Army Colonel Aaron Banks explained that “to the orthodox, traditional soldier it [unconventional warfare] was something slimy, underhanded, illegal, and ungentlemanly. It did not fit in the honor code of that profession of arms.”¹²⁷ This difference in mindset is necessary, because different types of conflicts have to be dealt with differently to achieve different ends, ways and means. It is an educational challenge to make sure that conventional commanders understand the importance of Special Forces and are able to utilize their special capabilities to the maximum effect when they are working together with these forces. On the other hand, another detrimental result of Special Forces’ exaggerated emphasis on secrecy and refusal to work with conventional forces is the fact that Special Forces are often misunderstood or not understood at all. Former SAS commander Major General Tony Jeapes conceded that he was appalled by the lack of understanding of the capabilities of the Regiment. He also observed that “the Regiment’s insistence upon secrecy in all it did had become counter-productive.”¹²⁸ Operational security is of great importance; nevertheless, secrecy in and of itself often becomes a tool to avoid scrutiny and build barriers to the outside world. This inflated sense of secrecy is an impediment towards the gulf between SF and conventional forces.

Of course, the nature of war is not the only concern towards the different use of Special Forces. Special Forces are often likened to "private armies" that often tend to become an object of suspicion to the public army. This is often because Special Forces value action and have little patience with bureaucracy. This, coupled with a "can do" attitude can cause organizational tensions. This tension is even higher when Special Forces have a powerful mentor in the political arena that is well-positioned to look after his or her interests. For example, Prime Minister Winston Churchill took great interest in

¹²⁶ Colonel John. W. Hackett, “The employment of Special Forces,” *RUSI Journal*, Vol. 97, No. 585, February 1952, 41.

¹²⁷ Aaron Bank, *From OSS to Green Berets: the Birth of Special Forces*, (Novato, CA: Presidio, 1986), 147.

¹²⁸ Major General Tony Jeapes, *SAS Secret War*, (Surrey: The Book People Ltd., 1996), 12.

the development of commandos, and he supported other similar, unorthodox-type units. This issue was addressed in the previous chapter as well and it has to be emphasized again that the subversion of command of the Hungarian Special Forces has to be avoided and the design of the command and control architecture has to make sure that this tension is kept to a minimum.

Another often-heard complaint is that Special Forces are better equipped than conventional units. British Field Marshal William Slim noted that “the equipment of these special units was more generous than that of normal formations.”¹²⁹ It is true that Special Forces often use special equipment and a wide variety of weapons for different purposes. It is often observed that Special Forces are the beneficiaries of the most modern high-tech equipment; nevertheless, the over reliance on technology has to be guarded against in the HUNSF. Another Special Forces truth has to be kept in mind, which is humans are more important than hardware. It is the unique quality of these soldiers that make them special, not the equipment they use.

At the core of this “better equipped” argument is the belief that the investment of valuable, highly-skilled manpower combined with virtually unlimited material resources fails to provide a worthwhile return for the costs incurred. The efforts of Special Forces are likened to “breaking windows by throwing guineas (gold coins) at them.”¹³⁰

Historian Eliot Cohen also observes that high publicity – both within the army and among the population at large – causes hostility towards Special Forces. High publicity generates the following three conditions: the GPF becomes demoralized, the quality of the GPF declines (two linked but distinct effects); and Special Forces troops are misused – often with tragic results.¹³¹ Therefore, a publicity-related analysis has to be carried out in regards to the HUNSF with an active participation of the Hungarian SFCO personnel and PR experts of the HDF. The goal should be to create media guidelines for the Hungarian Special Forces.

¹²⁹ Field Marshal Sir William Slim, *Defeat Into Victory*, (London: Cassell and Company Ltd., 1956), 546.

¹³⁰ Eliot A. Cohen, *Commandos and Politicians*, (Cambridge: Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 1978), 56.

¹³¹ *Ibid*, 54.

In short, conventional commanders are continually reminded of the cost of Special Forces since they are perceived to receive the best personnel and too much funding, despite the fact that they used to spend less actual time in combat. On the surface, this argument seems to be justified. Special Forces soldiers often seem to be free thinkers who do things in an unconventional manner. In reality, they are individuals who are capable of conceptualizing innovative tactics, equipment, and methodologies that are alien to conventional wisdom; therefore, such individuals are often marginalized. Yet their ideas and contributions, once properly harnessed and allowed to flourish, provide a considerable amount of payback. All this payback is only achieved if Special Forces units are created with the right mindset, foresight towards future challenges, and with anticipation of future needs. In order to achieve this, the foundation of the Hungarian Special Forces unit has to be laid down. This foundation has to involve the vision, the core purpose and the characteristics of the unit.

B. HUNSF VISION

Hungarian Special Forces soldiers provide the nation with multiple capabilities to engage the many challenges of Hungary's national interests. SF soldiers interface with high-level military commanders, country teams, and local indigenous forces, and do all this with extreme professionalism. Through their actions and their range of technical and tactical skills, SF soldiers serve in the region as operational and strategic assets. Therefore, once HUNSF achieves full operational capability, it has to be a strategic asset within the HDF. The Hungarian Special Forces will be an excellent force multiplier if employed correctly. Military and political leaders have to understand the exact capabilities and limitations of HUNSF in order to be able to decide upon employment. It is also important to understand that the use of HUNSF can result in high political fallout if the mission goes unsuccessful; therefore, all necessary assets have to be contributed to the recruitment, selection, training, and retention of the HUNSF soldiers to guarantee mission success.

Through a well-planned and executed recruitment and selection process, HUNSF has to select the "right" soldiers for the job. Quality soldiers are the greatest asset of Special Forces. The HUNSF must never forget that people, not the equipment, are critical. The most sophisticated equipment in the world cannot compensate for the lack of

skilled people. On the other hand, the right people who are highly-trained and working as a team will accomplish the mission with whatever equipment is available to them. The human dimension is central in war. Rise in the number of asymmetric conflicts highlights the importance of knowing and operating on the human terrain. The networked nature of the threat requires quality soldiers to deal with it. As General Sir James Glover observed, “A man of character in peace is a man of courage in war. Character is a habit. The daily choice of right and wrong. It is a moral quality which grows to maturity in peace and is and is not suddenly developed in war.”¹³² Character means that HUNSF soldiers can be trusted to do the right thing, even when they have to decide themselves. They recognize the political implications inherent in their mission. Character helps them to succeed in missions worldwide even in ambiguous and complex situations.

High training standards and unique skills are another important cornerstone of a SF soldier. Preparing the HUNSF soldiers through challenging and realistic training has its uses and serves as a recipe for success in the future. As the proverb goes, train hard, fight easy! Yet in the case of the HUNSF, the meaning of fight can be very different to conventional means. Therefore, SF training has to mirror the mission requirements of HUNSF and prepare the soldiers accordingly. It is very likely that HUNSF soldiers will not be deployed on open plains where there are relatively clear battle lines and where conventional maneuvers can be the decisive form of warfare. It is more likely that they will be fighting wars amongst city walls on complex terrain against a networked enemy and among the civilian population. Therefore, the HUNSF soldiers and officers have to quickly adapt to the battlefield, consider all aspects of fighting, and use the best method to carry out the mission.

Personnel retention is the third essential element to HUNSF operational readiness. The training process of a Special Forces soldier is relatively long. Special Forces invest in the most sophisticated weapon, namely people. Therefore, operators must be protected and retention of the soldiers is highly important. There is no use in spending several years and many resources on a soldier who finally achieves the desired operational capability only to resign. Retention has to be exercised through motivation, unique opportunities,

¹³² Sir James Glover, “A Soldier and His Conscience,” *Parameters*, (September 1983): 53.

incentives, and a special contract. HUNSF has to preserve its most valuable assets. The sustained high operational tempo puts a strain on Special Forces; therefore, the Hungarian Special Forces should have a different retention policy that includes different incentives, different mandatory retirement dates, different bonus programs, different special pays, and separate data bases.

C. CORE PURPOSE OF HUNSF

The core purpose is the essence of the future Hungarian Special Forces. The proposed core purpose deliberately does not list, describe, or define specific missions to be accomplished. There are two reasons for that. First of all, by examining historical examples it can be concluded that theater commanders have assigned missions that were not found in the approved SF doctrine of the day. It is worthwhile to carry out the viability and suitability checks before accepting these missions for SF, but new missions cannot be ruled out. If they are appropriate and only SF can do it, then the mission must be accepted. Second, SF missions were varied by time as well as geographically, because the requirements in each theater were different; nevertheless, even though missions can change, the core purpose of the HUNSF has to be constant. It does not mean that the purpose needs no reevaluation, rather just the opposite. The changing environment and threats calls for constant reevaluation of the purpose. The core purpose proposed here can serve as a basis for future discussions.

The core purpose of the HUNSF is to serve the nation in peacetime, conflict and war by accomplishing missions assigned by the National Command Authorities, in areas where the use of General Purpose Forces (GPF) is inappropriate, by using conventional and unconventional means in order to protect the sovereignty of Hungary and those of its Allies.

D. CHARACTERISTICS OF HUNSF

As it was concluded in the previous section, HUNSF soldiers should be special, yet being special does not mean that these soldiers are elite. This is an often spoken misconception. “Elite” has a secondary meaning of being above the rest of the soldiers. This is not the case. HUNSF soldiers are as valuable as any other Hungarian soldier who

dedicates his life to protect the nation. So what does the word special really mean? Part of the answer can be found in the nature of Special Forces. The draft NATO SF policy states:

Special Forces are military activities conducted by specially designated, organized, trained, and equipped forces using operational techniques and modes of employment not standard to conventional forces. These activities are conducted across the full range of military operations, peace, crisis, and conflict independently or in coordination with operations of conventional forces to achieve objectives. Political-military considerations may require overt, covert, or discreet techniques and the acceptance of a degree of physical and political risk not associated with conventional operations.¹³³

HUNSF are special because they provide the National Command Authority (NCA) with a broad range of capabilities and because of their unequalled professionalism. The professional attitude requires soldiers with attributes that distinguish them from GPF. Some of the most important differences are listed below.

- HUNSF operators are rigorously selected, exceptionally motivated, and capable of unconventional approaches. HUNSF personnel undergo careful selection processes or mission-specific training beyond basic military skills. These programs make any rapid replacement or generation of personnel or capabilities unlikely.
- The type of training required for HUNSF is lengthy, usually joint and often combined with foreign forces. It takes time to make a Special Forces soldier.
- HUNSF often use modified versions of standard equipment, unique items, or non-standard items procured through civilian suppliers. Much of the equipment used by HUNSF soldiers should be designed or modified to meet specific operational requirements. As such, HUNSF equipment is often delivered in small quantities and is difficult and costly to repair and replace.
- HUNSF personnel maintain a high level of competency in more than one military specialty. Selected HUNSF are regionally oriented for employment. Cross cultural communications, linguistic and interpersonal skills are a routine part of their training.
- HUNSF is a force multiplier in combat. Under most circumstances, HUNSF should not be a substitute for conventional forces, but a necessary adjunct to existing conventional capabilities.

¹³³ Draft NATO Special Operations Policy, MC 437, 1.

- HUNSF should maintain a very high level of pre-conflict readiness, as they are often in the first echelon of any commitment of the HDF. HUNSF has to be ready to be deployed as part of a Multinational Task Force with very short notice. This emphasizes the importance of joint, collective training tailored to achieve and maintain mission capabilities.
- Typically, HUNSF deploys a small and discrete force, which represents the most obvious difference between SOF and GPF. HUNSF operations are frequently clandestine in nature to ensure mission success.

Generally speaking, HUNSF capability involves a military element organized, trained, and equipped to conduct special operations that cannot be performed by conventional units. Trying to determine what was special about SF, Pirnie contrasted U.S. SF and GPF according to the following two criteria: typical employment and force characteristics.¹³⁴ By analyzing Pirnie's criteria, in terms of typical employment, HUNSF should be employed differently than conventional forces because of the aspects listed below.

- HUNSF often are detached from friendly forces and are inserted away from friendly support in sensitive areas or behind enemy lines from where they need to be subsequently recovered. A supply and recovery capability is, therefore, needed in order to support HUNSF missions.
- HUNSF elements may plan to avoid contact with the enemy entirely, or they are very selective with respect to targets and duration of combat. In engaging targets, they mainly rely on other arms and services (e.g., artillery and close air support), to preserve their secrecy.
- Risks of failure and loss to their forces are common features of special operations. Since there is little margin for error, HUNSF troops reduce risk through detailed planning, creative thinking, extensive intelligence support, stealth, surprise, and quick limited action. Because the theaters that HUNSF operates in vary case by case, HUNSF commanders have to be very flexible and adaptive.
- Instead of using conventional means of warfare, the intent of HUNSF should focus on exercising leverage by the use of a small element to gain operational or strategic advantage, creating indirection by diverting the enemy's combat power or weakening its sources, gaining or destroying the enemy's high value targets, or in the truly unconventional setting by working with and through the indigenous population.

¹³⁴ Bruce Pirnie, "Analysis of Special Operations Forces in Decision Aids: Recommendations," *National Defense Research Institute*, (RAND, Santa Monica, CA, 1994).

E. SELECTION AND TRAINING OF HUNSF

Selection is the critical initial process by which candidates with the necessary aptitude and attitude are identified into the Special Forces community. It is the common starting point for all Special Forces personnel. The goal of the selection process is the assessment of candidates for their suitability as future SF soldiers and trainability for future missions. Among the many who apply, only a few possess the essential combination of maturity, mental agility, physical strength, moral courage and an endless internal drive towards perfection necessary to endure Special Forces selection and training. The quality of the Special Forces soldiers sets the standards and guarantees that these unique personnel can carry out the arduous tasks in the most extreme circumstances and cope with the ever-changing environment. Special Forces training takes mature candidates and teaches them the unique skills to become regionally oriented, culturally attuned, and uniquely capable of operating in denied or sensitive areas as well as by, with, and through foreign armed forces and people. Successful special operations can be greatly attributed to the quality of the training of these soldiers. This training is time consuming and a general truth applies: Special Forces cannot be created after a crisis occurs and cannot be mass produced; therefore, future needs have to be anticipated well in advance and incorporated into the training process of the HUNSF. The training should put emphasis on modularity, where core military skills have an equal emphasis on cultural and language proficiency as lessons learned from contemporary conflicts, as Special Forces personnel must possess these skills. The newly redesigned United States SF pipeline also identifies teaching, coaching, and mentoring abilities as important aspects to the training program.¹³⁵ This thesis emphasizes that the uniqueness of the Hungarian Special Forces will require the development and maintenance of UW, and to achieve this capability, a special emphasis has to be placed on the cultural and language training of the HUNSF soldiers.

1. Cultural Sensitivity and Language Training

As was concluded in Chapter III, unconventional warfare (UW) capability is one of the core tasks the Hungarian Special Forces unit has to build and maintain. The local population represents the most important element in the UW domain. The population is

¹³⁵ Robert W. Marrs, "SFAS Redesign: An Essential Revolution," *Special Warfare*, (Spring 2000).

the only component that can be influenced through a wide range of actions ranging from non-violent ones (e.g., the distribution of propaganda) to extremely brutal ones (e.g., terrorism, political assassinations, etc). In special operations missions, persuasion plays a very important role, the success of which rests on the ability of the soldiers to communicate and generate trust amongst the local population. This process is facilitated through the use of language. In a cultural context, language influences the way people think, communicate and behave. According to Robert Force, language not only serves “as a device for reporting human experience but also as a way of defining, analyzing, and organizing it through prescribed channels into meaningful categories for its speakers.”¹³⁶ Languages often act as very complex guides to the social reality in which human communities operate. Learning a foreign language not only gives one a useful tool to interrelate with others in a foreign culture, but may also help one understand and appreciate “what in the foreign culture converges with ours in consolidating a basic human value.”¹³⁷

A good command of a language puts individuals in a better position to deal with the behavior patterns of other people. On the other hand, it is equally important to communicate different attitudes during human interactions through the use of non-verbal communication (i.e., facial expression, body posture, gesture, proximity). Richard McGonigal identified many relevant concepts that can be communicated from a person’s unintended actions or attitudes.¹³⁸ These tend to affect all human interactions. This is especially true when foreign troops are deployed into the conflict area, which almost always entails close contact with the population. Thus, it is important to understand that culture is often a relative matter, and its evaluation cannot be done outside the environment that generates it.

¹³⁶ Robert Force, & Michael Force, Science, New Series, Vol. 133, No. 3460., Retrieved from <http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0036-8075%2819610421%293%3A133%3A3460%3C1202%3AKTCU%3E2.0.CO%3B2-P>, 1202-1206, Internet, accessed August 2004.

¹³⁷ Anthony Balakian, Journal of Educational Sociology, Vol. 34, No. 6 (Feb.1961), Retrieved from Stable URL: <http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0885-3525%28196102%2934%3A6%3C252%3ATDTITT%3E2.0.CO%3B2-G>, 254, Internet, accessed August 2004.

¹³⁸ Richard A. McGonigal, *A model for the cross cultural interaction training of adults*, (PhD Thesis. Michigan State University, 1971), 8.

Culture is the sum total of a way of living; including values, beliefs, esthetic standards, linguistic expressions, patterns of thinking, behavioral norms, and styles of communication which a group of people has developed to assure its survival in a particular physical and human environment. Culture, and people who are part of it, interact, so that culture is not static. Culture is the response of a group of human beings to the valid and particular needs of its members.¹³⁹

The benefits of cross-cultural training have also been pointed out by Richard McGonigal, who identified that they produce a twofold benefit: (1) it makes one aware of how he is perceived by his counterparts and (2) increases one's tolerance for ambiguity.¹⁴⁰ Cross-cultural training refers to "all kinds of programs that train people to live, work, study or perform effectively in a cultural setting different from their own. The techniques of cross-cultural training are normally experiential, though they may include comparative cultural studies or the study of specific cultures."¹⁴¹

Language and cultural training enhances the ability of the HUNSF soldiers to work with people from a foreign culture in several ways. First, it reduces the level of culture shock experienced by personnel. Knowing what to expect from the people of a foreign culture reduces the tensions created by cultural differences, and thus allows military personnel to adapt easier to their new work environment. Second, it increases an understanding of local values. Cultural awareness helps people get over common stereotypes and erase prejudices in regards to other cultures. Third, it increases the level of trust between troops and civilians. Speaking the language helps military personnel overcome barriers to communication, thereby making interconnections with the natives easier. Fourth, it reduces the risks of failed communications and cultural conflicts. Different cultures have different ways of interpreting the signals given by the outside world. If language training and cultural sensitivity is incorporated into the training concept of the Hungarian Special Forces, it translates into operational advantages for the future.

¹³⁹ Daniel Hoopes & Michael Pusch, Definition of terms, in M. D. Pusch (Ed.) *Multicultural education: a cross cultural training approach*, (Intercultural Press, Inc., 1979), 3.

¹⁴⁰ Richard A. McGonigal, *A model for the cross cultural interaction training of adults*, (PhD Thesis. Michigan State University, 1971), 1.

¹⁴¹ Daniel Hoopes & Michael Pusch, Definition of terms, in M. D. Pusch (Ed.) *Multicultural education: a cross cultural training approach*, (Intercultural Press, Inc., 1979), 7.

Therefore, Hungarian planners should take into consideration the importance of language training and cultural sensitivity for the development of the HUNSF capability. In order to overcome an eventual problem Hungarian Special Forces may encounter in Afghanistan and Iraq as well as in other areas where national contingents are deployed, the following recommendations should be considered:

- Development of new language courses, available to leaders at the tactical level, as they are the ones in closest contact with the population. A special emphasis should be placed on those languages spoken in countries in the area of interest for the Hungarian Defense Forces. Since this area includes Europe (with special emphasis on the Balkans), the Middle East and North Africa, apart from English the courses should teach Serbo-Croatian, Albanian, French, Arabic, Farsi, Russian and Urdu.
- Use of native speaking teachers to teach the language courses and to give lectures to units ready to deploy abroad.
- Development of cultural awareness seminars with the help of anthropologists and sociologists that should teach military personnel about cultural aspects.
- Pre-deployment cultural training for the Special Forces teams being deployed in a foreign country and, if possible, continuation of the cultural training in the area of deployment with the help of local people.
- Use of military personnel returning from foreign theaters of war as guest speakers for the teams being deployed during the preparation period.
- Field training exercises with foreign partners from Hungary's areas of interest to develop relations based on trust, and to allow military personnel to experience cultural differences. This is especially important for the Special Forces, who have to work closely both with the indigenous forces and the population.

2. Selection of HUNSF Personnel

There is no perfect method of selection. The constantly changing international environment requires the reevaluation of selection criteria and changes to be made to them if needed. By assessing the candidates and selecting those who only have the necessary attributes and who can learn the required skills, the selection becomes the most important part of the training process of the HUNSF soldier. It is important to "weed-out" those who are not SF material as early on as possible. The purpose of the selection process is to select the future operators at an early stage of the training.

An important aspect of the Hungarian SF selection process is represented in Figure 8. Financial considerations make it necessary to analyze the difference between the high attrition approach and the elastic approach. Use of the economy of force concept in Hungary is necessary because SF training is resource intensive and because the HUNSF will likely want to spend the scarce resources on those personnel who will be deployable operators in the future. A lot of resources are unnecessarily spent when potential candidates in big numbers prove to be unsatisfactory SF material towards the end of the training process. This is why the personnel responsible for selection have a serious responsibility in selecting the right type of soldiers early on, as is shown by the high attrition approach. This means that the selection process will likely have a high attrition rate, but ensures that resources are spent on those candidates only who have the biggest potential.




Figure 8. Approaches of the Selection Process

The other important goal of the selection of the HUNSF is the maintenance of the standards and the selection of the right type of material. It is unacceptable to have personnel who are "not the right material" working in the HUNSF teams, because they can jeopardize the safety of the team as well as the mission. Yet what are these attributes? Who is "right" for Special Forces training?

The U.S. Special Forces selection and the U.S. attributes will have a strong influence on the selection and training of Hungarian Special Forces soldiers simply because the majority of the assistance in training is provided by the United States. Nevertheless, it is important not to copy the training and selection methods, but to analyze other SF units in order to determine the attributes of the "right type" of soldiers for the HUNSF and tailor it to the needs of Hungary and the capabilities of a Hungarian soldier. These attributes were reviewed in a recent study carried out by the U.S. Army Research Institute in collaboration with the Directorate of Training and Doctrine, U.S. Army JFK Special Warfare Center and School.¹⁴² The main goal of the study was to identify those attributes that may increase in importance in the future. The study emphasized, "SFAS provides a high level of the physical fitness attributes, a moderate level of assessment of the cognitive and personality attributes, and a low level of assessment of the communication attributes and the cultural adaptability attribute."¹⁴³ It was already pointed out that communication skills, interpersonal skills and cultural adaptability are key skills for an unconventional soldier. In future missions these skill sets are essential to successfully carry out the Hungarian SF tasks; therefore, these should be emphasized during the selection process. In the future, the HUNSF soldiers will require more specialized skills in culture-related functions and greater problem solving skills.

¹⁴² Dr. Michelle M. Zazanis, Dr. Robert N. Kilcullen, Dr. Michael G. Sanders and Doe Ann Litton, „The SF Pipeline Review: Voices from the field”, *Special Warfare*, (Spring 2000).

¹⁴³ Ibid, 6.

Based upon the above findings, the following guidelines should be kept during the Hungarian Special Forces selection process:

- Standards must be set and personnel attributes must be defined before any selection process starts. These standards have to be constant, thus enabling quality soldiers to enlist into the HUNSF.
- At any stage of the selection and training, unsuitable personnel should be sent for additional training or removed from the program. Resource restrictions should not prevail over quality of the Hungarian Special Forces soldier.
- The establishment of a training section within the HUNSF unit organization (responsible for the selection of the personnel) is absolutely necessary. These personnel should be "hand-picked" and the cadre should consist of the most experienced soldiers, preferably with SF training and operational experience. They should be responsible for maintaining the quality of the incoming soldiers.

3. The Hungarian Special Forces Training Process

Hungary will achieve full operational capability by the end of 2009, as was stated in the 2004 NATO Defense Planning Questionnaire (EG3520). This capability can only be obtained through a well-planned and meticulously carried out training program. The goal of this section is to provide a proposal for this training and to set the cornerstone of training requirements for the HUNSF.

The SF soldier is the cornerstone of the training. The quality of HUNSF soldiers is a mission enabler; therefore, it is important to elaborate on the personal traits the HUNSF soldier has to acquire in order to be in the Special Forces. There are three main areas which contribute to the training of a Hungarian Special Forces Soldier. The characteristics are represented in Figure 9. The three main areas of the characteristics are specialty training, mission-specific training, and deployment training. The identification of the abilities of the individual soldiers within these areas early on is essential, so he can be directed into the right skill sets that he has the most affinity to acquire.




Figure 9. Main Areas of Training of HUNSF Soldiers

The training program can be based on various elements. First of all, Hungarian national training programs can greatly contribute to the overall success. In fact HUNSF can only succeed if the training program of the Hungarian Special Forces unit will be incorporated into the various Hungarian training and exercise plans. On the other hand, several other areas are also available for cooperation. Some of these areas are represented in Figure 10. International training and joint exercises are important because Hungary has no experience in Special Forces training and orientation; therefore, this experience has to be acquired somewhere else. The United States has already offered valuable help in the field of training HUNSF soldiers, and Hungarian soldiers have already graduated from the SFQC at Ft. Bragg. Some other neighboring countries are also developing similar capabilities, and it is salient to cooperate with them on the area of training. Finally, national and international exercises can help in exchanging ideas and further developing the various skills of the HUNSF soldiers.




Figure 10. Possible Areas of Training Cooperation

Taking into account the selection and training processes, this thesis proposes a five -phase training cycle for HUNSF. The five phases are represented in Figure 11 and explained in detail below. The training process is divided into three main parts.

The first part – selection and basic training - starts with the selection of the candidates and finishes at the end of Phase Two, when the HUNSF soldier is "badged" and sent for follow-up training. This section mainly concentrates on the selection of the right type of personnel and on bestowing on them the basic SF skills in order to bring up all soldiers to the same level.

The second major part – Special Forces main training - includes Phases Three and Four. In this part, the majority of the HUNSF training commences. Soldiers acquire their specialties and they are trained in various deployment methods, such as escape and evasion, as well as interrogation techniques. The other and, perhaps, the lengthiest

segment of the training process is also conducted in this part. This is the cultural orientation phase. During this phase soldiers receive cultural lessons and improve their linguistic and interpersonal skills in order to be able to communicate in a foreign environment. At the end of this part, HUNSF soldiers are ready to be deployed.

The training of a Special Forces soldier never stops. Therefore it is important to introduce a third part - Special Forces further education and training - into their training cycle, where the HUNSF soldiers can acquire additional skills and refresh their knowledge.




Figure 11. Proposed HUNSF Training Cycle

The following is a detailed description of each phase, thus answering the third question of this thesis. The above proposed training process is a framework for future discussion and incorporates all training related suggestions of this thesis.

a. Phase One – Selection

The goal of selection is to select individuals potentially capable of participating in further SF training. Selection should be a five week process where soldiers improve their physical fitness, land navigation and basic soldiering skills, as well as participate in a set of live firing exercises.

b. Phase Two – HUSOF Basic Training

The goal of Phase Two is to bring all individual candidates up to the same skill and qualification level as well as to select the right individuals for the most suitable positions. During HUNSF basic training candidates should receive a series of training instructions in the various deployment methods, HUNSF task-related training, and specialty training. The goal of these instructions is to evaluate the candidates in their ability to acquire the various skills. Through the evaluation of each individual's abilities, suggestions can be made at the end of Phase One for which areas or skills each candidate possesses an affinity.

c. Phase Three – HUSOF Main Training

The goal of Phase Two training is to train individuals in their selected fields of expertise in order to obtain the required SF skills and be an effective component of the operational teams. By contrast, Phase Three should be subdivided into three sub-phases. Deployment training has the purpose to train HUNSF soldiers in their main deployment methods and is comprised of parachute training, waterborne training, mountain training and vehicle borne deployment techniques. Specialty training can be different in length and trains soldiers in the field of their expertise. Signals, medics, engineers and weapons specialists are trained during this sub-phase. During collateral training HUNSF soldiers should prepare for their tasks. Task-specific training should include preparation for DA, SR, CBT, and UW related training.

d. Phase Four – HUNSF Further Education and Training

Phase Four also consist of two sub-phases. In the survival sub-phase, HUNSF soldiers are trained for survival, escape and evasion, and resistance for interrogation. During the cultural sub-phase they get acquainted with the designated cultural areas (Europe, Middle-East and North-Africa) in order to improve their linguistic and interpersonal skills, thus enabling them to communicate in a foreign environment.

e. Phase Five – Cultural Training and Survival Training

Phase Five tasks are not described in more detail here, because they can be dependent on the actual training of each team at a given timeframe, and several factors can influence what the commander intends to train them for during this phase.

4. Education

Beyond training, professional military education at all ranks is vitally important to the continued success of the HUNSF. Therefore, a Hungarian Special Forces education plan should be created which focuses on the development of the Special Forces soldiers and leaders at every level, and on their continued improvement through a broad array of intellectual engagement and research initiatives. On the other hand, education is not only necessary for Special Forces personnel, but key personnel of the GPF also have to be educated in order to facilitate cooperation with Special Forces personnel in joint operations in the future. The civilian key decision makers also need to have an understanding of the capabilities of Special Forces and the limitations of their capabilities as well. The public perception is another important aspect of education. Influencing positive attitudes towards Special Forces without generating too much media attention, therefore, works toward building a successful Special Forces capability for the Hungarian Defense Forces. In this section of the thesis, only the issues related to the military education of Special Forces and GPF personnel will be discussed.

The Hungarian Defense Forces will never be able to actively participate in the cultural battle overseas if the government, schools, and other supporting organizations do not first tear down their own cultural walls. Interestingly enough, although the Hungarian soldiers deployed in conflict areas are fighting in low-intensity conflicts and given the preponderance and frequency of small wars versus large wars in the contemporary world, the Hungarian military educational system remains configured to deal with conventional wars rather than the much more common people's war, or the kinds of struggles Hungary is engaged in today in Afghanistan, Iraq, and for the foreseeable future. It is vital to build a better understanding of insurgencies and foreign cultures when dealing with the complex situations of contemporary low-intensity conflicts. Soldiers no longer need to be trained just to kill, but rather have to be given some of the tools needed by warrior-

diplomats whose individual actions can have far-reaching consequences not only on local and regional outcomes, but also on the world stage.

Irregular warfare needs to be taught throughout the officer and NCO professional military education system with a special emphasis on the education of Special Forces personnel. Each level of instruction should be tailored to the level of understanding about insurgencies needed at the soldier's specific level of responsibility. At these officer and NCO basic courses, the focus should be on the tactical level, for it is the young lieutenants and junior NCOs who will combat the insurgents face-to-face in the field. As an example, reading Mao Tse-Tung's *On Guerrilla Warfare* and other texts from Sun Tzu, Che Guevarra, and Carlos Marighella should be mandatory. In addition, new or recurrent tactics, techniques, and procedures currently used by the insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan should also be taught and discussed in great detail.

At the operational level courses, a program of instruction covering irregular warfare should examine what such struggles have meant in operational terms for governments and guerrillas. There should be a focus on how armed, intra-state struggles are actually carried out, to include how they begin, evolve, and end, and why they succeed or fail. The case studies of Malaya and Vietnam present excellent examples. The interactive nature of the insurgent and counterinsurgent campaigns should especially be stressed. This level of instruction further builds upon lessons taught in the basic courses. While the basic courses mainly focus on tactical level considerations at the team, squad, and platoon levels, the operational level courses should build on these previous teachings and incorporate field and combat lessons learned. The focus should be on the tactical aspects of the platoon and company as well as battalion operational considerations, for senior NCO's, captains and majors will play pivotal roles as platoon and company leaders, as well as battalion staff officers.

As for the strategic level courses for field grade officers at the National Defense University and for sergeant majors at the Sergeant Majors Academy, material should be assigned that will help them to develop an analytical framework by which to understand the origins and dynamics of organized insurgent conflict. Special attention should be paid to a critical examination of the prevailing theories of social rebellion in order to derive a

general theory of internal war that helps account for the social, political, and organizational dimensions of the struggle between political movements, non-state actors, and incumbent regimes. Once again, this instruction would build upon previous courses and should also incorporate current lessons learned at the strategic level.

Additionally, understanding how to identify local social structures would be extremely beneficial to understanding conflicts from new and different angles. Anthropology offers a way to study warfare and large-scale ethnic conflicts as seen from the perspective of the participants. Cultural awareness is extremely beneficial in three ways, as it fosters better international relations, provides views from different perspectives, and can greatly assist in knowing one's enemy. Consequently, understanding other cultures is critical in the development of an adequate irregular warfare war plan, whether at the tactical, operational, or strategic levels.

In addition to officer and NCO education, recently enlisted Special Forces soldiers should also receive instruction on understanding other cultures. Soldiers could be taught that what are completely acceptable norms of behavior back home can cause extreme discord in the Balkans region or in Mosul, Iraq. In the age of information warfare especially, one private's actions in front of the camera can now have strategic consequences.

In addition to school house instruction, Special Forces contact teams who have expertise in particular world regions should also be formed. These teams would periodically visit units to keep them abreast of and current on overseas affairs and, more importantly, visit units prior to a deployment to conduct cultural awareness training for the specific region of deployment. In addition, the contact team should re-visit the unit prior to the unit's redeployment to collect and gather information to strengthen the contact team's knowledge, pass on that information to other units (especially the next unit scheduled to rotate in), and share the information with the schoolhouses for possible updates to learning objectives and syllabi.

F. CHAPTER SUMMARY

A rapidly changing world deals ruthlessly with organizations that do not change.¹⁴⁴ The task of the SF community in Hungary is not only to develop a capable force, but to anticipate the future transnational and asymmetric threats and modify the HUNSF values, requirements and training accordingly in order to prepare for those threats.

Lessons learned from recent conflicts where Special Forces were extensively used (mainly Iraq and Afghanistan) calls for placing a special emphasis on training. The type of warfare being conducted in these theatres illustrates the need for SF leaders and soldiers who must adapt if they are to succeed. Particularly in Iraq's case, it can be concluded that additional emphasis should be placed on training for urban warfare skills.

Recent SF experiences with indigenous forces in Afghanistan and Iraq have validated the UW tactics and techniques as well. Cross-cultural, verbal and nonverbal communication skills, conflict resolution techniques and negotiation skills are critical to the future Hungarian Special Forces soldier who must establish and develop rapport with his foreign national counterparts, or operate as part of a multinational joint Special Forces Task Group. Many experts argue that the very essence of SF is UW and fighting with, by and through the indigenous population; therefore, cultural training and preparation together with language skills have to be cornerstone of the Hungarian Special Forces training process.

It is also important to emphasize that the training process produces an entry-level soldier. Institutional learning forms only the foundation upon which other professional experiences will be constructed. During the training process an individual can learn basic theory and simple application of skills, but on-the-job training is the ultimate test to one's suitability, and operations are the best situations to acquire seasoned and experienced Special Forces personnel.

¹⁴⁴ Peter J. Schoomaker, US Special Operations Forces: The Way Ahead, *Special Warfare*, (Winter, 1998), 7.

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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS

A. CONCLUSIONS

Taking into consideration that by 2009 the entire SF unit and other elements that belong to the Hungarian Special Forces capability are to be operationally ready, the purpose of this thesis was to introduce a conceptual framework for a successful development of the Hungarian Special Forces capability by adopting a problem-solution-concept method.

1. Problem: Changing Security Environment

Recent historical examples have shown that warfare has shifted from an Industrial Age focus on the enemy's armed forces to an Information Age focus on perceptions of the enemy's political decision makers. The new asymmetric threats (primarily terrorists, insurgents and rogue states) are concentrating on the fundamental precept that superior political will, when properly employed, can defeat a greater economic and military power, and such threats will use unconventional methods to achieve their goals. The greatest threat any democratic state has to face today is not only aggression from another state, but also a networked international terrorist organization supported by a rogue state and in possession of weapons of mass destruction.

The objectives of future threats are different. Asymmetric enemies will not attempt to win by defeating the enemy's military forces. Instead, via the networks, they directly attack the minds of enemy decision makers. Their ultimate objective is to destroy the enemy's political will, and the intermediate objectives are all milestones in shifting the opinion of the various target audiences.

Asymmetric opponents do not focus on swift battlefield victories. These conflicts will be lengthy. They focus on a long-term strategic approach. Asymmetric attacks are coordinated across the spectrum of human activity: political, military, economic and social. The military forces of developed democratic countries have no primary role in fighting the asymmetric threat; nevertheless, the military still plays an important part in the integrated effort in countering these challenges. In order to be capable of effectively coping with the future security challenges, the HDF have to develop new capabilities,

and, equally important some parts of the HDF have to be able to think differently because the unconventional battlefield requires a different mindset from military leaders and soldiers. In Hungary, part of the solution is to develop an unconventional warfighting capability, which means that soldiers at all command levels have to be able to understand the rules of unconventional warfare.

2. Solution: UW within the HDF

Analyzing the current employment of the HDF and the future security challenges, it is likely that Hungary will be involved mainly in asymmetric regional conflicts in the near future. It can be concluded that the Hungarian Defense Forces will most likely need to have an unconventional warfare capability that supplements the current conventional capabilities in order to effectively cope with asymmetric enemies in conflict zones and engage the opposing forces in low intensity conflicts.

It has to be understood, though, that for the most part UW is devoid of simple solutions and clear victories. Nor it is usually rapid. This means a willingness to accept lengthy commitments and incremental progress. It is also important to emphasize that UW, if correctly carried out by specially trained units, builds a unique intelligence capability and serves as a force multiplier in low intensity conflicts, therefore; UW should be incorporated as one of the salient tasks of the HDF.

Analyzing the current trends and development of the Hungarian GPF it is obvious that in the near future, conventional forces will better themselves and their TTPs in order to be able to react more effectively to new asymmetric security challenges. The Hungarian GPF will inevitably lean towards improving direct action, special reconnaissance and counterterrorism-related capabilities if they want to succeed against new evolving threats. With massive firepower, precision guided weapons, effective small unit tactics, and improved intelligence skills, the Hungarian GPF can achieve agility, speed and precision. The one thing they will not be able to master is unconventional warfare capability, because it requires different training and a completely different mindset from the soldiers as well.

3. How to Organize: HUNSF is the Most Capable to Acquire the UW Capability.

Unconventional warfare is the most important arena in which the uniqueness of HUNSF can best be exploited. From a Special Forces point of view, the goal of UW should be to help win a war by working with, as opposed to neutralizing or fighting around local populations. UW represents a classically indirect and ultimately local approach to waging warfare, and the most successful fighting method against networked asymmetric enemies.

Carrying out complex missions requires important organizational changes. The conclusions that come out of this thesis indicate that in the future, HUNSF should develop into a centralized and joint SF service with a flat hierarchy and organic intelligence assets. By adopting this flexible organizational configuration and acquiring proficiency in the fields related to its missions, HUNSF will be able to conduct special operations, both independently representing the interests of Hungary and (during deployments) with Allied forces in combined scenarios as well.

Special Forces are by design best suited to carry out unconventional tasks; therefore, unconventional warfare should be the primary task of HUNSF and the requirements associated with UW should be incorporated into the selection and training of HUNSF soldiers as well.

B. SUGGESTIONS

It is understood that defense resources are scarce and with the current ongoing force reductions within the HDF, the idea of developing new capabilities raises a lot of concern. The problem quoted below tightly resembles the present situation in the Hungarian Defense Forces:

Deep force reductions are in progress. It may be difficult to maintain the remainder at present high standards, because planned results from austere defense budgets could prove overly optimistic unless a major crisis reverses current trends. The Department of Defense (DoD) more than ever needs to extract maximum value from every dollar.¹⁴⁵

¹⁴⁵ John M. Collins, *Special Operations Forces: An Assessment 1986-1993*, (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, July 30, 1993), 1. (emphasis added)

Therefore, planners should extract the maximum value of the money spent on new capabilities. In fact, the argument suggests that the development of the Hungarian Special Forces is an optimal investment in the current situation for multiple reasons. The strategic utility of the Hungarian Special Forces is manifold:

- Economy of force – The Hungarian Special Forces, when employed correctly, can achieve significant results with limited forces. Special Forces have historically acted as force multipliers for conventional forces by preparing the battlefield for conventional operations. Special Forces are trained to facilitate working by, with and through the local population. This operating method results in increased military effectiveness. Accelerating the pace of military success can also be achieved by special operations. In conflicts of all kinds, the Hungarian Special Forces can conduct operations at a fraction of the cost of conventional forces and deliver an asymmetric return on investment. Therefore, Special Forces can offer a low cost solution to precisely targeted problems.
- Expansion of choice – The Hungarian Special Forces can expand the options available to political and military leaders. Policy requires a means of implementation. In peacetime the Hungarian Special Forces provide policy makers with a unique tool to support political goals. In wartime the Hungarian Special Forces increase the choices available to military commanders. Special Forces can be used in the conventional sense, but they are really effective on the unconventional battlefield (according to the hypothesis of the thesis HUNSF with a UW capability would be the only asset specifically tailored and designed to fight against asymmetric opponents). In times of both war and peace, whether operating independently or in support of a larger operation, the Hungarian Special Forces enhance the flexibility with which force can be applied.
- Broad range of tasks - The Hungarian Special Forces can perform a broad range of tasks; therefore, HDF military leaders have an increased number of flexible options they can choose from in any conflict situation. Some of the identified HUNSF tasks are solely performed by the HUNSF unit, and these tasks are designed to cover previously identified capability gaps within the HDF. Other HUNSF tasks contribute to the already existing capabilities of the HDF and are closely related to improving mission readiness of the overall force, meeting future security challenges and defending the sovereignty of Hungary.
- In peacetime the HDF can still gain much from the establishment of the Hungarian Special Forces. HUNSF soldiers can provide special expert training packages (close quarter battle, sniper training, survival training, etc.) to other units of the HDF. For officers serving in the Hungarian Special Forces on a tour - i.e. they serve for a specified time and then return to their parent units – expert training conducted by HUNSF soldiers within the HDF will positively contribute to the overall professionalism of

the HDF. HUNSF can serve educational purposes as well and help in the development of an “unconventional mindset” at all command levels.

- The Hungarian Special Forces unit will be an important contributor to intelligence gathering in all operational scenarios. Based upon the tasks of the HUNSF unit, one can easily recognize that the Hungarian Special Forces has important strategic informational value. Another salient contribution of the HUNSF in future warfare can be the cultural knowledge of the theatre. Cultural awareness of military personnel and linguistic capabilities of soldiers will play an important part in resolving future conflicts.
- The Hungarian Special Forces is specially designed to operate in a multinational environment. The HUNSF unit can, therefore, be integrated seamlessly with similar NATO units and can be deployed in support of military initiatives of the European Union.
- The Hungarian Special Forces is a high readiness reaction force that can be deployed in a short notice within the described AORs. No special training is required before the deployment of these soldiers; they are readily available for a broad range of tasks.

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